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Abstract
The aim of this thesis was to examine aspects of conceptual and non-inferential role-taking that 
are intact or limited in individuals with autism. More specifically, this thesis examined the ability 
to adopt different psychological perspectives, based on the hypothesis that basic non-inferential 
role-taking processes, related to the way we identify with the attitudes and feelings of other 
people, are relatively lacking in individuals with autism. Such processes might be important for 
the understanding of different perspectives in other people.
The series of studies presented in this thesis investigated role-taking in individuals with autism, 
relative to chronological and verbal mental age matched groups of participants without autism. 
The studies focused on three main areas of research: narrative role-taking, deictic understanding, 
and interpersonal non-verbal communication. In the first study, participants were asked to tell 
stories from the point of view of different characters. In the second study, a set of tasks examined 
production and comprehension of verbal and non-verbal deictic expressions. The third study 
examined the processes o f  interpersonal engagement and role-taking, by focusing on the non­
verbal communication exchanged between two people in the context of a one-to-one interaction.
The results from the studies provide evidence suggesting that individuals with autism show 
aspects of role-taking ability that are both limited and intact, which may be better explained by an 
impairment in interpersonal, and non-inferential role-taking, than by cognitive, and conceptual, 
limitations.
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CHAPTER ONE
The nature of social role-taking
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1.1 Introduction
Role-taking is about being able to stand in the other person’s shoes, and have a sense of what that 
person sees, thinks and feels. More precisely, is the ability to differentiate the perspectives and 
attitudes of ourselves and others. This ability unfolds during the first years of life and provides 
the child with the necessary concepts to think about the thoughts and feelings of other people. 
This is conceptual role-taking. On the other hand, the appreciation of the subjective orientation of 
another person (i.e. the intersubjective ‘feel’ of the internal perspective of another person) has 
been suggested to be another form of role-taking, which is non-inferential in nature. It is non- 
inferential, because it is not reasoned as it were, but felt. Such non-inferential role-taking is 
embedded i n e arly p attems o f  c o-ordinated i nteraction b etween i nfant and caregiver, whereby 
infants are pulled into the psychological stance and attitudes of the adult through feelings. Such 
mutual coordination is a reflection of the impact of interpersonal connectedness on both child and 
adult. The present thesis explores the view that this subjective experience of other people’s 
feeling and attitudes through interpersonal engagement is the basis of the child’s understanding of 
self and other. The approach to be taken is an investigation of early childhood autism.
Autism is a condition beginning very early in life, and initially described as a ‘disorder of 
affective contact’ (Kanner, 1943, P.250), in which the capacity for interpersonal relations and 
emotional connectedness with others is impaired. Children with autism suffer from a profound 
lack of interpersonal relatedness, one that may have important developmental links to their 
difficulties with psychological perspective-taking. The purpose of the present thesis is to examine 
the capacity for several aspects of role-taking among children with autism (relative to children 
without autism) in order to explore the significance of affective and interpersonal contact for the 
ability to differentiate and move between psychological perspectives. The limitations in role-
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taking of children with autism will be examined by focusing on three main areas of research: a) 
narrative role-taking, b) deictic understanding, and c) interpersonal non-verbal communication.
1.2 The definition of role-taking
Role-taking is broadly defined as the ability to differentiate between different individuals’ 
psychological perspectives. We can make a distinction between interpersonal and cognitive 
aspects of this ability. On the one hand, role-taking has been considered to reflect cognitive 
processes that allow us to think using concepts or representations of the mental states or 
psychological perspectives of others, referred to as conceptual role-taking. On the other hand, 
there are aspects o f  role-taking that are more experiential, and involve an appreciation of the 
feelings and attitudes of others through personal or intersubjective contact, referred to as non- 
inferential role-taking.
Although it is controversial to consider the earliest forms of interpersonal engagement between a 
caregiver and an infant as expressions of ‘role-taking’, I shall re-examine this area of study from 
the point of view of role-taking in order to highlight possible continuities between early person- 
to-person relations and later, more explicit, forms of perspective-taking.
1.2.1- Non-inferential Role-taking
Perceiving the psychological perspectives of other persons is not necessarily inferential. We not 
only think about the mental lives of others, we can ‘feel’ them. For example, we feel moved by 
the attitudes of others, as when encountering someone who is hurt or afraid. This process involves
12
moving into and adopting the emotional or subjective perspective of another person, and 
experiencing that perspective oneself. Arguably, this non-inferential form of role-taking, perhaps 
the earliest and most basic form of role-taking (Hobson, 2002), is present from the earliest 
months where baby and caregiver engage in co-ordinated affective exchanges. This has been 
suggested to be an early form of role-taking, which is non-inferential and emotionally regulated. 
Trevarthen (1979) used the phrase primary intersubjectivity to describe this emotional dance that 
takes place between infant and caregiver in the earliest months of life, whereby each partner is— 
in a sense—moved by the other during one-to-one interactions. This can be likened to a dance in 
that babies and their caregivers respond to one another in a co-ordinated and attuned manner. 
Infant-caregiver dyads respond positively to and seek to achieve synchrony. As early as ten 
weeks o f  age, infants are responsive to  emotional expressions in their mothers (Haviland and 
Lelwica, 1987). When mothers show joy in their expressions, their babies tend to show increased 
joy. And the same happens with other emotional expressions such as sadness or anger. Infants 
begin 1 ife w ith a p ropensity t o s electively a ttend to p  eople, a nd a re m oved b y o thers through 
reciprocal regulation of affective exchange. This same co-regulation of affective engagement with 
others appears to underlie much of interpersonal contact throughout life. Within social play, for 
example, between the ages of three and nine months infants and caregivers participate in a 
process of affective matching with bi-directional influence in which each partner responds to  
changes in the other (Tronick et al. 1982.).
In an innovative study of this process, Murray and Trevarthen (1985) examined the responses of 
three-month-old infants engaged in a face-to-face interaction with their mothers, when their 
mothers either became unresponsive toward their infants or their responses appeared 
desynchronised with the child’s responses. In one experiment, the authors examined ‘ normal’ 
face-to-face interactions, where mothers were simply instructed to engage (‘chat’) with their 
babies normally for a brief period of time. Then an interruption was imposed, where an
13
experimenter asked the mother some questions in order to create a ‘naturalistic’ break between 
mother and baby. Following this ‘interruption’ period, mothers resumed contact with their 
infants. Then, mothers were instructed to assume a still-face and become unresponsive to, while 
continuing to look at, their infants for 45 seconds. This blank-face period was followed by a final 
phase of normal interaction. The authors found that, preceding the interruptions, babies engaged 
in positive interactions with their mothers, characterised by frequent smiles and wide open 
shaping of the mouth that are typical to find in infants during infant-caregiver interaction 
(Brazelton et al. 1974; Stem, 1974; Trevarthen, 1979; Trevarthen et a l 1981) and engaged in long 
sustained and continuous looks. Although attention to their mothers decreased during the 
naturalistic interruption, babies did not become withdrawn or distressed. A very different pattern, 
however, emerged during the still or blank face phase of this procedure. Almost immediately, 
infants became markedly distressed, displayed fleeting glances, and then withdrew. In a second 
experiment, infants and mothers were placed in separate rooms and interacted with each other 
through closed circuit television monitors. Initially, mother and infant engaged in a live sequence 
characterised by normal interaction. After 30 seconds, however, the tape was rewound and infants 
observed a replay version of their mothers, completely uncoordinated from their current 
behaviour. It turned out that, as in the still-face procedure described above, infants who had been 
content in the live interaction via television monitor were noticeably distressed by the replay. 
They turned away from their mothers and showed shorter, fleeting glances. Murray and 
Trevarthen (1985) concluded that through an “emotional mechanism that regulates interpersonal 
contacts and relationships from the early weeks o f life” (p. 195), young infants are sensitively 
attuned to "the immediate affective quality o f maternal behaviour” (p. 191).
Following the first few months of life, infants begin to increasingly attend to objects in the world, 
outside of the dyadic interaction with their caregivers (Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978). Then from 
around 6 months, when infants begin to follow the gaze and head turn of an adult (Scaife and
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Bruner, 1975), we can begin to see relations that are more clearly related to role-taking, in that the 
child’s orientation appears to be affected by the orientation of someone else. This new phase of 
secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen and Hubley,1978), involves the coordination and sharing 
of infant-caregiver understanding about objects and events.
Around 9 months, infants move from sharing affect in face-to-face exchange to show a capacity 
for sharing subjective states regarding objects and events in the world. For example, they begin to 
engage in social referencing, whereby they look to caregivers for emotional cues to guide their 
reactions to events in the world. In one experiment, 12-month-old infants were placed on a visual 
cliff -created by a glass surface connecting two tables giving the appearance of a drop-off- while 
their mother was standing on the other side of the cliff (Sorce et al. 1985). The infants looked to 
the mother’s face immediately after they noticed the drop-off of the cliff. The majority of infants 
(14 out of 19 who were met with a happy face) proceeded forward if their mother displayed a 
happy expression, but refused to cross to the other side if she displayed a fearful expression (not 
one of the 17 children who were met with a fearful face, crossed over the cliff). Social 
referencing illustrates how infants incorporate the attitudes of others to regulate their own 
behaviour, a process which is regulated by a non-inferential form of role-taking.
Not only do infants engage in social referencing, as described above, but they participate in 
interpersonal interchanges with another person concerning the world around them. One important 
aspect of secondary intersubjectivity is joint attention, a process through which the infant 
coordinates attention with others toward the world, either by following into or directing the 
attention of others. Infants not only observe and follow into the attentional focus of others, they 
also engage in showing, pointing, and alternation of gaze for purposes of co-ordinating attention 
and sharing experiences (Bates, 1979). Both partners have a mutual awareness about the
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psychological orientation of the other, and communicate with each other about the world through 
the coordination of attitudes.
Another example of the child’s initial ‘awareness’ of the psychological perspectives of other 
people is evident in new forms of play between infant and adult. Games like peek-a-boo or rolling 
a ball back and forth, enable the child to switch roles. With these kinds of interactions the infant 
learns that the exchange is reciprocal and that he/she can either be the one taking the lead or 
following. Through playing games, the child " is identifying with the adult by doing the kind o f  
thing that she has observed the adult do in relation to herself’ (Hobson, 2002, p.74). Thus, 
perhaps through forms of non-inferential role-taking, the child is pulled into the subjective 
perspective of another person, where the adult’s attitude becomes the child’s own attitude in both 
primary and secondary intersubjectivity.
1.2.2- Conceptual Role-taking
The conceptual view on role-taking focuses upon the fact that humans develop a cognitive ability 
to think about what another person might be seeing, thinking, or believing. This view can be 
traced back to Piaget’s theory of cognitive development. According to Piaget (Piaget, 1926), 
young children spend the first several years of life unable to appreciate the difference between 
their own and another’s perspective. One of the main characteristics of preoperational thought is 
egocentrism, or the inability to see a situation from an alternative viewpoint. Piaget demonstrated 
egocentric thinking with his classic ‘Three-Mountains-Problem’ in which a child, seated across 
from an examiner with three differently coloured and designed mountains in between, is unable to 
distinguish between what he/she and the examiner might see, and instead selects a photo (or gives 
a description) corresponding to his own viewpoint, regardless of whose viewpoint he has been 
asked to describe. Unaware of the differing perspectives of other people, Piaget supposed, the
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preschool age child is constrained to one aspect, or view, of a situation at a time. Concurrently, 
the preschool child also fails class inclusion problems and conservation tasks due to the inability 
to decentre, or to consider more than one aspect of the perceptual field at a time.
Piaget described concrete operational thought as the new quality of mind that emerges in middle 
childhood in which thinking becomes ‘two-sided’ and the child is able to simultaneously consider 
and coordinate multiple viewpoints on a given situation. This leap in cognitive ability, the 
progression to concrete operational thinking, allows the child to understand and comprehend how 
others see things. The development of the capacity for perspective-taking as outlined by Piaget 
was largely impersonal, as it focused more on the relationship between subject and object than on 
the relationship between persons.
This conceptual role-taking account was further developed by Flavell (1974) who—like Piaget— 
gave a largely impersonal account of how children come to understand alternative orientations to 
the world. Using both pre-existing knowledge of how people behave in various situations and the 
perception of certain attributes in others, the child gathers information about the internal 
perspectives of other people. Flavell (1974) described a developmental sequence through which 
this skill emerges. At the first level, the young child learns about differing visual perspectives. At 
this stage, the child can describe which object a person sees, but not their particular view of the 
object. For example, even a two-year-old child appreciates that someone who is blindfolded or 
not looking will be unable to see an object (Lempers et a l 1977). The second level brings with it 
an ability to comprehend and appreciate multiple perspectives on the same object. Depending on 
the orientation, different people can see the same object differently. At the final level, which does 
not occur before age eight, the child is able to represent the apparent size and shape of the objects 
as seen by others. In other words, the development of perspective-taking ability culminates in the 
ability to represent another’s visual perspective.
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Such an account is heavily focused on the child’s developing ability to appreciate differing visual 
perspectives. However, role-taking involves more than the capacity to represent the perceptual 
experience of another person. As Shantz (1975) suggested, the ability to judge what another 
person might see is a very different matter from the capacity to pick up on their possible thoughts, 
feelings, or intentions. Indeed, the ability to comprehend and even represent differing visual 
viewpoints may be present well before concrete operational thought and appears to be relatively 
intact among children with autism (Hobson, 1983; Baron-Cohen, 1989). Beyond simply judging 
what another person can see, role-taking also involves the ability to appreciate what others might 
think, feel, intend, or desire. The ability to attribute beliefs, desires, or intentions to oneself and 
others, referred to as ‘theory of mind’, allows human beings to make sense of and predict the 
behaviour of others by virtue of inferences about their mental states. For example, while leaving 
the house you might have observed your friend absentmindedly pick up her library card and place 
it into her pocket. When, upon entering the bus, she retrieves the library card and begins to show 
it to the driver, it becomes evident to you that she thinks she has retrieved her travel card (not the 
library card in her hand) and will soon be surprised to hear that she is expected to pay for this bus 
ride. This form of conceptual role-taking allows us to make sense of situations like this, with 
representations of other people (and their behaviour) in terms of their beliefs, desires, intentions, 
and emotions.
The concept of ‘theory of mind’ was introduced by Premack and Woodruff (1978), who 
suggested that an adult female chimpanzee, Sarah, was able to impute mental states to a human 
actor. Reportedly, Sarah was able to make sense of the actor’s behaviour by inferring intentions. 
Initially, research on the theory of mind concept focused on when children come to understand 
false belief, a belief that does not correspond to reality. For example, an early study of false belief 
reported by Wimmer and Pemer (1983) presented 3- and 4-year-old children with a doll (Maxi)
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who put some chocolate into a green cupboard and then went to the playground. While he was 
away, Maxi's mother (another doll) used the chocolate for baking a cake, and then put it into the 
blue cupboard. When asked where Maxi would look for the chocolate when he returned from the 
playground, hungry for a snack, 3-year-old children maintained that he would look in the blue 
cupboard (where the chocolate really was) rather than the green cupboard (where he had last seen 
it and ought to have expected it to be), whereas the majority of 4-year-old children responded that 
Maxi would look in the green cupboard. A number of studies indicate the onset of the ability to 
pass such false-belief tasks at around the age of four (Wimmer and Pemer, 1983; Pemer et a l 
1987; Hogrefe et a l 1986), but others have explored how toddlers show some knowledge of the 
wishes and desires of others, for example knowing that finding an attractive object would make a 
doll feel happy, but finding nothing would leave the doll feeling sad (Wellman, 1990). There are 
also investigations that suggest early forms of such understanding, especially in relation to 
intentions, even before toddlerhood (e.g. Meltzoff, 1993). Very young children, therefore, appear 
to understand people as having psychological orientations to the world (including intentions) 
early in life, and are able to talk about the mental states and feelings of other people, even when 
they are contradictory to their own, or to the actual state of affairs. Conceptual role-taking is but 
one expression of young children’ skills in these domains.
1.3 Theories about the development of role-taking
Both non-inferential and conceptual role-taking overlap and interact with each other. Two main 
theories have tried to explain the developmental pathway of both non-inferential and conceptual 
role-taking, and their impact on the development of the child’s understanding of other minds and 
perspectives. These theories are the ‘interpersonal’ theory, and the ‘theory of mind’ theory.
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1.3.1- The Interpersonal Theory
An interpersonal theory of the child’s understanding or grasp of alternative viewpoints for 
considering the world holds that what begins between people becomes internalised into the 
child’s thinking. Vygotsky (1979) suggested that development proceeds through dialectical 
engagement in a social context, so that the child’s sense of self begins through relations with 
others. By relating to (and through) other people’s ways of relating to the world, it is suggested, 
the child comes to appreciate that the world can be viewed from different attitudes and 
perspectives, that seeing is really ‘seeing as’ (Hobson, 1990). The child internalises this process 
to his/her own thinking and is able to move between numerous ways of ‘seeing as’ in relation to 
the world, along with the developing capacity to pretend and to adopt multiple orientations on the 
world. Along these lines, as Mead (Mead, 1934) claimed, we become self aware through 
internalising the attitudes of others towards ourselves.
These views hold that our understanding of self and other evolves through interaction with others. 
Whereas the theory of mind theories consider the child’s development in representational 
thinking to be the primary factor that gives rise to the child’s social understanding and self-other 
awareness, interpersonal theories consider the child’s social relatedness, relating to other persons 
with differing subjective orientations toward the self and world, to  be the primary factor that 
drives this development. Along these lines, Hobson (2002) wrote the following:
"Thinking arises out o f  repeated experiences o f ‘moving’ from one psychological stance to 
another in relation to things and events. Critically important is the kind o f mental movement 
involved. It is not enough that the baby shifts perspectives by herself. In order to grasp that she 
can move in her attitudes to the world, the movements need to happen ‘through someone else’. ’’ 
(p.105).
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Infants begin their lives involved in social interactions that entail an interchange of feelings and 
attitudes with others. Feelings of social connectedness are one of the outcomes of such 
interchanges. According to Hobson, the infant is repeatedly moved by other people’s feelings and 
attitudes, and then experiences those movements in her self. It is through repeated movements to 
the other person’s perspective and orientation that the infant becomes gradually aware of her own 
and other perspectives. The process underlying such movements is the mechanism of 
identification.
The term identification refers to the way in which we not only perceive but also respond to and 
adopt the subjective orientations of others. In other words, we become temporarily anchored in 
the stance o f  someone else, while maintaining our own psychological stance (Hobson & Lee, 
1999). To identify with other people is to experience and even adopt aspects of their attitude and 
feelings. This process of identification not only changes the infant’s actions, it also shapes the 
infant’s subjective experience of the world. Hobson puts forth the claim that primary 
intersubjectivity (i.e. person-person interaction) is the basis for secondary intersubjectivity 
(person-person-world interaction), and that identification provides the vehicle through which 
these processes are possible. He gives particular emphasis to person-person-world interactions to 
explain how the child adopts and assumes different perspectives, and exemplifies this process 
with a diagram, the relatedness triangle (See Figure 1.1).
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Figure 1.1 Hobson’s relatedness triangle (2002)
Returning to the visual cliff example (Sorce et al. 1985), described earlier, we can re-examine 
social referencing through the lens of the relatedness triangle. First, the child is presented with an 
ambiguous and potentially threatening situation, the visual cliff, and does not know what to do. 
Feeling uncertain, he looks to his mother to determine her affective orientation toward this 
puzzling situation. His mother (as instructed by the experimenters) displays an attitude in relation 
to the cliff (e.g. a happy and encouraging expression), which is immediately not only perceived 
but also adopted by her infant. The double arrow shows the child’s appreciation of his mother’s 
attitude. In this way, the infant relates to his mother’s way of relating to the cliff and feeling 
courageous, decides to cross over the cliff. Experiencing his mother’s attitude, and adopting it as 
his own, has modified the child’s way of relating to the world. His mother’s attitude toward an 
object has become his own. However, the child needs to experience repeated movements of this 
kind before he/she can shift between multiple psychological viewpoints simultaneously on his 
own. The curve and dotted arrow of Hobson’s relatedness triangle does not take place until the 
child has gradually assumed the attitude of another person as an attitude from outside him/herself. 
Thus, the child begins developing a sense of separateness between his/her own perspective and
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the perspective of another person, which does not involve thinking and is non-inferential in 
nature. The child’s awareness of different perspectives will become gradually integrated into the 
child’s thinking when the child evolves the concepts to understand and talk about other minds. In 
Hobson’s view, the developing of a theory of mind is based on this non-inferential role-taking. 
Identification is the process that pulls the child into the perspectives of other people, and it is the 
process underlying non-inferential role-taking
Thus, the ability to simultaneously shift between various psychological perspectives and stances 
emerges directly from interpersonal encounters, where the infant experiences other people’s 
attitudes and feeling toward oneself and toward a shared outside world. It is through the process 
of identification with other people that the infant develops the awareness not only of similarities, 
but also the distinctions between self and others (Bretherton et al. 1981). Identification pulls the 
child temporarily into the perspectives of others. Such basic role-taking may form the basis for 
the subsequent development of conceptual role-taking, where the child shows the capacity to 
understand that persons have minds and that one thing can represent another as in symbolic play 
(Hobson, 1993). And the developing child, in gaining self-reflective awareness, comes to realize 
that he/she can initiate movements and shifts into multiple roles and orientations.
1.3.2- Theory of Mind Theory
According to the ‘theory of mind’ theory, we understand other people when we have the concepts 
to think and talk about their internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires, intentions and 
emotions. There are differing views regarding the developmental pathway leading to theory of 
mind.
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Metarepresentation, or the capacity to form high-order representations, has been suggested as the 
developmental basis for the capacity for theory of mind. There have been two different views 
about what is meant by metarepresentation. The first definition was given by Pylyshyn (1978), 
following on the study of Premack and Woodruff (1978). He defined the metarepresentational 
capacity as ‘the ability to represent the representational relation itself. For example, a 
photograph of the painting ‘Venus at her mirror’ is a representation of a representation, but not a 
meta-representation. My belief that you think that ‘Venus at her mirror’ was painted by Diego 
Velazquez is a metarepresentation, or what is the same, a representation of your belief. According 
to Pylyshyn, a metarepresentation entails a representation (e.g. the proposition ‘ Venus in front o f  
mirror' was painted by Diego Velazquez’) of a relational representation (e.g. the proposition ‘the 
fact that I  believe that you know it'). This perspective considers a metarepresentation as an 
advanced form of representation that involves representing representational relations among 
different verbal propositions like the ones presented above.
Josef Pemer (1991), who has included this definition of metarepresentation in his theory, 
distinguished three important moments in the development of representations in the young child. 
During the first year of life, infants use primary representations of the world, that is to say, simple 
representations of their perception of objects or events. From the second year, young children 
begin using secondary representations, that is to say, the representation of more than one 
representation at the same time. The understanding of object permanence or means-ends 
relationships is an indication that the child is forming secondary representations. With this type 
of representation the child is able to understand to some extent that other people’s behaviour is 
guided through their internal states of knowledge and desires, but they are not able yet to 
understand the properties of the representational relation. This metarepresentational process does 
not become evident until the age of around four years.
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One of the most influential theories in explaining the origins of theory of mind is that of Leslie 
(1987), whose definition of metarepresentation differed from previous accounts in that it is not a 
representation of a representational relation, but a new representation that holds two meanings at 
once, the real and the pretend. Leslie (1987) linked the onset of the capacity for 
metarepresentation with the child’s ability to pretend, or to ‘manipulate attitudes toward 
information ’ (p. 416). For Leslie, the metarepresentational mechanism is a modular system that is 
independent of other capacities. This means that that the module that allows metarepresentation 
begins to function as the child matures. This metarepresentational system allows the decoupling 
of primary representations from their real meaning. Leslie argued that there is a similarity 
between the ability to understand mental states such as belief (e.g. ’Paul thinks that the Queen o f 
England is called Margaret 0 and the symbolic play of the child (e.g. ‘Paul pretends that a 
banana is a telephone’). In both instances, the real meaning of some thing is lifted out and 
replaced by other possible meanings. Leslie proposed that the emergence of a decoupling 
mechanism, being able to simultaneously acknowledge two perspectives, underlies the ability to 
pretend and play and is also the basis for the child’s understanding that other people have minds. 
He also suggested that there was an autism-specific deficit in this decoupling mechanism.
In recent years, the definition of theory of mind has broadened to include a developmental 
perspective viewing its emergence as one milestone in a complex, unfolding understanding of 
persons (Flavell et al, 1999). For example, it has been suggested that joint attention—the sharing 
of attention and experiences with others regarding events in  the world—may be an important 
early developmental precursor to theory of mind. In this case, at a purely cognitive level of 
explanation, the child manifests awareness and understanding of both his and another’s attention 
or perspective toward outside objects. The child’s ‘awareness’ of a link between adults and 
objects, by representing others as seeing or attending, could be one of the first steps in the child’s 
evolving theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et a l 1985). Therefore, the theory of mind theory
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considers the child’s understanding of different points of views and perspectives in other people 
as an outcome of previous cognitive developments. It also considers the child’s social 
understanding to be conceptual in nature, that is to say, the child needs to have concepts before he 
can have this level of awareness of self and other.
1.4- The case of autism: outline of this thesis.
Autism is a developmental disorder that is characterized by severe limitations in social relations, 
language and communication, and imagination (including play). The language of the majority of 
individuals with autism who speak is abnormal, and the disorder usually presents with unusual 
repetitive preoccupations and rituals. The ability to understand mental states in the self and 
others, known as theory of mind, has been well documented as an impaired ability in autism (to 
be discussed in Chapter 2). Yet, deficits in social responsiveness and intersubjective contact with 
others are apparent in  autism long before the age at which typically developing children pass 
theory of mind tasks.
Individuals with autism have been reported to have profound difficulties in adopting the role of 
another person. Understanding that other people have separate internal perspectives allows us to 
move flexibly among different perspectives and put ourselves into another person’s shoes. The 
present thesis will explore both the theory of mind and the interpersonal theories to explain the 
difficulties of individuals with autism in appreciating and understanding the psychological and 
emotional stance of others. The hypothesis of this thesis is founded on the interpersonal theory 
regarding the origin o f  the role-taking impairment in people with autism, which suggests that 
individuals with autism have profound limitations in understanding other perspectives because 
they fail to  identify and to  move to the perspective of another person from very early in life.
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Chapter 2 will review the case of autism, by detailing the clinical features of the syndrome. It will 
outline the relevance of the theory of mind and interpersonal theories for understanding the role- 
taking deficits in this disorder.
The first study will be presented in Chapter 3, and will focus on the ability to adopt roles in a 
narrative, story-telling task. Most of the studies that have examined the ability to take the role of 
another person in individuals with autism have focused on their pragmatic use of language, where 
adjustment in language may depend upon mutual understanding between speaker and listener 
(Baltaxe, 1977; Menyuk, 1969; Prutting, 1982; Loveland et a l 1990, Tager-Flusberg, 1981), or 
they have focused on their use and understanding of mental state terms in theory of mind tasks 
(Tager-Flusberg, 1992, 1995). However, it is uncertain whether these processes account for the 
ability to adopt another person’s role or perspective. Although individuals with autism show 
deficits in the pragmatic use of language and in understanding mental state terms, as evidenced in 
these studies, there is not scientific evidence regarding whether they can take the role of another 
person in a task when asked to do so.
Therefore, Chapter 3 will aim to examine the ability to adopt the roles and perspectives of 
different characters in narrative. The hypothesis underlying this study is that by virtue of 
experiencing the perspectives of other people and by identifying with them, we develop the 
ability to take the role of another person and move flexibly between different viewpoints. A 
further hypothesis is that individuals with autism have difficulties in identifying with other people 
in this way. Therefore, it was predicted that they would have limitations in adopting different 
roles, when asked to make up stories with three human figures made of cardboard, and retell the 
stories from the perspective of different characters. The organization of the stories in relation to 
the perspectives of different characters may reveal aspects of role-taking that are limited in 
individuals with autism, as well as aspects that are intact and therefore arguably less influenced
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by interpersonal contact with others. Indeed, participants with autism were expected to perform 
well in  other, more cognitive rather than interpersonal, parts of the task (e.g. maintaining the 
content of one story when retelling the same story from the point of view of another character, 
what will be called “co-ordination”).
A second set of studies will be described in Chapters 4 and 5, which will explore role-taking in 
the context of expressing and comprehending deictic expressions. This set of four experiments 
had the aim of examining the use and understanding o f  these expressions in  individuals with 
autism, compared with a closely matched group of non-autistic individuals according to age and 
language ability. The ability to take into account aspects of another person’s thoughts and 
feelings is fundamental to the success of social interactions, where some aspects of language are 
modified in accordance with another person’s psychological and spatial perspective, a defining 
characteristic of deictic expressions. Deictic linguistic expressions are terms such as here/there, 
this/that, come/go, bring/take that shift depending on who the speaker is and on the spatial 
relation between the speaker and the listener. There are also deictic (‘pointing’) non-verbal 
expressions, such as a point or a nod that refer to something. It is important to examine deictic 
expressions in individuals with autism because of the lack of empirical research in this area, even 
though person-centred expressions are critical for communication. The interpersonal theory 
suggests that one needs to identify with the speaker who uses a deictic expression (like ‘there’ 
while pointing to an object), and assume his/her perspective before having a full understanding of 
such expression. If this is correct, deictic expressions are also expressions of role-taking. If 
individuals with autism have limited experience of other people, then it is reasonable to assume 
that they may show difficulties in using and comprehending such expressions.
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Chapter 4 will include one experiment (Experiment 1) that was designed to examine the 
production of deictic expressions, and in particular, whether or not individuals with autism use 
verbal (e.g. ‘there’) and non-verbal (e.g. a pointing) deictic expressions.
Chapter 5 describes three experiments of the deixis study that aim to study the comprehension of 
deictic expressions. Experiment two examines the comprehension of the deictic terms ‘come’ and 
‘bring’, which involve a movement towards the speaker. Experiment three was designed to study 
comprehension of both verbal and non-verbal deictic expressions, such as the verbal expressions 
‘here/there’ or ‘this/that’, or a non-verbal nod used to refer to a position. Finally, Experiment four 
examines the participants’ comprehension of those deictic verbs that involve a movement towards 
or from the speaker’s position, like come/go and bring/take.
Chapter 6 will examine aspects of role-taking that are embedded in non-verbal communication 
between two people. When conversing with another person, several aspects of the other person’s 
point of view are taken into consideration, not only through language, but also through non-verbal 
expressions. For example, we normally make shakes and nods of the head to link in with what is 
being said by another person, as well as to let the other person know that we are listening. 
However, individuals with autism have been reported to have limitations in the non-verbal 
expressions that they use in conversations. For example, they have been reported to use fewer 
head shakes and nods, and fewer interpersonal looks than language matched control groups in 
conversations with another person, especially when the other person is speaking (Tantam et a l 
1993; Capps et a l  1999). One of the aims of the study presented in this chapter was to replicate 
these previous findings, by comparing the non-verbal exchanges of groups of matched 
participants with and without autism in the context of an interview. Participants with autism were 
predicted to show abnormalities in their use of non-verbal expression, because of their relative 
lack of identification with other people. Further, a novel approach was included in this study, 
where it was predicted that the relative lack of mutual identification would be reflected in the
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interviewer’s non-verbal expressions. The non-verbal measures included head shakes and nods, 
looks to the other, and smiles. These measures will be examined in relation to the periods of time 
when either the participant or the interviewer was talking. Innovative subjective measures of 
social connectedness were also included in this study in order to examine the relation between 
interpersonal engagement and the non-verbal expressions used by the participants.
The final chapter will be devoted to a review of the above studies, a discussion of their 
significance in relation to previous clinical and experimental investigations, and a consideration 
of methodological issues.
Therefore this series of studies will investigate three aspects of role-taking: a) the ability to adopt 
the role of a character, b) the use and understanding of deictic person-anchored expressions, and 
c) the use of interpersonal non-verbal communication. The results of these studies will shed some 
light about the nature of the role-taking deficits in people with autism and will provide new 
evidence about aspects of role-taking that are both impaired and intact in these individuals. The 
understanding of these aspects will be crucial to identify the processes underpinning the human 
capacity for simultaneously considering multiple perspectives. The studies will generate evidence 
for or against the hypothesis that basic non-inferential role-taking processes related to the way we 
identify with the attitudes and feelings of other people, are relatively lacking in individuals with 
autism.
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CHAPTER TWO
Role-taking, issues in Autism
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2.1 Introduction
Autism is a disorder that has fascinated scientists since it was first described by Kanner in 1943. 
One source of fascination i s the difficulty that individuals with autism have in  understanding 
other people, but perhaps equally fundamental for our understanding of autism is the experience 
of parents and professionals who feel unable to establish a full emotional connection with a 
person suffering from autism.
Chapter 1 w as c oncemed w ith h ow y oung i nfants c ome t o u nderstand t hat o ther p eople h ave 
psychological perspectives different from their own. Two kinds of role-taking were distinguished, 
conceptual and non-inferential role-taking. The processes involved in the development of both 
types of role-taking were examined through two main theories, the theory of mind and the 
interpersonal theory. The hypothesis of the present thesis is founded on the interpersonal theory. 
This suggests that early social connectedness with other people, a non-inferential type of role- 
taking, is the mechanism that drives infants to feel moved by other people and to gradually 
become aware of the thoughts and feelings of others in a conceptual form of role-taking. Finally, 
the case of autism was introduced by emphasizing these individuals’ difficulty not only in 
understanding the mental states o f  other people, but also in  being involved with other people 
through feelings.
The first aim of this chapter is to introduce the syndrome of autism, and to clarify the main 
features of the syndrome. I shall stress clinical evidence for a lack of social connectedness in 
individuals with autism. Those individuals’ limitations in both non-inferential and conceptual 
forms of role-taking will be considered with reference to the view that an early impairment in
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interpersonal engagement with others might account for later limitations in the ability to think 
about the minds and perspectives of others.
2.2 What is autism?
2.2.1- Description of Autism
Autism has been characterized in different ways by clinicians and researchers, as well as by 
affected individuals (Kanner, 1943; Asperger, 1944; World Health Organisation, 1987; Frith, 
1991; American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Riviere andNuflez, 1996; Williams, 1996). One 
of the difficulties in describing the syndrome is that it may present differently in different 
individuals. Some people with autism are more ‘aloof, some more ‘active but odd’ and some are 
more ‘passive’ (Wing & Gould, 1979). Another difficulty is that autism is a developmental 
disorder whose features change through the life of the child. One challenge is to define which 
aspects of the child’s abnormal social development are specific to autism and which others are 
not. For instance, mental retardation can affect the social development of the child, but the 
clinical features may be distinguished from those that characterize autism. Therefore, an in-depth 
description of autism requires an integration of different aspects of the syndrome.
In his first description of autism, Kanner (1943) considered that the 11 cases he was studying 
were examples of "...inborn autistic disturbance o f affective contact” (p.250). Kanner identified 
as the fundamental characteristic "... the children’s inability to relate themselves in the ordinary 
way to other people” (p.242). These difficulties in engaging with other people were reflected in
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the descriptions given to him by parents who gave statements such as the following about these 
children:
‘having always been ’self-sufficient”, ‘like in a shell’, ‘happiest when left alone’, ‘acting as i f  
people weren ’t there ’, ‘perfectly oblivious to everything about him ’, ‘giving the impression o f 
silent wisdom ’, failing to develop the usual amount o f social awareness ’ (p 242).
In these 11 cases, Kanner also described characteristics such as the children’s failure to assume an 
anticipatory posture, excellent rote memory, delayed echolalia, refusal of food, reactions to loud 
noises and moving objects, anxiously obsessive desire for the maintenance of sameness, 
perturbation upon the sight of anything broken or incomplete, limited spontaneous activity, 
experiencing of people in about the same manner as objects, their good cognitive potentialities, 
physically normality, and the fact that they were often raised in highly intelligent families.
People who suffer from autism have also highlighted the lack of social connectedness with other 
people. In Donna Williams’s (1996) statement of how she has experienced this syndrome, she 
makes explicit her difficulty in building up a sense of self and understanding other people. She 
describes how she had to learn to act and the difficulties that she experienced to differentiate her 
own self from other selves. She wrote:
"... I  learned to act as though I  had a sense o f ‘us’ and ‘w e’ even i f  my systems integration 
problems made it very difficult to consistently process internal ‘s e l f  and external ‘other’ at the 
same time" ... ‘‘My ‘autism ’-related difficulties ... drowned out any remaining residue o f REAL 
interests or wants, thoughts or emotions and made me an accomplice to the actions and 
expressions o f a body, face and voice I  didn ’t even feel was mine. ( p. 5)
According to Williams, non-autistic people can ‘read appearances’, and her difficulties in 
understanding other people has led her to see ‘systems’ rather than ‘appearances’. On closer 
inspection, this difficulty in ‘ reading o f appearances ’ appears to reflect an impairment in basic 
forms of non-inferential role-taking.
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2.2.2- Clinical case and features of autism.
One o f  the 11 cases that Kanner included in  his first report was that of Charles N, who was 
brought to his clinic by his mother on February 2,1943, aged four years and five months. He was 
bom normally and was a planned and wanted child. He sat up at 6 months and walked at less than 
15 months with no preliminary creeping. Charles was the oldest of three children. His father was 
a high school graduate and a clothing merchant. His mother had a successful business in New 
York. Kanner described the first time Charles entered his office with the following:
"Charles was a well developed, intelligent-looking boy ... When he entered the office, he paid not 
the slightest attention to the people present. Without looking at anyone, he said, ‘Give me a 
pencil’ and took a piece ofpaper from the desk and wrote something ... He had brought with him 
a copy o f ‘Readers Digest ’ and was fascinated by a picture o f a baby. He said, “Look at the funny 
baby, ” innumerable times, occasionally adding, “Is he not funny? Is he not sweet? “. (p.236)
Charles’s mother described Charles as an inactive baby, “...slow and phlegmatic”.... “he would 
lie in the crib, just staring” (p.235). The lack of social connectedness was also emphasized by 
Charles’s mother: “The thing that upsets me the most is that I  can ’t reach my baby” (p.235). She 
also used expressions such as ‘detachment’, ‘inaccessibility’, ‘lives in a world o f his own’ 
(p.236), which reflect the psychological and emotional inaccessibility of Charles. She also said 
the following about Charles’s difficulties in relating to other people,
" No sense o f relationship to persons.... he never envelops himself in a group...never offers 
anything himself...he never initiates conversation ”. (p.236)
Kanner reported that the lack of social connectedness was also noticeable in Charles’s eye 
contact:
“When he is with other people, he doesn’t look up at them... He did not pay attention to them, but 
their presence was felt. He will mimic a voice ... He did not respond to being called and did not 
look at his mother when she spoke to him ”. (p.236-7)
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Another characteristic of Charles’ lack of social connectedness was reflected in his absence of 
awareness of other people’s psychological perspectives, even though, as Charles’s mother pointed 
out, he registered the presence of the people who were in the room. This difficulty in attributing a 
mind to a person was clearly present in the first encounter that Kanner had with Charles, and is an 
important feature of the autistic syndrome:
"... he struggled with the hand that held it, without looking at the person who had taken the book 
... at no time did he seem to connect the pricking with the person who held the pin . . . he tried to 
remove the foot as i f  it were another detached and interfering object, again with no concern for  
the person to whom the foot belonged”. (p.237)
Despite Charles’ isolation and incapacity to relate to people, he developed impressive cognitive 
abilities. At the age of eighteen months, he could discriminate between eighteen symphonies and 
he had a wonderful memory for words. Charles’ mother also reported that he had developed 
obsessions and an inflexible pattern of behaviour. For instance, he was interested in reflecting 
light from mirrors and catching reflections.
One more feature of autism that was apparent in the case of Charles was his abnormal use of 
language, and in particular, shifting among the uses of person-anchored terms:
“He would say, ‘he wants’ -never 7  want ...h e  once turned to his mother and excitedly said, 
“Give it to you!" ...He never used language as a means o f communicating with people”.
(p. 236-7)
The case of Charles exemplifies not only the main characteristics of the autistic syndrome, but 
also the difficulties that these individuals have in understanding other people. They appear to 
have an incapacity to connect emotionally and psychologically with others.
36
2.3 Theories related to role-taking in autism.
There are several theories that have tried to explain the difficulties that people with autism have 
in understanding that people have different psychological perspectives. Some of these theories 
have focused more than others on role taking difficulties to explain the picture of autism. Two of 
the main theories of autism that have given special precedence to role taking are the interpersonal 
theory and the theory of mind theory. It is for this reason that I will mainly focus on these two 
theories throughout this thesis. However, I would like to describe briefly two other influential 
theories, the ‘Weak Central Coherence’ theory and the ‘Executive Function’ theory, that might 
also explain why individuals with autism have role taking difficulties.
2.3.1- A summary of theoretical perspectives
Building on collaborative work with Hermelin, Frith (1989, 1991) suggested that people with 
autism have specific difficulties in integrating different aspects of situations because they have a 
‘weak central coherence’. Central coherence is the ability to process the information that we 
receive in wholes, rather than in parts. For example, when we read, the essential part of a story, as 
oppose to the details, is often most easily remembered by non-autistic individuals. According to 
this theory, people with autism have fragmented information processing, tending to focus more 
on parts and local details rather than on coherent whole configurations. This type of processing 
has been described as a certain kind of cognitive style (Happe, 2001) that explains both 
intellectual strengths and weaknesses of these individuals. For example, in the block design 
subtest of the Wechsler scales, people with autism tend to perform better than non-autistic 
individuals in reconstructing from separate blocks a model pattern that appears as a total
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configuration. When, however, the model design is shown in ‘pre-segmented’ form, the 
advantage of those with autism disappear (Shah and Frith, 1993).
Although proponents of this theory consider the ability to read the minds of other people as an 
independent ability from the weak central coherence ability, with both abilities in separate 
module systems which interact with each other, it remains possible to interpret certain features of 
role-taking in terms of an inability to integrate context or multiple sources of input. This would 
offer an alternative explanation for perspective-taking impairments in individuals with autism. 
However, it would not necessarily lessen the developmental implication of role-taking difficulties 
per se.
Another theory that might explain some aspects of the role taking difficulties found in people 
with autism is the Executive Functioning Theory. This is a neuro-cognitive model of dysfunction 
and views the impairment in executive functioning as primary. Executive functioning is defined 
as the ability to maintain an appropriate problem-solving set for the attainment of a future goal, 
involving such attitudes as planning ahead, inhibition of established responses, and flexibility in 
thinking and actions.
People with autism often appear to have difficulties in planning ahead, and inhibiting established 
responses, and tend to be rigid and inflexible, and perseverative. This is illustrated by 
performance on the Tower of Hanoi and The Wisconsin card Sorting Task. The former task can 
be completed only if  one understands certain rules (for example, a larger disc cannot be placed 
above a smaller one) and plans ahead in order to complete the task. The latter task requires that 
one arranges cards according to feedback received, and measures the capacity for flexible thought 
through the ability to switch sorting strategies according to feedback. Ozonoff, Pennington and 
Rogers (1991) reported that children with autism obtained significantly lower scores than control
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participants matched on chronological age and aspects of verbal IQ (the Information, Similarities 
and Vocabulary subtests of the WISC-R and WAIS-R) on both tasks. However, recent evidence 
presents a challenge to the theory that executive function difficulties give rise to the syndrome of 
autism. For example, evidence has emerged that executive function deficits emerge after affected 
children reach the age of three years (Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, & Rogers, 1999; Rutherford 
& Rogers, 2003; Wehner & Rogers, 1994), substantially after their abnormalities in social 
interaction and communication have been manifest.
It is possible to see how skills such as planning, anticipation, inhibition of pre-potent responses, 
and flexible shifting among mental schemata, might influence our interpersonal functioning, and 
through this, affect a range of role-taking abilities. However, these mechanisms of such effects 
are yet to be determined. Therefore, it seems appropriate at this stage to focus on both, the 
‘Interpersonal’ theory and the ‘Theory of Mind’ theory to illustrate the role-taking impairment in 
autism.
According to the ‘Interpersonal’ theory, individuals with autism have an early impairment in 
social connectedness with other people that also involves an impairment in non-inferential role- 
taking. What this theory suggests is that there may be something in the way in which infants who 
will be later diagnosed with autism, respond to and perceive other people through feelings. It 
suggests that an inability to engage with other people from early in time prevents individuals with 
autism from fully developing an understanding of self and others as centres of consciousness, and 
therefore they have difficulties in understanding other people’s minds.
In the previous chapter it was described how, in typically developing infants, the process of 
identification u nderlies p erson-person-object i nterchanges, w ith a 'relatedness t riangle'. This 
triangle exemplified the processes underlying joint attentional situations, where adult and infant
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co-ordinate jointly their attention toward one aspect of the world. In these situations, the infant 
relates to other people’s psychological relatedness to themselves and to the world (Hobson, 1993, 
p i97). According to this theory, this type of interpersonal relatedness is abnormal in individuals 
with autism. First, they have difficulties in experiencing the adult’s attitudes toward themselves 
and toward an object or event of the world. They lack the role-taking process of ‘moving’ to the 
stance of another person with feeling and experiencing aspects of the world through the 
‘emotional viewpoint’ of another person (a process called ‘identification’). Second, this lack of 
repeated experiences of the attitudes and feelings of other people in relation to the world prevents 
individuals with autism from fully developing a sense of separateness between their own 
perspectives and the perspectives of other people. This theory, therefore, suggests that non- 
inferential role-taking is the core of the autistic impairment in understanding other minds.
In contrast, the supporters of the ‘theory of mind’ theory have suggested that individuals with 
autism have impairment in  conceptual role-taking due to an impairment in the cognitive (and 
modular) mechanism of metarepresentation (Leslie, 1987). This might stem from an earlier (and 
arguably, metarepresentational) impairment in the ability to use joint attention to show things 
(e.g. pointing to show a bird flying), an ability that contrasts with the ability to  request (e.g. 
pointing to request a sweet). According to this theory, this impairment has an impact on the 
development of the child’s symbolic activity and on the development of concepts about the mind 
of others, and more specifically on the development of concepts such as belief and pretend. 
Therefore the child with autism is unable to fully develop a ‘theory of mind’ about other people’s 
minds and as a result of this, the child has difficulties in understanding the perspectives of other 
people.
The two theories presented above disagree in their view about which is the primary impairment 
that leads individuals with autism to have role-taking difficulties in understanding the
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psychological perspectives of other people. Whereas the theory of mind theory considers the 
cognitive mechanism of metarepresentation the main cause of the theory of mind impairment in 
autism, the interpersonal theory suggests that certain aspects of non-inferential role-taking, more 
in particular the process of identification, are impaired in individuals with autism, and this is what 
leads them to have difficulties in conceptual role-taking.
I shall now consider some of the evidence for such ‘basic’ limitations in social connectedness 
and conceptual role-taking. Once again, I shall be considering the earliest forms of interpersonal 
relations -  relations that are not obviously ones that involve ‘role-taking’ -  for the reason that we 
may find evidence of developmental continuities between such relations and later, more explicit 
forms of interpersonal perspective-taking.
2.4 Impairments in social connectedness
The interpersonal theory posits that people with autism have an early impairment in non- 
inferential role-taking, that is to say, they have difficulties in linking in with other people and in 
‘moving’ to the position of others through feelings and attitudes. According to this theory, infants 
who will be later diagnosed with autism do not connect with others in the same way as non- 
autistic infants. In the first chapter of this thesis, the way typically developing infants relate with 
others through primary (person-person interaction) and secondary (person-person-object 
interaction) mechanisms was described. Non-inferential role-taking was considered as a possible 
mechanism that underlies both processes. Whereas many people agree that secondary 
intersubjectivity involves a degree of non-inferential role-taking, it is questionable whether 
primary intersubjectivity mechanisms require the same degree of role-taking. I shall nevertheless
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examine both types of mechanisms for possible manifestations of non-inferential role-taking 
impairment in individuals with autism.
2.4.1- Primary intersubjectivity
If individuals with autism have impairment in non-inferential role-taking, it is appropriate to 
explore whether this might be manifest in the ways in which they relate to other people during the 
first months of life. It has been difficult to explore the possible early manifestations of this 
impairment. I shall begin by considering studies of videotapes of infants who later attract the 
diagnosis of childhood autism, and come to consider evidence both from observational studies, 
and retrospective parental reports.
I begin with a study of videotapes carried out by Adrien et al. (1992). These authors reported 
disorders in a group of eight children with autism and three children with atypical pervasive 
developmental disorder as early as the fifth month of life. The participants’ global development 
quotients (calculated with the Brunet-Lezina scale) varied from below 20 to 105. Family home 
movies were collected from the families, and 10 were made before any pathology was envisioned. 
In two cases movies were recorded at birth, and in five cases as early as the first two weeks of 
life. The films lasted between 10 and 80 minutes. The films were observed and evaluated by a 
group of professionals who were not blind to the diagnosis of the participants. Each film was 
scored with the Infant Behavior Summarized Evaluation (IBSE) Scale. The IBSE includes 33 
items under six headings: socialization, communication, adaptation to the environment situations, 
tactility-tone-motility, emotional and instinctual reactions, and attention-perception. The 
following characteristics were detected during the first year: 1) poor social interaction, 2) no or 
abnormal eye contact, 3) no social smile, 4) lack of appropriate facial expressions, 5) lack of 
appropriate gestures and/or expressive postures, 6) too calm, 7) hypoactivity, 8) overly excited, 9)
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hypotonia, 10) no expression of emotion, 11) ignoring people. A subsequent phase of the study 
compared three typically developing children with the three children with atypical pervasive 
developmental disorder and with six of the eight autistic children. The contents of the family 
home movies of the typically developing children were identical to the ones of the other children 
regarding age and the type of situations in which they were taken. The same scoring method was 
applied to these films. Results showed that signs of disorder were more marked and frequent in 
the group with autism than in the other two groups.
Another study that reported evidence of abnormal social connectedness before the age of 12 
months, and more specifically between 9-12 months, was carried out by Baranek (1999). The age 
of the participants of the study was above 2 years and the families were required to have home 
videos of their child between birth and 2 years of age. The study group comprised 11 children 
with autism who had a mean age of 63 months, and a mild level of mental retardation. These 
participants were compared with 10 children with developmental disability and without autism of 
the same level of mental retardation and developmental maturity/adaptive behaviour, and with 11 
typical developing children. The parents of the participants with autism and the participants with 
mental retardation reported onset of problems in their child prior to 18 months, but the group with 
autism evidenced these problems significantly later than the group with mental retardation. In 
addition, regression was reported by parents in 54% of the cases in the group with autism. An 
average of four scenes from the family videotapes was selected. The ages of the children in the 
films varied from 9 to 12-months of age, with a total 10 minutes of videotape per subject. From 
the tapes independent raters judged affective expressions, looks, gaze aversion, response to name, 
social touch responses, motor stereotypies, tactile modulation, auditory modulation and visual 
modulation. The proportion of time that each behaviour was observed was calculated. A series of 
one-way analyses of variance were performed on each variable. Results suggested that the 
children with autism needed more adult prompts to  draw their attention when called than the
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comparison groups, and they manifested a tendency to orientate less to visual stimuli, to manifest 
mouthing of objects and more aversion to social touch than the comparison groups. Interestingly, 
the children with developmental disability showed more stereotyped inappropriate play and less 
looking toward the camera than either of the other two groups. Unusual posture was significantly 
more frequent in the children with autism and developmental disability, relative to the typically 
developing children.
These two studies need to be considered critically, for methodological reasons. First, the size of 
the study and control groups was very small, making it difficult to extrapolate the results to the 
general population. Second, there was a lack of statistical analysis to support the results in 
Adrien’s study. Baranek did not report distribution of results across participants, and therefore 
this makes the interpretation of the study difficult. Finally, there were methodological problems 
in relation to the kind and amount of videotape information used, and the way this information 
was rated. For example, although the investigators in both studies tried to ensure consistency in 
the videotaped films rated, this was only partly accomplished. Also, the raters of Adrien’s study 
were not blind to either the participants’ diagnosis or the aims of the study, and therefore ratings 
were likely to be contaminated.
It is here that one might turn to another source of evidence for early abnormalities in social 
connectedness, namely parental reports of behaviour in the early months of life. One study was 
carried out by Riviere (2000). The parental reports given by 83 families with children diagnosed 
with autism were compared to those given by 46 families with children with mental retardation 
and autistic-like features, and with those given by 66 families with children of the same age with 
normal development. The children with mental retardation and with autistic-like features had a 
mean developmental quotient and a mean chronological age comparable to that of children with 
autism (the means of the developmental quotiens were 56 and 58 respectively, and means CA
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were 6;7 and 6;3 years respectively). Results indicated that the two groups displayed a pattern of 
passivity or tranquillity, which attracted the attention of the parents during the first year. 
Moreover, there were three out of four parents of children with autism who perceived their 
children as ‘normal’ during the first year of life, versus one out of four parents of the children 
with mental retardation and autistic-like features. When the children with autism were compared 
with the typically developing children, the children with autism prompted greater suspicion of 
presenting an anomaly in development and were more 'quiet* or passive during the first year. This 
study suggests that the early social impairment of children with autism is less strikingly abnormal 
during the fist year of life than that of children with mental retardation who also present autistic- 
like features.
However, after the first year of life the majority of studies -  whether observational or of parent 
reports -  provide evidence of a striking increase in the indicators of impairments in primary 
intersubjectivity in children with autism. For instance, L6sche (1990) reported that when playing 
with adults, children with autism appeared as “being played with” rather than playing with them. 
In Adrien's study (1992), the items "ignores people", "prefers to be alone", "poor social 
interaction", "no social smile", "lack of appropriate facial expressions", "lack of appropriate 
gestures and/or expressive postures", "unusual postures", "no expression of emotions" and "easily 
distracted" were specially noticeable after the first year. There is also evidence that after the 
children’s first birthday, there are abnormalities in eye contact, for example as manifest in 
infrequent eye contact made with other people and the absence of following the gaze of others 
(Osterling and Dawson, 1994; Wimpory et al, 2000; OzonofF and South, 2001; Leekam, and 
Moore, 2001), and other studies report a failure to orient to their names after the first year (Adrien 
et a l 1992; Riviere, 2000).
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Here it may suffice to summarize two studies of impairments in primary intersubjectivity, each 
employing a semi-structured observational methodology. O ne is  a study of children just past 
infancy, and the other concerns older children of similar age and ability to those tested in the 
present thesis.
Charman, et a l (1997) compared a group of 20- month-old children with autism with a group of 
children with developmental delay, and a group of typically developing children, in a situation 
where an experimenter pretended to hit his thumb with a toy hammer. For ten seconds, and before 
showing the child that his finger did not hurt anymore, he displayed facial expressions of distress 
and pain. The child’s reaction to the experimenter’s condition was videotaped. Not a single child 
with autism showed any facial concern, compared with 44% of the children with developmental 
delay and 68% of the typically developing children. Moreover, 60% of the children with autism 
did not look at the experimenter’s face when sharing his distress, whereas this was the case for all 
of the participants in the other two groups.
In a quite different setting, Hobson and Lee (1998) videotaped 24 individuals with autism aged 
between 8.3 and 21.1 years (Mean verbal MA: 5; 7) while greeting and saying farewell to a 
stranger experimenter (E2). The participants were matched with 24 mentally retarded non-autistic 
participants for chronological age and verbal mental age. The spontaneous responses to E2 (who 
was seated across a table) of the participants arriving and leaving a room with a familiar 
experimenter (El) were coded, as well as the prompted responses when arriving at the room (i.e. 
if the participants did not spontaneously greet E2, then E2 said “Hello, P (name) ”), and when 
leaving the room (i.e. if the participant did not make spontaneous gestures of farewell, E2 
said: “Goodbye ”)• The coding procedure included both behaviour ratings (i.e. verbalizations 
directed to E l, looks at E2’s face, wave at E2), and subjective ratings of the degree to which the 
participants were engaged with E2 (i.e. “to what degree did you fee l that P  engaged with E2? ”
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either, strongly, somewhat, or hardly, i f  at all). In addition, those participants who waved at E2 
were examined for possible oddities in  the way the wave was displayed. Results showed that 
individuals with autism were less likely to greet E2 spontaneously. The majority of participants in 
the two groups who required a prompt, made a response by saying something or by nodding. 
However, significantly fewer participants with autism looked to  the experimenter’s face. This 
lack of social engagement with the experimenter in the greeting period was also reported by 
rater’s subjective judgement, in that the majority of the participants with autism (as oppose to a 
minority of the non-autistic participants) were felt to have engaged with the adult hardly i f  at all. 
Similar results were found when subjects took their departure. During this period, participants 
with autism were less likely than the control participants to use a wave. Moreover, the waves of 
all the participants with autism who waved were considered abnormal, compared with the 35% of 
the waves of the non-autistic participants who waved. The authors interpreted these findings in 
terms of a relative lack of intersubjective engagement by individuals with autism.
Therefore in both young and older individuals with autism, there are clinical features that appear 
to constitute impairments in primary intersubjectivity. The mechanism underlying such 
impairment has been suggested by some authors to involve deficits in non-inferential role-taking. 
Yet the studies that have examined children with autism during the first year of life -  those that 
arguably, are most important for establishing whether impairments in non-inferential role-taking 
may be primary in autism - need to be reviewed carefully for several reasons. Firstly, these 
studies reveal that although some suggestive abnormalities in primary intersubjectivity could be 
found at very early stages in children with autism, most of these characteristics are not strikingly 
different from those seen in infants with mental retardation, and only appear to be clearly 
abnormal after the first year of life. Secondly, most of these studies present methodological 
problems, such as a lack of control of the impact of mental retardation on the development of the 
children, and the use of small numbers in the comparison groups. They do, nevertheless, provide
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some information about the manifestations of a possible impairment in non-inferential role-taking 
during the first months of life of the child with autism. However, evidence of a limited ability to 
‘move’ to the perspective of other people is more apparent after the first year of life.
2.4.2- Secondary intersubjectivity
Chapter 1 described how at the end of the first year of life, the ways infants engage with adults 
change markedly, in that they begin to engage in ‘social referencing’ towards adults when they do 
not know what to do in uncertain situation, and they become engaged in joint attention episodes, 
which they sometimes initiate (e.g. an infant shows a flower while alternating looks between the 
flower and the adult) or sometimes follow the attention-directing gestures of others (e.g. an adult 
points to a dog while alternating gaze between the dog and the infant).
Both the interpersonal theory and the ‘theory of mind’ theory predict abnormalities in such 
manifestations of secondary intersubjectivity in individuals with autism, but for different reasons. 
The first theory explains these abnormalities in terms of difficulties in engaging with other people 
and the latter theory explains it in terms of a more profound cognitive impairment that is a 
precursor of the development of a theory of mind.
One study that illustrates abnormalities present early in life is that by Baron-Cohen et al. (1992). 
These investigators asked general practitioners and health visitors to administer a screening 
instrument for autism (the Checklist for Autism in Toddlers, CHAT) to 41 eighteen-month-old 
siblings of children already diagnosed with autism, as well as 50 randomly selected 18-month- 
olds in their developmental check-up. Four of the 41 siblings of children with autism failed two 
or more of the items related to joint attention behaviour (e.g. “Does your child ever bring objects 
over to you, to SHOW you something?”), ‘sharing’ or ‘protodeclarative’ pointing (e.g. “Does you
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child ever use his/her finger to point, to indicate INTEREST in something? ”), as well as items 
concerning pretend play, social interest and social play. These were the only children who 
received a diagnosis of autism at the age of 30 months.
In a subsequent study, Baron-Cohen el a l (1996), asked general practitioners and health visitors 
to pass the same check list to 16000 children, once again, during their 18-month-old 
developmental check-up. From the previous study, they predicted that children at 18 months of 
age who failed three items Cprotodeclarative pointing', 'gaze-monitoring', and *pretend play1) 
would be at risk for receiving a diagnosis of autism. They found 12 children who consistently 
failed the three key items. Diagnosis of autism was confirmed in 10 of these children at the age of 
three years and six months of age.
Such evidence is complemented by retrospective reports by parents of children with autism. 
Wimpory, Hobson & Nash (2000) explored the manifestations of social engagement during the 
first two years of age in a group of young children with autism using a semi-structured interview 
(The Detection of Autism by Infant Sociability Interview) given to parents. The participants 
included 10 children with autism and 10 non-autistic developmental delay participants of 
comparable age (between 2.5 and 4 year-olds) and developmental level (Griffiths Performance 
Quotient between 23 and 117) at the time of the parental interview. Some of the items of the 
interview referred to joint attention skills, for example, ‘showing’, ‘offering’, ‘giving’, 
‘referential eye contact’, ‘pointing’ and ‘following points’ (e.g. “Would s/he show you things”, 
or, “Would s/he look both to where s/he was pointing and to  you?). Results showed that the 
parents of the children with autism were most likely to report that their children very infrequently 
offered or gave objects to others, pointed at objects or followed others pointing at objects. The 
authors concluded that infants with autism manifest a range of abnormalities suggesting a 
profound limitation in ‘triadic’ person-person-object interactions. The authors suggested that
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autism-specific deficits in joint attention and other aspects of triadic interaction may arise from 
developmentally prior abnormalities in the children’s ability to establish and experience ‘primary 
intersubjectivity’ with others. These authors, therefore, link the limitation of individuals with 
autism in primary intersubjectivity with their later limitation in secondary intersubjectivity.
So, too, there is evidence from semi-structured observations of somewhat older children. Mundy 
et al. (1994) examined whether joint attention is a specific impairment in autism or is an 
impairment that is related to high/low mental age. Thirty young children with autism were 
divided into a ‘low mental age’ group (Mean CA: 3 years, and Mean MA: 18 months) that 
comprised 13 children, and a ‘high mental age’ group (Mean CA: 4 years, and Mean MA: 30 
months) with the remaining 17 participants. These two subgroups were matched for chronological 
age and mental age with a mentally retarded group, and for chronological age with a typically 
developing group of children. The participants were systematically presented with various toys, 
with situations designed to elicit non-verbal responses. For example, in some situations the 
experimenter pointed to the left, the right and behind while saying the child’s name, or provided 
the child with the opportunity to roll a ball back and forth, and to take turns using different 
objects, like a hat. The scoring procedure distinguished ‘low level joint attention behaviour’, 
which included incidents of either eye contact while holding a toy, or alternating eye gaze 
between the experimenter’s face and the toy, from ‘high level joint attention beh a v io u rwhich 
included either pointing to toys within reach, or showing or extending toys towards the 
experimenter’s face. Results showed that in the low mental age sub-groups, significantly fewer 
participants with autism than participants from the other two groups followed the experimenter’s 
pointing. However, no significant differences were found among the high mental age subgroup 
with autism and the other two groups in this respect, with a majority of participants in the three 
groups following the experimenter’s point. In relation to the ‘high’ and ‘low’ levels of joint 
attention behaviour, the participants with autism, compared with the other two groups, exhibited 
significantly less ‘low’ and ‘high’ levels of joint attention behaviour. Moreover, the higher mental
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age sub-groups showed significantly more ‘low’ and ‘high’ level of joint attention behaviour than 
the lower mental age subgroups. Among the ‘low’ mental age subgroups, the participants with 
autism exhibited significantly less ‘low’ level of joint attention behaviour than the other two 
groups, and significantly less ‘high’ level joint attention behaviour than the typically developing 
participants only. Among the high mental age sub-groups, no significant differences were found 
in the ‘low’ level of joint attention behaviour, although significant differences were found for 
‘high’ level of joint attention behaviour with the developmentally delayed group only. The results 
of this study suggest that in non-autistic children, the development of social abilities, like for 
example joint attention, is related to mental age. However, in children with autism, only those 
with high mental ages appear to achieve some significant, although limited, joint attention 
understanding, which suggests that children with autism follow different pathways in the 
development of their social capacities.
As in the case of primary intersubjectivity, it is possible to trace later manifestations of 
impairments in secondary intersubjecitivity later in the children’s lives. For example, drawing on 
other authors Bates et al. (1975) and Baron-Cohen (1989) distinguished two types of pointing: 
protoimperative and protodeclarative pointing. Protoimperative pointing is that employed to use 
another person to obtain an object (e.g. Infant points to obtain a sweet), whereas protodeclarative 
pointing is used to comment on something about the world to another person (e.g. Infant points to 
show a colourful butterfly). The aim of Baron-Cohen’s study was to explore in more detail the 
suggestion that requesting gestures (protoimpetatives) are present in individuals with autism, 
whereas those gestures that are used to share an event of the world (protodeclaratives) are absent 
in children with autism. Twenty children with autism (Mean CA: 11;11, Nonverbal MA: 9;3, 
Verbal MA: 5;5) were compared with 14 children with Down Syndrome of lower non-verbal and 
verbal mental ages (Mean CA: 10; 11, Nonverbal MA: 5;11, Verbal MA: 2;11), and with twenty 
seven 4-5 year-old typically developing children. To test whether the child could label a pointing
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as either a requesting or a ‘sharing’ gesture, the participants were instructed: ‘7  am going to use 
my finger to say something. What am I  saying? ”. In order test comprehension of protoimperative 
pointing, the experimenter, while facing the participant, pointed to one of four toys in turn. The 
toys were positioned close to the participant but at some distance from the experimenter. In order 
to test comprehension of ‘sharing’ pointing the experimenter walked over to the window, looked 
up to the sky and pointed while alternating gaze between the child and his object of reference. 
The results of this study showed that in the protoimperative pointing task, the majority of 
participants in the three groups interpreted the point as a request for objects (14/20 autistic, 11/14 
Down Syndrome and 25/27 typically developing participats); whereas in the protodeclarative 
pointing task, significantly fewer participants with autism (2/20 participants) than participants in 
the other two groups (12/14 Down Syndrome participants and 26/27 typically developing 
participants) passed the task by indicating their understanding of the gesture.
In a subsequent experiment, Baron-Cohen tested the use of pointing in a group of 10 children 
with autism, 10 children with mental retardation and 10 two year-old typically developing 
children. The groups with autism and with mental retardation were comparable in their CA 
(means: 3.9 and 4.2 respectively), non-verbal MA (means: 3.0 and 2.0 respectively) and verbal 
MA (means: 1.9 and 1.6 respectively). Each group was video-taped for 45 minutes during play. 
Results showed that whereas a non significant difference was found in the use of protoimperative 
pointing among the three groups (4 in the group with autism, 8 in the Down Syndrome group and 
7 in the typically developing group), not a single participant with autism, compared with 7 Down 
Syndrome and 9 typically developing children, used pointing to share (i.e. protodeclarative 
pointing). Once again, the results of this study support the prediction that individuals with autism 
are impaired in the production of ‘sharing’ pointing, whilst their production of ‘requesting’ 
pointing is relatively unimpaired. ‘Sharing’ pointing involves taking into account the perspective
52
of the other in relation to an aspect of the world, an ability that appears to be impaired in 
individuals with autism.
To summarize, individuals with autism seem to have specific deficits in person-person-person 
interactions from early in their lives, and in particular, they have profound deficits in joint 
attention situations that involve sharing an event with another person, as opposed to joint 
attention situations that involve requesting objects. Since sharing of experiences involves some 
level of understanding that another person has a distinct subjective orientation, one might view 
these deficits as expressions of impairment in early forms of role-taking.
2.4.3- Autism and the process of identification
Finally, there arises the question of what are the mechanisms of supposed ‘non-inferential role- 
taking’ that might have roots in primary as well as secondary intersubjectivity. Here a study not 
with infants, but with older children and adolescents with autism, may point to the kind of 
processes that are involved.
Hobson and Lee (1999) tested the hypothesis that "people with autism might have specific 
limitation in imitating the 4style ' o f another person’s actions, and identifying with another person 
in tests o f  imitation “ (p.649). The aim of their experiment was to examine whether or not 
individuals with autism can imitate not only the action that accomplishes a goal, but also the style 
with which the action is performed. The imitation of the style was considered an index of 
identification with the person who performs the action. Sixteen participants with autism were 
matched according to chronological age and mental ability with 16 non-autistic mentally retarded 
participants. First, the investigators checked that the participants did not spontaneously use the 
material in the same way as the experimenters were going to demonstrate. The participant was
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seated across a table from the experimenter. During the demonstration period, the experimenter 
demonstrated four actions with different objects after saying “Watch this”. The actions were the 
following: a) E put a pipe-rack to his shoulder and drew the stick along its slotted edge three 
times, b) E wiped his brow with a cloth frog in three brief moments and then flattened the frog 
with a roller, c) E pressed a stamp on to the ink-pad and then on the a sheet of paper, and d) E 
pressed the top of a rolling policeman toy.
In addition, the experimenter employed two different styles of actions so that half of the children 
saw the experimenter using one style and the other half using the other style. In the first task, the 
experimenter strummed the pipe-rack in either a harsh or a gentle way. In the second task, the 
experimenter wiped his brow with the frog with either abrupt/harsh or with gentle/caressing 
movements. In the third task, the experimenter stamped down the inkpad and then the paper in 
either a forceful or in a careful way. Finally, in the rolling-policeman task the experimenter used 
either two outstretched fingers, or the front of his cocked wrist, to depress the top of the 
policeman.
Nearly all the participants were attentive and motivated to accomplish the goals of the four 
actions. However, as predicted, the participants with autism were significantly less likely than the 
control participants to imitate the style that accompanied the action. The authors suggested that 
the control participants imitated the style as well the goal of the action because they imitated not 
only the action, but also the person who accomplished such action, whereas the participants with 
autism imitated only the action. In addition, the authors realized that two of the four demonstrated 
actions involved an orientation to the body of the person who was acting, as seen in the pipe-rack 
and the frog tasks. Results showed that whereas 10 control participants oriented the pipe-rack to 
their own body and 14 oriented the frog to their own brows, only two participants (of the 16) with
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autism oriented the pipe-rack to their own body, and only five applied the frog to their own 
brows. Hobson (2002) gave the following interpretation of these results:
“In two respects, then, the children with autism were not moved to adopt the orientation o f the 
person they were watching. They did not adopt the s tyle with which Tony (the experimenter) 
executed the actions, nor did they identify with him and copy his self-orientated action so that 
these actions became oriented towards themselves. On the other hand, they were perfectly able to 
perceive and copy the strategies by which he achieved the goals in each demonstration. So they 
were able to learn something from watching what Tony did. They were also motivated to use what 
they had learned when their own turn came round. Yet what they learned seemed to be available 
from their position as a kind o f detached observer o f actions and goals. They were not moved. ” 
(p.223)
To date, however, there is only this suggestive evidence that individuals with autism fail to 
identify with other people, and one aim of the present thesis is to explore this hypothesis from 
novel points of view.
2.4.4- Additional perspectives
There is one additional line of evidence that bears upon the thesis that an impairment perceiving 
and responding to the attitudes and feelings of other people, rather than a constitutional cognitive 
impairment, might lead to autism. This derives from recent studies of children who have been 
deprived of certain forms of social contact from early in life, and specifically, deprived of 
experience of the ‘relatedness triangle’ either because of lack of vision -  since vision is important 
for seeing how other people’s attitudes focus on a ‘target’ in the world -  or profound deprivation. 
The evidence comes from studies of congenitally blind children, and children raised in Romanian 
orphanages where social contact was very limited.
In the case of congenitally blind children, the suggestion is that a lack of visual experience can 
lead to failure in psychological perspective taking. Moreover, the ability to perceive and be drawn 
into the bodily expressed feelings and attitudes of other people may be crucial for the
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development of mental representations of the child’s self in relation to other people (Sandler & 
Hobson, 2001). Hobson has suggested that because congenital blind children lack the experience 
of seeing (literally) the attitudes of other people directed to the world, and the experience of the 
‘relatedness triangle’ between the self, other and the shared environment, they are, therefore, 
deprived o f a principal means to achieve psychological co-orientation and co-reference with 
others (Hobson, 1993, p. 205). To be able to move and shift flexibly among different perspectives 
is very important for the children’s differentiation of different psychological orientations, and has 
been said to play an important role in the development of symbolism, language and theory of 
mind.
There have been several studies of congenitally blind children suggesting that an impairment in 
the perceptual ability to see are indeed associated with clinical features similar to those found in 
individuals with autism. For instance, Brown et al. (1997) found that in a group of special schools 
(and therefore not an epidemiological sample) a proportion of 10 out of 24 congenitally blind 
children justified the diagnosis of autism. This proportion corresponded closely with that 
suggested by Fraiberg and Adelson (1977), namely 7 out of 27 blind children. Brown et al. 
compared a group of visually impaired children who had been totally blind or with minimal light 
perception from birth, and a group of sighted autistic children. The two groups were subgrouped 
according to upper and lower ability in relation to their verbal IQ and were matched according to 
age and cognitive ability. In the upper ability category there were 15 blind children and 10 
sighted children with autism. In the lower ability category there were 9 blind children and 9 
sighted children with autism. The prevalence of autistic-like features distinguished more 
intellectually able (IQ>70) blind children from group-matched sighted autistic children, whereas 
less able (IQ<70) blind children were comparable to group-matched autistic children.
56
In a subsequent study, Hobson, Lee and Brown (1999) compared the same 9 visually impaired 
children who had been included within the lower ability group in 1997, with 9 sighted children 
with autism who were similar in age and intellectual ability. This time the groups were matched 
for IQ as well as verbal mental age. The purpose of this study was to examine the differences in 
the profiles of performance between visually impaired and sighted autistic children that might 
alter our perspective on the psychopathology of autism itself. The principal results were that 
there were close similarities between the groups, although there was some indication that the 
social impairments of the blind children were less severe than in those who were sighted.
In order to test the performance of a group of blind children in a theory of mind task, Minter, 
Hobson & Bishop (1998) compared a group of 21 visually impaired children with a group of 21 
sighted children, matched by CA and verbal IQ. Then, the participants were given two different 
theory of mind tasks which had been adapted for use with blind children. The performance of the 
participants across the two tasks was that over half of the visually impaired children (n=12), and 
only two sighted children, failed at least one theory of mind question. Moreover, one third of the 
visually impaired children (N=7) but only one out of 21 sighted children failed at least two such 
questions. The authors concluded that the factor most likely to account for the differences 
observed between visually impaired and sighted children’s performance on theory of mind tasks 
is the ability to see.
Here, then, there is evidence to suggest that for whatever reason -  and plausibly but not 
necessarily, because of a lack of visual co-orientation with other people -  congenitally blind 
children are at risk for the kinds of perspective-taking difficulties observed in sighted children 
with autism. Might such difficulties also arise in children who are deprived of almost all human 
contact over the early months of life? Here evidence from Romanian orphans may be relevant.
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With the end of Ceau§escu’s regime, several orphanages were found with children who had been 
raised in  very extreme condition where contact with other people was minimal. For example, 
some children were left in their cots for days without toys or any other stimulation, with limited 
contact with other people when they needed to be fed or washed. Some of these children were 
adopted by families in the United Kingdom.
A group of 111 of these children who before the age of 24 months were adopted in the UK were 
studied by a group of researchers to examine the impact of extreme social deprivation on the 
development of these children (Rutter et al. 1999). Professionals assessed the children at the ages 
of four and six years. What the authors found is that a higher than expected proportion of these 
children developed features of autism. The prevalence of autism in the UK has been reported to 
be of 4.9 children in 10,000 (Wing and Gould, 1979), and of 21.2 when including those 
individuals within the spectrum of autism. In Ruttter’s study one in 16 children presented with 
features of autism. The children who presented features of autism were further observed and 
studied through systematic interviews with parents, and questionnaires to parents and teachers. 
Although the features of autism differed considerably among the children, all children had severe 
problems with social relationships and communication. For instance, they had difficulties in 
forming friendships, showed impoverished reciprocal communication with others, poor eye-to- 
eye gaze and gestures in social exchanges, and their language in conversations was limited. A 
majority o f  theses children also developed obsessions and preoccupations, like many children 
with autism. The authors considered that prolonged experience of terrible social and non-social 
privation was very likely to be the main factor responsible of the “quasi-autistic” patterns found 
in these children. Once again, it appears that social-developmental factors, and perhaps but not 
necessarily experience of sharing experiences of the world with others, may lead to a clinical 
picture that includes features of autism and failures of role-taking.
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2.4.5- Summary
There are some data to suggest that individuals with autism have impairments in their early 
interpersonal relations that amount to deficits in forms of non-inferential role-taking. 
Abnormalities in both primary and secondary intersubjectivity have been reported in these 
children. One hypothesis is that failures in ‘identification’, involving engagement with and 
‘movement towards’ the psychological state of others, may be the underlying mechanism of such 
abnormalities.
During the first year of life, family home movies studies have revealed that babies who will be 
later diagnosed with autism present signs of anomalous development, are more 'quiet' or passive, 
manifest poor social interaction and manifest abnormal non-verbal gestures (e.g. eye contact or 
smiles) than typically developing children. However, when compared with children with mental 
retardation or developmental delay results are not decisive. The parents of the children with 
autism appear to report problems in their children significantly later than the parents of children 
with mental retardation or developmental delay. However, children with autism need more adult 
prompts to draw their attention when being called than children with developmental delay. In 
addition, regression (i.e. loss of capacities already acquired and used by the child) has been 
reported by 54% of parents of children with autism, and in this case, it is questionable how far 
one can claim that deficits in primary subjectivity or identification are ‘primary’ for other aspects 
of the syndrome. Observational studies of children with autism have provided evidence of a lack 
of emotional responsiveness to others during the second year of life, but by this time, it is also 
plausible that cognitive impairments such as those related to ‘metarepresentation’ may be 
operative.
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Impairment in person-person-object interactions, Trevarthen’s secondary intersubjectivity, has 
also been reported. Individuals with autism appear to have impairment in joint attention. For 
example, children with autism have difficulties in understanding and producing gestures that are 
used to share an event (as oppose to request for something). The lack of ‘sharing’ gestures, like 
pointing, have been considered as possible precursors of the autistic impairment in conceptual 
role-taking, and its absence in young infants has been recently included as a risk factor for the 
diagnosis of autism.
The interpersonal theory suggests that the process underlying non-inferential role-taking is the 
process of identification. Individuals with autism have been suggested to have difficulties in 
engaging emotionally and psychologically with other people, in other words, they have 
difficulties in identifying with other people with feelings and attitudes. For example, individuals 
with autism do not spontaneously say something or nod when greeting or saying goodbye to a 
stranger, and show limited eye contact with the new person. Moreover, the gestures of those who 
use a wave to say goodbye, appear to be abnormal. Also, the lack of identification with other 
people has been suggested to explain why individuals with autism can imitate and accomplish the 
goal of an action displayed by another person, but have specific difficulties in imitating the style 
used by that person while performing the action (e.g. gentle vs. harsh). Moreover, even though 
individuals with autism are motivated to imitate the actions and the goals of the actions that are 
orientated to the body of the person that performs them, they do not orientate these actions to 
their own bodies. This lack of orientation when imitating another person’s actions has been 
suggested to be an indicator of the lack of identification with other people of individuals with 
autism. Therefore, although they can imitate the action, they do not appear to imitate the person 
that accomplishes the action.
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Finally, studies that examine children who have experienced specific kinds of deprivation of 
interpersonal contact from early in life, and in particular congenitally blind children or children 
raised in Rumanian orphanages, provide some evidence to suggest that such conditions can lead 
to a picture similar to that characterized by individuals with autism. Therefore it is plausible that 
impairments in non-inferential role-taking play a role in leading to the syndrome of autism.
2.5- Conceptual role-taking in autism
The majority o f  studies that have examined the ‘ Theory o f  Mind’ impairment in autism have 
focused on the understanding of certain mental states, for example what it means to have false 
beliefs. The importance of ‘false belief is that it is a mental state in which a person has a 
representation of a state of affairs that is false, and therefore does not correspond to ‘true’ reality 
(Pemer 1991); and someone who understands this, understands the nature o f  people’s mental 
representation as constructs of ‘reality’. From the point of view of role-taking, here we have an 
example of the kinds of concepts required to fully appreciate how other people’s perspectives 
differ from one’s own, and how ‘perspectives’ per se are of different kinds.
Baron-Cohen eta  I. (1985) showed a group o f  children with autism, a group of children with 
Down syndrome and a group of typically developing children two dolls, one called Sally and one 
called Anne, who were standing in  the same room. The participants with autism had a mean 
mental age of 9,3 years, whereas the other two groups had lower mean mental ages of 5,11 and 
4,6 years respectively. The participants were shown how Sally placed a marble in a basket and 
went out of the room. While Sally was out, Anne moved the marble to a second basket and then 
Sally came back in. First, the authors ensured that the participants knew the dolls’ names. The 
participants were then asked different questions to test whether they knew that Sally would look
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for her marble in the basket that she (mistakenly) thought the marble was (belief question), and 
whether they knew where the marble was in the beginning and where the marble really was at the 
end (memory control question and reality control question). Even though the mental ages of the 
group with autism were higher than the ones of the other two groups, eighty percent of the 
children with autism failed to appreciate Sally’s false belief, saying that Sally would look in the 
basket where the marble actually was. In contrast, 86 percent of children with Down syndrome 
and 85 percent of the typically developing children responded that Sally would look where she 
had previously placed the marble. All participants successfully passed the remaining questions. 
Baron-Cohen et al. concluded that children with autism have a specific impairment in 
understanding other people’s mental states, and more specifically, the mental state of belief.
Since this study was published, several studies have explored why individuals with autism have 
difficulties in understanding the mental state of ‘belief and whether this impairment is specific to 
this term or is related to a wider impairment in understanding other mental states. For example, 
Pemer et a l (1989) devised a task with a smarties container. The participants with autism had a 
verbal mental age between five and 13 years. In this task the children were presented a smarties 
container and were asked what they thought was inside the container. They were then shown that 
there was a pencil instead of smarties and were asked what the next child would think is inside 
the smarties container. As in the previous task, the aim was to test whether the participants 
understood that the next child would not know that there was a pencil inside the container, and 
therefore would think that there were smarties inside the container instead. Once again, results 
showed that children with autism failed to recognize that another person might have a false belief 
about what was inside the smarties container, even when the participants with autism had been 
compared with a group of children with specific language impairment of lower verbal mental 
ages.
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The impairment of individuals with autism in understanding ‘false belief or related mental states 
was also confirmed using a different kind of task, a picture-sequencing test (Baron-Cohen et 
al.,1986). Individuals with autism performed well at sequencing stories that did not involve any 
understanding of mental states, whereas they performed significantly less well than typically 
developing participants or matched Down syndrome participants in those stories that involved 
understanding of a person’s belief. Other studies with older children with autism have provided 
further evidence of this impairment (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1989b; Reed and Peterson, 1990; 
Ozonoff, at a l 1991).
Additional studies have examined whether individuals with autism have difficulties in 
understanding other mental states than belief. One way of thinking about such studies is in terms 
of the kinds of mental perspective -  or the kinds of role-taking -  that either prove difficult, or 
relatively possible, for individuals with autism.
For example, Leslie and Frith (1988) tested two aspects of cognitive understanding in children 
with autism. First, they tested the ability to predict behaviour according to what someone knows 
or does not know. S econd, they tested the ability to remember the location of an object and 
understanding of the concept seeing/not seeing. The participants consisted of 18 children with 
autism whose CA ranged from 7;01 to 18;06 years, and whose MA ranged from 4 years 5months 
to 12years 8 months; and 12 children with specific language impairment (SLI), whose CA ranged 
from 6 years 11 months to 9 years 11 months, and whose MA ranged from 5 years 5 months to 8 
years 7 months. All the children were given a ‘false belief task. In addition, 14 of the children 
with autism participated in two other tasks (line of sight and memory for position), and all the 18 
children with autism were also given a ‘limited knowledge’ task. The line of sight task was a 
visual perspective-taking task, where the children had to work out whether or not a doll could see 
a counter using different positions. The memory of position task tested the children’s ability to
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remember the box in which a marble had been placed by an experimenter. The limited knowledge 
task tested whether or not the children were able to know that another person may or may not 
know that an object had been hidden in a certain place depending on what that person had seen. 
Finally, the ‘false belief task was similar to the Sally/Anne task but in this case, two 
experimenters gave the task instead of using dolls. The children with autism were very successful 
in their performance in the line of sight and memory for position tasks. They, nevertheless, 
performed very poorly on the knowledge and false belief task, with 10 and 13 participants 
respectively failing in their responses. This study supports the notion that children with autism 
have specific difficulties understanding not only beliefs, but also knowledge.
Tan and Harris (1991), examined the understanding of mental terms of perception, emotion and 
desire in individuals with autism. They tested a group of 20 children with autism (Mean CA: 
12;8, mean VMA: 7 ;7) who were compared with a group of 20 typically developing children 
(Mean CA: 6;11, Mean MVA: 6;5). The participants were given a visual perspective-taking task 
based on Flavell’s distinction of two levels of perspective-taking ability (levels one and two). 
Results indicated that children in both groups were very accurate on both levels of perspective 
taking ability (a result that confirmed previous studies about visual-perspective taking in autism; 
Hobson, 1984). Then, the children’s understanding of simple emotions and desires was tested. In 
this case, a group of 22 children with autism (Mean CA: 12; 1, Mean VMA: 6;3), was compared 
with a group of 22 typically developing children (Mean CA: 6;2, Mean VMA: 6;4) and a group of 
22 mentally retarded children (Mean CA: 12; 1, Mean VMA: 6;3). The procedure began with an 
'emotion judgment' task, where the participants were asked whether they would feel Very happy1 
or 'so unhappy* in four different scenarios. At the end of this task the participants were offered the 
choice of a sweet, with the promise that it would be given to them when they had finished. Then a 
'distracter' task was given. Here, the children were shown a group of items and were asked which 
one they liked. Finally, the experimenter handed the child the sweet that was not the one that
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he/she had chosen and waited to see if the participant spontaneously denied that it was the chosen 
sweet. The results were that the majority of the children in each group made an appropriate 
judgment about all the four ‘emotion judgment’ situations and almost all the participants in each 
group named their original choice either spontaneously or following a prompt from the 
experimenter. The authors concluded that autistic children have some understanding of emotions 
and desire. Finally, the authors discussed these findings in relation to the current research in this 
field. They proposed three possible explanations for the fact that children with autism understand 
some psychological states but not others. They suggested that the notion of a generalized 
developmental delay in the understanding of mental states must be abandoned and that the most 
plausible explanation would be a delay in the autistic children’s understanding of selected mental 
states.
Studies such as these have found that some aspects of conceptual role-taking appear to be 
impaired, and others intact, in individuals with autism. On the one hand, such individuals are 
good at recognizing where other people are looking as well as remembering aspects of their 
behaviour, and they seem to have some knowledge of what other people feel in different 
situations, at least at a level of simple emotions like ‘happy’. On the other hand, they appear to 
have specific difficulties in understanding what other people believe and know. However, these 
studies assume that conceptual role-taking (i.e. theory of mind) is directly related to the child’s 
understanding of mental state terms and leave aside the possibility that other processes may 
account for the development of a theory of mind, and therefore its impairment in individuals with 
autism. For example, the fact that “we know other people to be subjects o f experience" (Hobson, 
1993, p. 122) may require a more basic level of interpersonal understanding of their mental states 
that is required for interpersonal understanding.
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The question arises whether there is convincing evidence that the impairment of individuals with 
autism is specific to their limited grasp of representational mental states. For example, there are 
studies that have explored the perception of ‘feelings’ in others. It is less clear that the 
understanding of what another person is feeling is cognitively rooted, and it is possible that non- 
inferential role-taking is directly linked to  this understanding. I f  individuals with autism have 
difficulties in understanding ‘feelings’ in other people, then it is possible that the impairment in 
grasping concepts of ‘belief and ‘know’ may not stem from a primary impairment in the ability 
to metarepresent.
There have been a number of studies that have attempted to examine whether individuals with 
autism have difficulty in identifying expressions of feelings in others. Hobson, Ouston and Lee 
(1988) compared the performance of a group of children with autism with the performance of a 
language-matched group of non-autistic children on an emotion recognition test. This test 
consisted of a group of photographs of different people, which had to be matched with another set 
of photographs. In the emotion condition, the participants were asked to match the photographs of 
different people showing one emotion with photographs of the same people showing a different 
emotion (for example, a woman with happy face had to be matched with a man with happy face). 
In the identity condition, the photographs had to be matched according to identity (for example, 
the woman with happy face would need to be matched with a photograph of the same woman but 
with an angry facial expression). The results of the study showed that the two groups of 
participants were proficient in matching still-face photographs in both tests. However, the authors 
questioned whether the participants with autism were actually using different strategies from the 
control participants to accomplish the task. To test this idea, the participants were given the same 
two tests, but this time the mouths and foreheads of the faces had been blanked out. In this case, 
the participants had to respond according to the ‘feel’ of each face and therefore the level of 
difficulty of the task increased. Under these circumstances, the group with autism performed
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significantly less well than the control participants in the emotion test, but still performed equally 
well in  the identity test. Finally, the photographs were shown turned upside-down in order to 
disrupt face recognition and to eliminate the ‘feel’ of each expression. Here, the performance of 
the participants with autism improved considerably, whereas the performance of the control 
participants deteriorated: the performance of the participants with autism was significantly 
superior to the performance of the control participants on matching both emotions and identities. 
This result suggests that individuals with autism may be using more perceptually driven matching 
strategies than non-autistic participants (Hobson, Ouston and Lee, 1988; Ozonoff, Pennington and 
Rogers 1991) that may be compensating for a more basic impairment in the ‘feel’ of emotional 
expressions.
One could therefore argue whether the recognition of emotions in other people involves 
something more than cognitively representing a certain kind of ‘emotional’ mental state. In order 
to recognize emotion one has to feel what another person may be feeling through non-inferential 
role-taking. A few studies have examined whether individuals with autism have a specific 
impairment in the subjective ‘feeling’ of emotions in other people. One study used an innovative 
method that presented moving dots of light (Moore et a l 1997). The dots of light were attached to 
real people displaying actions and emotional expressions. The participants of this study were 13 
young people with autism who were matched according to age and verbal ability with 13 non- 
autistic participants. First, the authors tested and confirmed that the participants in the two groups 
could recognize the dots of light as people. Then the participants were shown sequences of the 
point-light person enacting gestures of different feelings (e.g. surprise or anger). Participants were 
asked, "tell me what’s happening”. Results showed that significantly fewer participants with 
autism than control participants described the person’s movements in terms of feelings (as 
opposed to the majority of control participants, who did so). The participants with autism, 
however, were very accurate in their definitions of what happened, but it was the person’s
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movements and actions rather than feelings that were reported. For example, a scared figure was 
described to be ‘standing up and moving backwards ’. After this test, the authors wanted to 
examine how accurately the participants with autism could name actions and emotions when 
explicitly asked to do so. The participants were presented sequences of dots of light, which were 
either emotionally expressive sequences (e.g. itchiness, boredom, tiredness, etc), or non- 
emotional actions (e.g. lifting, hopping, kicking, etc). They were then asked either ‘what the 
person is feeling ' or ‘what the person is doing'.Once again the participants with autism were 
markedly less successful in identifying the emotionally expressive sequences than in identifying 
the non-emotional actions sequences.
This lack of being influenced by the emotional responses of other people was also found by 
Sigman et al. (1992), who tested 30 three and a half year old children with autism, children with 
mental retardation, and 19 moth old typically developing children. A remote-controlled robot 
moved towards the child, and stopped. Then, the parent and experimenter, who were seated close 
to the child, made fearful facial expressions, gestures and vocalizations in relation to the robot. 
The participants with autism were less attentive to the adults, and appeared to ignore or not notice 
the adults showing these negative affects. Moreover, the participants with autism were much 
more engaged in toy play than the other children, suggesting that they were less influenced by the 
adult’s emotional responses of fear.
What these studies suggest is that although individuals with autism can name emotions in other 
people in some situations, it is not clear that they perceive other people’s expressions of feelings 
as salient or ‘affecting’ as other children. In fact, the processes underlying emotion recognition in 
individuals with autism appear to be different from those of non-autistic individuals, who seem to 
rely more on the subjective ‘feel’ of face or bodily expressions rather than on its perceptual 
characteristics. This was also suggested by a study by Weeks and Hobson (1987), who found that
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participants with autism tended to sort photographs of different men and women according to 
either gender or the fact that some of them were wearing hats; whereas a non-autistic verbally 
matched group tended to sort the photographs by the facial expressions displayed by the men and 
women of the photographs. Once again, the participants with autism appeared to be less engaged 
with expressions of feelings than the non-autistic participants. Ozonoff, Pennington, and Rogers 
(1990) also reported that individuals with autism performed significantly less well than age and 
verbal IQ matched non-autistic individuals in matching photographs of both simple and complex 
emotions.
Therefore, and to conclude, the evidence that individuals with autism have difficulties in 
conceptual role-taking because they have a primary cognitive impairment in the ability to 
‘metarepresent’ is inconclusive. It seems clear that individuals with autism have difficulties in 
understanding some mental states, but not others, and the reason for their difficulties do not 
always seem to stem from cognitive limitations. Studies on the recognition of emotions suggest 
that although individuals with autism may appear to be proficient in their understanding of certain 
emotions more subtle methods of investigating have found that individuals with autism may have 
difficulties in this respect. The processes underlying emotion recognition in individuals with 
autism seems to differ from those in non-autistic individuals. Therefore, there is some data to 
suggest that after all, the impairment in understanding mental states may perhaps have its roots in 
an impairment in interpersonal contact with others, in an impairment in non-inferential role- 
taking.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, the clinical picture of autism has been illustrated with a case study from Kanner 
(1943), concerning a person whose lack of social connectedness and involvement with other 
people was highlighted. Then two theories, the ‘interpersonal’ and ‘theory of mind’ theories, were 
examined in order to provide two different accounts concerning how individuals with autism 
come to have difficulties in understanding the psychological and emotional perspective of 
themselves and other people. Whereas the conceptual theory suggests that individuals with 
autism have an impairment in the modular system that provides young children with the 
necessary equipment to develop concepts about other people’s minds (i.e. conceptual role- 
taking); the interpersonal theory suggests that a more basic non-inferential role-taking impairment 
underline such development. Moreover, contrary to what the theory of mind theory suggests, the 
interpersonal theory considers that typically developing young children have a sense of the 
attitudes and feelings of other people before having the concepts to think about them.
Scientific evidence has been examined to study the impairment of individuals with autism in non- 
inferential and conceptual of role-taking, with the aim of finding evidence to either support or 
reject the view of the interpersonal theory about the origins of role-taking impairment in autism.
Evidence to support the theory of mind theory was inconclusive. Individuals with autism have 
difficulties in understanding some mental states, but not others, and such difficulties do not 
always seem to be accounted for by cognitive limitations. For example, studies of emotion 
recognition in individuals with autism have found that individuals with autism are proficient in 
understanding certain emotions; however, when using more subtle methods of investigating,
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individuals with autism show difficulties in this respect. They appear, therefore, to use different 
compensatory strategies than non-autistic children, in some situations to achieve the same goals.
In relation to the interpersonal theory of autism, impairments in primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity have been reported in individuals with autism. Nevertheless, reports from 
parents and family home movies provide ambiguous results about the lack of social 
connectedness of children with autism during the first year of life. These results make it difficult 
to either rule in or rule out the suggestion of the interpersonal theory that an impairment in non- 
inferential role-taking is present from birth in individuals with autism. In addition, there have 
been some studies that have examined the lack of identification of individuals with autism with 
other people, and have found some evidence to support this proposal. Moreover, studies with 
congenitally blind children, and children raised in Romanian orphans, have provided evidence to 
support the hypothesis that an early deprivation of social contact (either biologically rooted as in 
the case of individuals with autism and congenitally blind, or environmentally rooted as in the 
case of children raised in Romanian orphanages) can lead to a pictures similar to that of autism.
The studies in this thesis are not designed to examine whether early limitations of role-taking lead 
to the social impairments in autism, but rather, to test whether in relatively older children and 
adolescents, there is evidence for qualities o f impaired role-taking that seem to be in keeping with 
the interpersonal theory of autism and beyond that which could be explained by the ‘theory of 
mind’ theory. As already outlined, behind these studies lies the hypothesis that individuals with 
autism have an impairment in the ability to adopt different psychological perspectives (conceptual 
role-taking), because of more basic impairments in identifying with and moving (with feelings 
and attitudes) to the perspectives of other people (non-inferential role-taking). The following 
chapters will examine how far children with autism have the ability to adopt different
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psychological perspectives, from three perspectives: narrative role-taking (Chapter 3), deixis 
(Chapters 4 and 5), and non-verbal interpersonal communication (Chapter 6).
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CHAPTER THREE
Narrative role-taking in Autism
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3.1 Introduction
It is a commonplace observation that individuals with autism tend to be insensitive to the feelings 
and thoughts of others. One potentially helpful way of capturing this is to consider their 
difficulties in taking the role of another person.
Previously described in Chapter 2, the theory of mind theory suggests that the difficulties people 
with autism have in understanding the perspectives of other people stem from an impairment in 
understanding specific mental states. The hypothesis underlying the present thesis is precisely the 
opposite, that a difficulty in relating to others and in moving to the psychological position of 
other people is what leads individuals with autism to have problems in understanding specific 
mental terms and difficulties in adopting the perspective of another person. The latter hypothesis 
has been suggested by the interpersonal theory. This chapter will examine the ability to adopt the 
role and/or the perspective of another person in individuals with autism.
3.2 Narrative role-taking in autism
Role taking in people with autism has been studied from different research perspectives. In the 
area of the pragmatics, for instance, researchers have been interested in the way individuals with 
autism modify their language according to social context (Baltaxe, 1977; Menyuk, 1969; Prutting, 
1982; Loveland et a l 1990, Tager-Flusberg, 1981). For instance, adjustment in language may 
depend upon mutual understanding between speaker and listener, including their current feelings 
(Tager-Flusberg, 1993). Individuals with autism have difficulties in taking into account a 
listener’s needs in conversations (Loveland et al 1990) and have an inability to use markers of
74
time and place in narrated events (Bartolucci and Albers, 1974; Bruner and Feldman 1993, 
Loveland and Tunali, 1993). Some researchers have argued that these impairments are related to 
theory of mind deficits in autism (Tager-Flusberg,1995).
Conceptual role-taking has been studied by examining not only whether young people with 
autism understand mental states (see Chapter 2), but also whether they use mental states in their 
narratives. Tager-Flusberg (1992) carried out a longitudinal study with six young people with 
autism (aged 3 years and 4 months to 7 years 7 months) and Down syndrome (aged 3 years 3 
months to 6 years 9 months), respectively, who were matched according to chronological age and 
language level, as measured by the mean length of utterance (MLU). Transcripts of spontaneous 
speech protocols of the children in different activities (e.g. playing with toys) were collected 
bimonthly. All the psychological terms used by the children were classified into one of the 
following: desire (e.g. want), perception (e.g. listen), emotion-behaviour (e.g. cry), emotion (e.g. 
sad) and cognition (e.g. believe). Each one of these categories was divided into subcategories. For 
example, perception terms included vision, hearing, touch, smell, taste and attention; and 
cognition terms included idiomatic, conversational and mental terms. Results showed no 
significant differences between the two groups in the desire, perception and emotion terms used. 
However, the participants with autism were significantly less likely than control participants to 
refer to attention (e.g. use of Took, ‘see’ or ‘watch’ to call something to their mothers’ attention) 
and mental states (e.g. use of ‘belief, ‘knowledge’, ‘imagination’, ‘dream’ or ‘memory’ terms). 
The author wrote:
" Without the language to talk about cognitive states, it is no wonder that autistic children have 
such difficulties in social understanding and social relationships... ” (p. 170).
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The results of studies of conceptual role-taking appear to vary considerably depending on the 
matched groups. For example, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1995) examined a range of lexical 
cohesive devices in a set of narrative stories in a group of children with autism, to examine the 
relationship between narrative ability and theory of mind. The participants were 27 young people 
with autism (aged 6-22 yrs, IQ 43-92) who were compared with 27 non-autistic mentally retarded 
participants (aged 7-17 yrs, IQ 52-96) and with 17 normally developing participants with 
chronological ages comparable to the mental ages of the other two groups (aged 7-10 yrs). The 
groups with autism and with mental retardation were matched according to language ability, as 
measured by the CELF (Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals), which provides 
information about the participant’s sentence comprehension and productive language ability. The 
participants with autism were significantly older than the participants of the other groups. The 
participants were shown a wordless picture book with several stories described with pictures. 
Pilot work indicated that such book was likely to elicit numerous cognitive and emotion terms. 
Each participant was shown a story by an experimenter who said nothing to the child about the 
story. Then, the participant was asked to tell the story to another experimenter who had never 
seen the book before. To test theory of mind understanding, the groups with autism and mental 
retardation were shown other stories that were created to assess the participants’ understanding of 
false belief. These were stories of characters that knew that another person had a false belief of a 
situation; for example, a boy whose mother is cooking spaghetti, but he thinks she is making 
hamburgers for dinner. Participants were then asked questions about the theory of mind stories 
(e.g. "What does Ricky think Mum made for dinner?”) to test the their understanding of false 
belief. Results showed no significant differences in the number of emotion and related feeling 
state terms used by the participants. Also, contrary to what the authors expected, very few 
cognitive terms were used by the participants in any group (between 22 and 37 percent of the 
participants of each group), suggesting that the selected narrative task was not well suited for this 
purpose. As a result of this, it was not possible to reach a conclusion in relation to the
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participants’ use of cognitive terms. A high number of participants in both groups passed the false 
belief task. For both groups there was a strong association between passing the false belief task 
and talking about the cognitive states of story characters. The findings of this study indicate that 
if the groups are carefully matched on measures of linguistic ability, some of the reported 
differences between these groups are eliminated. The participants with autism were preselected 
for their advanced linguistic ability, and therefore may not be representative of the range of 
participants who are usually selected for this kind of study.
There are other studies that have also found fewer differences between individuals with and 
without autism than would be expected when examining the psychological content of their 
narratives. Lee & Hobson (1998) examined the content of what a group of 12 participants with 
autism (aged 9 years 2 months to 19 years; and VMA 4 years 4 months to 9 years 9 months) and 
ten non-autistic mentally retarded participants (aged 12 to 17 years one month; and VMA 4 years 
to 9 years 3 months) said about themselves during a self-understanding interview. The two groups 
were matched according to chronological age and verbal mental age. They were also comparable 
in the mean length of their utterances (MLU). The interview took between 35 and 60 minutes. 
The participants were asked questions about themselves (e.g. ‘W hat kind ofperson are you?’ ox 
‘ What makes you different from anyone you know? ^  in order to study whether their relative lack 
of interpersonal engagement was associated with limited reflective self-awareness (Hobson, 1990, 
1993), as well as a failure to integrate other people into their self-characterisations. In accordance 
with the authors’ predictions, participants with autism produced significantly fewer statements of 
a ‘social’ category (e.g. including attributes related to social interactions and social relations), 
even though they were very similar to the control group in producing other kinds of self-concepts, 
including psychological concepts (which concerns the individual’s emotions, thoughts, 
preferences, or other cognitive processes). Not one participant with autism made a social 
statement that referred to friends or being a member of a social group, whereas the majority of the
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control participants explicitly acknowledged others in their definitions of self. One possible 
interpretation of this result is that the restricted experience of interpersonal contact with other 
people constrains the social experience and understanding of people with autism. This lack of 
experience of other people appears to affect the concepts that they have about themselves and 
other people, even though they use psychological concepts of emotions, thoughts or preferences.
Therefore, the studies of Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1995), and Lee and Hobson (1998) 
suggest that individuals with autism with good linguistic abilities appear to use as many 
psychological concepts of emotions, thoughts, preferences, or other cognitive processes than non- 
autistic matched control individuals. Tager-Flusber and Sullivan also found a strong association 
between passing the false belief task and talking about the cognitive states of story characters. 
However, even though these individuals talk about some psychological states of other people, 
they seem to use fewer social statements related to social interactions and social relations (Lee 
and Hobson, 1998) when talking about themselves.
Thus, although individuals with autism seem to have some knowledge of other people’s mental 
states, it remains possible that they do not have a clear differentiation between their own 
perspective and that of others, as evidenced in their lack of statements of other people. Baltaxe 
and Simmons (1977) found that the bedtime monologues of a girl with autism reflected only a 
hearer’s perspective, in contrast to the monologues of typically developing children who tended 
to imitate a dialogue between two persons. This may suggest a difficulty in managing changes in 
point of view (Loveland and Tunali, 1993).
One way of studying whether or not individuals with autism move flexibly across different 
viewpoints is by examining how they organize stories in relation to their characters. Very few
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studies have examined this aspect of story narratives in detail. Loveland and Tunali (1993) gave 
the following description of story narratives:
“A story-narrative is expected to be an organized series o f causally-related event-descriptions 
that deal with some topic or lead to some p o in t... Only after several years’ practice do children 
begin to produce adult-like narratives. ...Both fictions and anecdotes require an understanding o f 
event causality and linguistic tools for describing events. ...In  the case o f re-tellings, much o f the 
distinction between fiction and anecdote disappears, since the teller need not construct the 
fiction. ... Stories may also be spontaneous or elicited. ... This technique (Elicited stories), has 
the v irtue o f i  nsuring s ome d egree o f  u niformity o f  c ontent a mong then arratives o f  d ifferent 
tellers, enabling the experimenter to make comparisons more directly. However, it does not 
reveal whether the subject can make up a story ‘out o f the whole cloth’”, (p. 249-50).
Thus, re-telling a story is a highly demanding task that requires taking into account several 
aspects of the story at once, like the distinction between reality and fiction. Loveland and Tunali 
(1993) suggested that re-telling stories should be difficult for people with autism because it 
involves a need to make references clearly, to interpret the meaning of the material, and convey it 
to the listener clearly. In addition, original story-telling should be most difficult for a person with 
autism, because it involves few structuring limits and the choice is unlimited.
Loveland et al. (1990) investigated narratives of a group of high functioning individuals with 
autism when re-telling a story from a puppet show or a videotaped sketch, for the reason that this 
ability might reflect the child’s ability to describe everyday events to a conversational partner. A 
group of 16 participants with autism (their mean CA was 13 years and 6 months, and their mean 
VMA was 6 years) was matched according to chronological age and verbal ability with a group of 
16 participants with Down’s syndrome (their mean CA was 13 years and 3 months and their mean 
VMA of 5 years and 9 months). Before showing the puppet show to the youngest participants, 
and a videotaped sketch with actors, of similar nature, to the oldest participants, the participants 
were told that they would be asked some questions about the stories after its presentation. Each 
story involved a thief who tries to steal something from a main character, but is driven away. The 
story was presented twice, and then another experimenter entered the room and asked: "Tell me
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the story. What happened in the story? Results showed that the participants with autism were to 
some extent able to interpret the story presented, and to tell the story to a listener. However, the 
kinds of narratives in children with autism reflected a lack of organization and clarity, poor 
grammar, intrusions and incoherence. They also displayed a failure to anticipate the listener’s 
needs for new or previous information. Some of the narratives given by individuals with autism 
suggested that they do not fully understand characters’ thoughts or motivations, reporting mainly 
the characters’ actions. In this case, 37 % participants with autism, and only 6% of the control 
participants, understood the puppets mainly as moving objects, rather than as characters of a 
story. The authors said, “this deficiencies might reflect a broader difficulty in appreciating 
meaningful aspects o f human activity and the human world” (p. 19), suggesting that the social 
deficits in autism is not limited to an impairment in understanding other people’s thoughts and 
feelings. They suggested that what seems to be lacking in individuals with autism is a “human 
cultural perspective "(p.21).
One interesting observation came from an anecdote of a high functioning male with autism who 
participated in this study (Loveland and Tunali, 1993). About an hour and a half after having 
narrated a story to an experimenter, he spontaneously re-told the story to his mother during a free 
interaction session. What the authors noticed was that his meanings were obscured by distortion 
of grammar and failure to specify the referents of pronouns. Moreover, when retelling the story 
he betrayed a lack of awareness that the story was fiction instead, telling it as if it really 
happened. The authors suggested that, although it is difficult to know the source of this confusion, 
this might be an indication o f  a failure to  understand the character’s motivations in  the story 
context.
To conclude, most of the research undertaken to examine whether individuals with autism 
understand the perspectives of other people has focused on the understanding or use of certain
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psychological terms. Some studies have also examined the linguistic organization of stories 
produced by individuals with autism in relation to their pragmatic understanding. However, it is 
unclear to what extent people with autism can take the role or the perspective of different 
characters within a story, and whether they can move across their different perspectives. This is 
an important aspect o f  role-taking still to be examined. One of the difficulties of this type of 
research, as Loveland and Tunali (1993) emphasised, is to design a sensitive method of approach, 
especially when the aim is to study participants’ original story tellings.
The aim of this chapter is to examine whether role-taking abnormalities are reflected in the 
story-tellings of individuals with autism within a formally structured role-taking task, and to 
determine more precisely the nature of any limitations in their role-taking ability. Although the 
participants with autism were encouraged to tell new stories, these were based upon similar 
material across participants in order to obtain consistent stories.
3.3 A study to examine role-taking in young people with autism
The present study investigates the degree to which children with autism have difficulties in 
adopting the perspective of another person. More specifically, its aim is to assess whether the 
children can adopt complementary roles within stories. The method was to employ a task 
designed by Feffer (1970) for use with participants with mental delay. This evaluated whether 
participants were able not only to adopt the role of a character of a story (e.g. “I am a mum and I 
cooked dinner for the boy ”), but also to adopt the perspective of such a character (e.g. “ My son 
loved the dinner that I cooked for him ”). The ability to move from the perspective of one 
character when telling a story, to the perspective of another character when retelling the same 
story, was also assessed (e.g from the son’s point of view: “ I loved the dinner that my mum
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cooked for me”). The co-ordination of the content of the stories that the participants told from 
different characters’ viewpoints was an additional feature of this role-taking task.
3.3.1- Hypothesis and predictions
The hypothesis underlying this study is that social connectedness is important in  determining 
more sophisticated kinds of interpersonal understanding, such as inferential and conceptual role- 
taking, and that children with autism are handicapped in this respect.
For the present study, the predictions concerned the manifestations of impaired role-taking in 
producing stories:
a) The principal prediction was that compared with a language-matched group of individuals without 
autism, children with autism would score lower on Feffer's measure of overall role-taking ability, as 
applied to the stories they produced.
b) A subsidiary prediction concerned the pattern of results on the component indices of role-taking 
within Feffer’s overall measure: that 'perspective-taking ’ (which covers the most ‘social’ of Feffer’s 
indices,) would contribute more to group differences than story co-ordination (which also implicates 
more cognitive abilities).
c) A second subsidiary prediction was that individuals with autism would score lower on ‘change o f 
perspective ’ than the non-autistic participants. Change of perspective was the ability to retell one 
story from the perspective of two different characters.
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d) The final prediction was that group differences in role-taking ability would not be explained by the 
participants' lack o f mental state concepts, as revealed in their stories. The importance of this is to 
examine whether the autistic child’s difficulties in understanding other psychological perspectives 
might be reduced to the use and comprehension of mental terms.
3.3.2- Participants
The participants of this study were 15 children and adolescents with autism and 15 children and 
adolescents with mental retardation but without autism. All the participants with autism fulfilled 
diagnostic criteria for autism according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, (DSM-IV: American Psychiatric Association, 1994- See Appendix 1) and the 
Childhood Autism Rating Scale of Schopler, Reichler, & Renner (CARS: Schopler,E. et al. 1986- 
See Appendix 2). The two groups were group-matched for chronological age and language ability 
derived from the participants’ performance on the British Picture Vocabulary scale (BPVS: Dunn 
et al. 1982). Although the BPVS is a widely used measure of verbal mental age in studies with 
children with autism, the profile of linguistic skills in individuals with autism is different from 
that of other groups of children. In the present study, the participants were given a linguistic task 
where they were asked to tell stories about different characters. Therefore, it was necessary to 
establish that the two groups participating in the study were comparable in relevant linguistic 
skills, in order to ensure that a ny d ifference i n t heir p erformance o n t he t ask w as n ot d ue t o 
differences in language ability.
It was also important to establish that the two groups were comparable in the complexity of their 
language output. Therefore as a supplementary procedure the mean length of utterance (MLU) 
was calculated for each participant. This was achieved by counting the number of morphemes per 
utterance, using the participant’s first 50 utterances in the role-taking task, as shown in Appendix
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3 (Brown 1973). The participants with autism had a mean MLU of 6.14 (SD 1.61 range 3.92 to 
9.90) and the participants without autism had a mean MLU of 6.90 (SD 1.92 range 4.27 to 11), t 
= -1.2, df= 28, ns. In order to establish that the amount of verbal output was also similar in the 
two groups, the number of words used by each participant in the task was counted. The 
participants with autism had a mean number of words of 105 (SD 65, range 37 to 210) and the 
participants without autism had a mean number of words of 107 (SD 59, range 24 to 216). 
Therefore in these respects the two groups were comparable.
Participant characteristics are presented in Table 3.1. The chronological ages of the two groups 
ranged between nine and eleven years, and the verbal mental age between approximately four and 
eleven years. In the group with autism there were 14 boys and one girl, and in the control group 
11 boys and four girls.
Chronological Age Verbal Mental Age 
(BPVS)
Mean Length of 
Utterance (MLU)
Mean
yr;mo
SD
yr;mo
Range
Yr;mo
Mean
yr;mo
SD
yr;mo
Range
yr;mo Mean SD Range
Autistic
n=15 13;04 2;10
9;08-
17;03 6;09 1;09
4;09-
10;07 6;16 1;67
3;92- 
9; 90
Non-
autistic
n=15
14;02 2;11
10;10-
19;0 7;02 1; 10
4;05-
10;04 6; 90 1;92
4;27- 
11 ;00
Table 3.1 Narrative RT study: Participant characteristics
3.3.3- Method
Participants were tested in their own schools in a quiet room by one experimenter. The task was a 
structured role-taking task which was designed to be used with children with mental delay
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(FefFer, 1966). Fifteen drawn cut-out human figures, each 8.5cm high, were presented to the 
participants. They depicted a range of different people: for example a nanny, a policeman or a 
little girl. There were also seven drawings of backgrounds scenes: for example, a classroom, an 
empty street or a living room.
Each participant was asked to produce two stories in relation to three characters and two 
different background scenes. For the first story, the participant was given the ‘living room 
scene’ as a background, and was asked to select three characters from the 15 available figures 
to take part in the story. Once the participant had selected the figures he or she was given the 
following instructions:
7 want you to make up a story with a beginning a middle and an end about this scene and these 
people’.
After the participant had told the story, the experimenter said:
‘Now I  want you to tell me the very same story again as i f  you are....(one of the figures that 
featured often in the story was selected)..so this time you are the... ’.
Once the participants had retold the story from the point of view of the chosen character, then 
he or she was asked to retell the very same story again, but this time from the point of view of 
another character. The instructions were as follows:
7  want you to tell me the very same story again but this time you are th e .... ’
(The character that interacts the most with the main character was chosen by the investigator).
When the first story had been completed, the whole procedure was repeated a second time. In 
this case, however, the participant was invited to choose which background scene he or she 
wanted for the story, as well as which three of the remaining 12 drawn figures would take part.
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The critical issue was how far the participant would adjust and elaborate each account so that 
each version was described from the perspective of the main character, and therefore the other 
characters (the second characters) were described from the protagonist's point of view.
All the participants were prompted by the experimenter if necessary with questions such as 
'So what happened next? \  ‘What did the mum do?, etc.
Participants were audio and video taped while being tested on Feffer's role-taking task. 
Transcriptions of the stories were used for rating purposes, and the videotaped information 
was only used when it was not clear from the transcriptions which character the participant 
was referring to.
3.3.4 Scoring of the Role-Taking Task
Although the scoring criteria were based on those used by Feffer, some changes were introduced 
in the ways in which the scores were organized in order to simplify the previous complex scoring 
system. All the modifications will be highlighted. The following illustrates the structure of the 
scoring. The terms and scoring procedure will be explained later on with more detail in the text.
There were two stories and two versions of each story. For each version of a story, participants 
were scored for,
a) Adoption of a role (item score 0-2): whether or not the child took the role of the main 
character.
b) Adoption of a perspective (item score 0-2): whether or not the child put him/herself into the 
character’s shoes.
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c) Co-ordination of story content (item score 0-4): whether or not the content of the role-taking 
versions was the same as the content of the main stories.
In addition, the two versions of each story were considered in relation to one another. This 
generated a further score for
d) Change of perspective (item score 0-4): whether or not the child adopted the perspective of one 
character on the one hand, then the perspective of another character within a different version of 
the same story on the other hand.
Then the scores were combined as follows in the Table 3.2:
Table 3.2 Narrative RT study: Scoring procedure
Therefore the transcriptions of four accounts comprised the material used for ratings. What 
follows is a description of the overall scores and each one of the role-taking components. In
OVERALL 
ROLE- TAKING 
INDEX
addition, the classification of the psychological terms used by the participants will also be 
described.
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
SCORES
Adoption of a role 
Adoption of a perspective
CO-ORDINATION
SCORES Co-ordination of story
87
- Overall Scores
a) Overall Role-Taking Index (Feffer’s overall index score) max score=32: This is a composite 
measure that combines “perspective taking" and "co-ordination" scores.
b) Perspective Taking scores (Feffer’s role-taking shift) max score=16: This is the composite 
score that combines ‘adoption o f a role’ and ‘adoption o f a perspective’.
c) Co-ordination scores (Feffer’s role-taking co-ordination) max=16: This is the composite score 
that combines all the co-ordination scores given to the main and the second characters on each 
version.
d) Change o f perspective (Feffer’s change of perspective score) max score=4: This is a score 
calculated from the profile of the ‘adoption o f a perspective ’ score of the two versions of each 
initial story. Here, whether or not the participant was able to move from the perspective of one 
character in one version, to the perspective of the other character in the other version of the same 
story, was studied. This score will be described in more detail later.
- Role-taking Components.
Each role-taking version produced by the participants received a score within different role-taking 
components: 1) adoption of a role, 2) adoption of a perspective, and 3) co-ordination of story 
content.
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a) Adoption o f a role (Feffer’s ‘self-entry’) max score per version=2:
This is the ability to describe the main character according to his or her role. It is important to 
stress that to take a role does not necessarily mean taking the perspective of a character since the 
participant could be describing the main character according to his/her role attributes without 
modifying the story or the description of the other characters from the main character’s point of 
view. The description of the main character for each of the role-taking versions was given a rating 
that ranged from 0 to 2, where a score of 0 was given for no adoption of a role, and a score of 2 
was given for good adoption of a role, as follows:
a.l- Score 0 (Feffer’s No Role-Taking score):
Criterion: The participant received a score of 0 when he or she neither took the role of the main 
character nor showed any degree of elaboration of a perspective when describing the main 
characters of the stories.
Example: a boy with autism said, " That boy was going to bed. He was having a bath before he 
goes to bed.... ”
a.2- Score 1 (Feffer’s Simple Role-Taking score):
Criterion: The participant received a score of 1 when the main character was not described 
according to his or her own role, but in this description there was some elaboration of a role. For 
instance, the use of dialogue could be a sign that the participant had some degree of 
understanding of the protagonist’s role.
Example: a girl of the control group said, “( (boy) Hi Sue. (girl) Hi, what have you done to your 
leg? (boy) Oh I  fe ll o ff a tree. Went on holiday, (girl) Did you have a nice holiday?.... ”
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a.3- Score 2 (Feffer’s role-taking score):
Criterion: The participant received a score of 2 when he or she described the main character 
according to his or her role. To show a correct use of personal pronouns (for instance to use ‘I* 
every time that the participant refers to the main role-taking character) was sufficient to receive a 
score of 2.
Example: a boy with autism said, “So I  stick out my tongue at the girl, and the teacher tell me 
off, send me to the Headmaster, and he said ‘This is your one more chance’. I  went outside. I  hit 
the girl and the teacher said ‘You are expelled from school! ”
b) Adoption o f a perspective (Feffer’s ‘elaboration entry’) max score per version=4:
This is the degree to which the characters of each version were described from the main 
character's point of view. Thus, the critical feature is how the story was modified according to the 
perspective of the main character. Here the description of the story from the main character’s 
viewpoint was rated according to the following criteria:
b .l- Score 0 (Feffer’s Character Elaboration together with the PEO score):
Criterion: the participant received a score of 0 when the second characters were not described as 
seen from the perspective of the main character. A score of 0 was also given to those versions 
where the content of the story had important discrepancies in relation to the content of the initial 
story, so even if the participant was adopting a perspective, this perspective was not the one of the 
main character (the participant could be making up a different character).
Example: a boy of the control group (who received a score of 2 in ‘Adoption of a Role’ and a 
score of 0 in ‘Adoption of a Perspective’) said: " I ’m the mum and I ’m doin ’ the nurse. And 
helpin ’ the boy is on crutches with the plaster leg. And the dad is waiting”
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b.2- Score 1-2 (Feffer’s Perspective Elaboration 1 and 2):
Criterion: the participant received a score of either 1 or 2 when the second characters were 
distinguished in relation to the perspective of the main character.
b.2.1- Score 1 (Feffer’s PEI score):
Criterion: the participant received a score of 1 when the story was described from the point of 
view of the main character, in terms of specific actions.
Example: a boy with autism (who received a score of 2 on ‘Adoption of a Role and a score of 1 
on ‘Adoption of a Perspective’) said, “ Once upon a time I  was coming, I  was walking through 
the door and I  saw my big brother and my small brother and I  gave them a present. I  gave 
Andrew a watch, my small brother a watch and my big brother a coat.... ’’
b.2.2- Score 2 (Feffer’s PE2 score):
Criterion: The highest score of 2 was given when the participant used psychological terms when 
retelling one story from the main character’s viewpoint.
Example: a girl of the control group (who received a score of 2 on ‘Adoption of a Role and a 
score of 2 on ‘Adoption of a Perspective) said: " Once I  got my son some presents ‘cos it was his 
birthday. ..and he had a dog because he’s always loved dogs...I bought him a dog...he loved 
it...the dog ate the choke so me and my wife had to take him to the vet.... ”
c) Co-ordination o f story content (max score per version=6)
Criterion: Co-ordination is the degree to which the content o f each version is compatible with the 
content o f the initial story. What is evaluated here is whether the participant is retelling the initial 
story and not making up a new one. In Feffer’s original coding system, co-ordination was a single 
score that merged the co-ordination o f  the description o f  both main and second characters in
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relation to the initial story. In the current scoring system a score of co-ordination was given to the 
main and second characters respectively, because in some cases it was difficult to give a single 
score.
Each score of co-ordination ranged between 0 and 2, where 0 meant poor co-ordination of the 
story content and 2 very good co-ordination. Therefore, the maximum score for co-ordination per 
version was 4 after having added the two co-ordination scores for both first and second 
characters.
- Change of Perspective (max score per two versions=4):
Criterion: Change of perspective is the degree to which the participant was able to move from the 
perspective of one character in one version, to the perspective of the other character in the other 
version of the same story. Therefore ‘change of perspective’ was scored considering the two 
versions in relation to one another. The participant received a score higher than 0 when he/she 
described the initial story from the perspective of two different characters, adopting the 
perspective on each version of the same story. Therefore, in order to score more than 0 on 
‘change of perspective’, a participant had to score at least 1 on ‘adoption of a perspective’ in both 
versions.
The scores for ‘change of perspective’ were the following for each pair of versions:
a) Score 0: This score was given when the participant had a score of 0 on ‘Adoption of a 
Perspective’ in at least one version.
b) Score 1: This score was given when the two versions received a score of 1 on ‘Adoption of 
a Perspective’.
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c) Score 2: This score was given when at least 1 version received a score of 2 on ‘Adoption 
of a Perspective’; and the other version received a score of at least 1.
- Psychological Terms (not from Feffer)
In addition, all the psychological terms used by the participants in each role-taking version were 
categorized according to the classification used by Tager-Flusberg (1992). Each psychological 
term was classified into one o f  the following categories: a) Desire (e.g. care, want, wish), b) 
Perception (e.g. watch, cold, smell, taste), c) Emotion-behaviour (e.g. cry, kiss, smile), d) 
Emotion (e.g. angry, happy, hate), and e) Cognition (e.g. believe, forget, think).
3.3.5- Reliability of scoring.
The assessment o f  inter-rater reliabilities was based on the ratings of two independent judges 
rating 20% of the data (three participants with autism and three non-autistic participants). The 
degree of agreement was evaluated by calculating the Kappa coefficient, which takes into account 
the likelihood of chance agreement between the raters. The Kappa coefficients (Landis and Koch, 
1977; See Appendix 4) were 0.63 for perspective-taking and 0.78 for co-ordination scores, 
reaching substantial agreement between the two raters. The Kappa’s coefficient for ‘adoption of a 
Role’ was 0.76, and for ‘adoption of a perspective’ was 0.92, reaching substantial and almost 
perfect agreement respectively.
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3.3.6- Results
I shall begin by presenting the formal results in relation to the a priori predictions and will 
conclude with an informal overview of the content of the stories. Although there were no 
predictions in relation to the latter part of the study, such a description will provide a framework 
for interpreting the more specific results.
- Formal results
The scoring method outlined by Feffer yields data that are mostly ordinal rather than interval in 
quality. For example, there are variables that are created by adding up four scores that are rated 
with a 0-2 point scale where zero means low performance and a score of two means good 
performance. Therefore two people may score for instance 5 and have four 0-2 point scale scores. 
For this reason nonparametric analyses have been adopted. However, parametric statistics will be 
used for descriptive purposes.
a) Overall Scores
a.l- Overall Role-Taking Index (max score 32): The prediction in relation to the overall role- 
taking score was that compared with a language-matched group of individuals without autism, 
children with autism would score lower on Feffer’s measure of overall role-taking ability. This 
difference was confirmed to be significant (mean rank autistic 12.7, mean rank non-autistic 18.3, 
Mann-Whitney U=71, p< .05, one-tailed). Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the participants on 
the overall role-taking scores. In this figure one can see how the majority of participants with 
autism are distributed among the lower scores, although some participants with autism managed
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to score relatively high in role-taking (three of them very highly), suggesting that some 
individuals with autism can achieve a sophisticated degree of role-taking.
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The correlation between verbal mental age and ‘overall role-taking score’ was analysed with a 
Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficient. This was shown to be significant in the 
control participants (Spearman’s coeff .69, p<.005), but not in the participants with autism 
(Spearman’s coeff .33, ns). This finding suggests that role-taking and mental age are not as 
strongly related in individuals with autism as in non-autistic individuals.
a.2- Perspective Taking and Co-ordination scores (max score 16 each): The first subsidiary 
prediction was that ‘perspective-taking’ contributes more to group differences than story co­
ordination, because it is more dependent on social factors than co-ordination. To test this 
prediction two scores, one for each component, were derived. A total score of ‘perspective 
taking’ was calculated by adding the scores of ‘adoption of a role’ and ‘adoption of a
1 I I I I I I I
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
Overall role-taking score ■  Autistic 
□  Non-autistic
Figure 3.1 Narrative RT study: Overall role-taking score
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perspective’. Then, the general ‘co-ordination’ score was calculated by adding all the scores of 
co-ordination of story versions for both the main and the second characters. The mean score for 
perspective taking was 5.5 (SD: 4.7) for the group with autism and 8.2 (SD: 3.7) for the control 
group, the mean score for co-ordination was 10.7 (SD: 4.8) for the group with autism and 12.7 
(SD:3.9) for the control group. As predicted, t here w as a s ignificant d ifference b etween b oth 
groups in ‘perspective-taking’ (Mann-Whitney U=69, p< .05, one-tailed) but not in co-ordination 
(Mann-Whitney U=84, ns, one tailed).
Given that the scores of both perspective-taking and co-ordination ranged between 0 and 16, a 
Mann-Whitney test analysis with the difference scores between co-ordination and perspective- 
taking was conducted to examine whether there was an interaction between these scores. This 
analysis showed no significant interaction between the variables, suggesting that the two groups 
scored higher on co-ordination that perspective-taking as Figure 3.2 shows.
—
16'
14 '
12 '
10'
Perspective taking Story coordination
■  Autistic DNonautistic
Figure 3.2 Narrative RT study: Perspective-taking and Co-ordination mean scores.
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a.3- Change of perspective (max score 4): A second subsidiary prediction was that individuals 
with autism would score lower on ‘change of perspective’ than the non-autistic participants. 
Change of perspective was described as the degree to which the participant was able to retell the 
very same initial story from the point of view of two different characters. What this means is that 
in order to score more than 0 on ‘change of perspective’, participants are required to have scored 
more than 0 on ‘adoption of a perspective’ in the two versions of the same story. Table 3.3 shows 
that 3 out of 15 participants with autism, and 9 out of 15 participants without autism, described 
the two versions of at least one story from the point of view of the main characters, a significant 
group difference (Fisher’s exact test, one tailed, p = .030).
At least one CP No episodes
Autistic Group 
n = 15 3 12
Control Group 
n = 15 9 6
Table 3.3 Narrative RT study: Number of Ps who changed perspective in at least one story 
- Psychological Terms (not from Feffer)
The final subsidiary prediction was that group differences in  role-taking ability would not be 
explained by the participants' lack of mental state concepts, as revealed in their stories. Table 3.4 
shows the number of participants who used terms in each psychological category at least once. 
The two groups were remarkably similar in their use of psychological terms. If one considers 
those participants who used these terms more than once (see Table 3.5), the number of terms used 
is also very similar. The two groups used ‘desire’ terms like, want, need or hope; ‘perception’
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terms like watch, see or listen; ‘emotion-behaviour’ terms like fight, cry or smile; ‘ emotion’ 
terms like miserable, happy or worried; and ‘cognition’ terms like know, think and believe
Desire Perception Emotion-
Behaviour
Emotion Cognition
Autistic 
group n=15 7 12 8 14 8
Non-autistic 
group n=15 6 12 5 10 9
Table 3.4 Narrative Rr? study: Number of Ps who used mental terms at least once
Desire Perception Emotion-
Behaviour
Emotion Cognition
Autistic 
group n=15 1 8 2 10 4
Non-autistic 
group n=15 1 7 1 9 5
Table 3.5 Narrative RT study: Number of Ps who used mental terms more than once
- Perspective-taking Components
Next I shall report the performance of each group on each one of the ‘perspective-taking’ 
components: ‘adoption of a role’ and ‘adoption of a perspective’.
a) Adoption o f a role (max score= 8): The ability to take the role (but not the perspective) of the 
main character was tested. This score was created by adding the scores of ‘adoption of a role’ of 
each version. The maximum score for each version was 2, which means that the participant was
98
able to take the role of the main character. The ‘adoption of a role’ score also includes a score of 
1 for those participants who showed some ability to adopt a role (e.g. using dialogues among 
participants).
The group with autism showed a tendency to score lower on adoption of a role (Mann-Whitney 
test, U=74.5, one tailed, p= .056). At this point it was important to examine the profile of the 
scores, in that this would identify the numbers of individuals who were relatively unable or 
consistent in role-taking. In relation to the maximum scores in ‘adoption of a role’, 8 participants 
with autism and 12 participants without autism took the role of the main character in at least one 
of the four role-taking versions. However, in relation to the minimum scores in ‘adoption of a 
role’, 8 participants with autism but not a single individuals among the control participants did 
not take the role of a character in at least one version (Fisher’s exact test, two tailed, p< .003).
Although there was a greater number of participants with autism who did not take the role at all 
(scoring zero) in at least one of the four role-taking versions, it is important to highlight that only 
two participants (both with autism) scored zero in adoption of a role in all four versions. 
Therefore, most of the participants with autism (although scoring zero in at least one version) 
achieved some degree of role-taking.
b) Adoption o f a perspective (max score = 8): this is the degree to which the story was described 
in relation to the main character's point of view. Here, the second characters were seen from the 
perspective of the main character.
Again, there was a trend for participants with autism to achieve lower scores (Mann-Whitney 
Test, group with autism mean rank= 13.17, control group mean rank = 17.83, two tailed, p=.12).
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As in  the case o f  ‘adoption o f  a role’, this score comprises the total scores across four story 
versions, and therefore it is important to explore the participants’ responses in more detail.
In relation to those participants who adopted the perspective of the main character (either 
describing it in terms of specific actions or in psychological terms), there were 5 participants with 
autism and 10 participants without autism who adopted the perspective in at least one version 
(Fisher’s exact test, two tailed, p = 0.14). However, among those participants who adopted a 
perspective, only a few in each group conveyed psychological orientations in at least one of the 
four role-taking versions (3 out of the 5 participants with autism, and 4 out of the 10 control 
participants who adopted a perspective). The remaining 2 participants with autism and 6 
participants without autism who adopted a perspective in at least one of the four role-taking 
versions, did so in terms of specific actions.
- Background to formal results.
I shall now give a brief description of the topics that the participants chose for their stories, as 
well as a description of how the different characters interacted with each other in their stories.
Participants in both groups told stories concerned with similar topics. For example, in the 
versions of the first story (where the living-room was used as the background scene), participants 
told stories about matters involving a family (six participants from each group) and robbery (five 
participants from each group). Among the remaining participants, one control participant made up 
stories about getting ready, two control participants about helping others, one participant with 
autism about hunting, another child with autism about watching television, and one participant in 
each group described social events, such as having a cup of tea with someone else. For the second 
story, participants chose the following background scenes: 6 autistic and 3 control participants 
chose the doctor’s surgery as the background scene, 3 autistic and 7 control participant chose the
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classroom, 2 autistic and 2 control participants chose the street comer, 3 autistic participants 
chose the bedroom, and 1 autistic and 3 control participants chose the shop scene. In these 
versions, participants of the control group tended to make up stories about misbehaving in school 
(3 autistic and 7 control participants) and about robbery (2 autistic and 6 control participants), 
whereas relatively more participants with autism told stories about doctor/illness (5 autistic and 2 
control participants). The remaining 4 participants with autism made up stories about shopping (1 
participant), helping others (2 participants) and about a row (1 participant).
To explore how the characters of the stories were related to one another, a rater who was blind to 
diagnosis rated the degree of interaction, and the emotional and psychological engagement, 
among the characters that the stories conveyed. No inter-rater reliability was calculated in this 
section of the results because the purpose here was to explore the content of what the stories that 
the participants produced, on a descriptive level.
a) Interaction among characters: The aim here was to study whether or not the characters 
interacted with each other in the stories produced by the participants. Thus, the assessment was 
whether the three characters of each version had contact with each other in the stories, or instead 
were d escribed s eparately from the other characters. The interaction of the characters in each 
version was classified as ‘hardly if at all* (i.e. no interaction or very little interactions among 
story characters), ‘moderate’ (i.e. some interaction among the characters of the stories) or 
‘definite’ interaction among characters (i.e. the characters definitely interacted with each other in 
the story).
All the participants except one of the group with autism, showed ‘moderate’ or ‘definite’ 
interaction among characters in at least one of the four story-versions. Ten participants with 
autism and 14 control participants produced at least one story where the characters definitely
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interacted with each other. However, six participants with autism and only one control participant 
produced at least one story where the characters hardly interacted with each other (Fisher’s Exact 
Test, two tailed, p=.04).
b) Emotional and Psychological Engagement among characters: The aim here was to explore 
whether or not the participants told stories that conveyed any ‘emotional’ and/or ‘psychological’ 
engagement among characters. Each version was classified as ‘hardly if at all’, ‘moderate’ or 
‘definite’ emotional and/or psychological engagement among characters.
In relation to ‘emotional’ engagement’, the majority of participant in the two groups (13 autistic 
and 14 control participants) conveyed a ‘hardly if at all* emotional engagement among the 
characters in at least one story-version; and 6 participants with autism and 10 control participants 
showed ‘somewhat’ or ‘definite’ emotional engagement in at least one story-version. Again, only 
a small number of participants in the two groups (two autistic and four control participants) 
conveyed a ‘definite’ emotional engagement among characters.
Similarly to the case with ‘emotional’ engagement, the majority of participant in the two groups 
conveyed a ‘hardly if at all’ psychological engagement in at least one story-version (11 autistic 
and 10 control participants), although in this case the majority of participants in the two groups 
also showed either ‘somewhat’ or ‘definite’ engagement among characters in at least one story- 
version (11 autistic and 14 control participants). In this case only four autistic and seven control 
participants conveyed a ‘definite’ psychological engagement among the characters of at least one 
version.
Thus, in the majority of the stories produced by the participants, the characters of the stories did 
not show any emotional or psychological engagement with each other. However, approximately
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half of the participants in the two groups conveyed some emotional engagement among the 
characters in at least one story-version, and the majority of participants in the two groups 
conveyed some psychological engagement among the characters in at least one story-version.
3.3.7- Summary of results
One of the main results of this study is the lack of significant differences between the two groups 
in some aspects of role-taking. For instance, all the participants except two of the group with 
autism, reached some degree of role-taking, either adopting the role of a character or showing 
some understanding of different roles among characters (scoring more than 0 on ‘adoption of a 
role’) in at least one version. However, few participants in each group produced stories adopting 
the perspective of the main character in terms of psychological orientation, that is to say, 
involving thoughts and feelings. In addition, no significant difference was found in co-ordination 
of story content. Both groups tended to score higher on co-ordination of story content than on 
perspective taking. Finally, the mental state terms used in the stories were similar in both groups.
In spite of the above similarities, individuals with autism showed role-taking limitations in that 
they scored significantly lower than the non-autistic participants on the ‘overall role-taking’, 
‘perspective taking’ and ‘change of perspective’ scores. They also showed a tendency to score 
lower on ‘adoption of a role’ (corresponding with the higher number of participants with autism 
who did not take the role of a character in at least one version) and ‘adoption of a perspective’. 
Moreover, mental age and overall role-taking were significantly correlated in the control group, 
but not in the group with autism, suggesting that the developmental mechanisms involved in role- 
taking might be different for each group of participants.
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Participants with autism also showed several similarities with the control participants in relation 
to the content of their stories. For instance, participants in both groups produced stories 
concerning similar topics (school, family, robbery, etc), and they related the characters with each 
other to some degree (although six participants with autism and only one control participant 
portrayed no interaction among characters in at least one version). The majority of the stories did 
not convey any psychological or emotional engagement among the characters of the stories. 
Concerning the degree of engagement among the characters in at least one story-version, similar 
number of participants in both groups conveyed some psychological (approximately half of the 
participants in each group) or emotional (the majority of participants in each group) engagement.
3.4 Discussion
The majority of participant with autism reached some degree of understanding of different roles 
of the characters described in their stories. However, the stories they produced showed less 
elaboration of the characters in relation to their roles and perspectives, than the stories of the 
control participants. In addition, they showed limitations in shifting from the perspective of one 
character, to the perspective of another character in the same story.
Significant differences were found between the two groups on perspective-taking, but not in co­
ordination of story content. This result confirms the prediction that ‘perspective-taking’ contributes 
more to group differences than ‘story co-ordination’. This result is compatible with the view that co­
ordination of story content might implicate higher cognitive understanding than ‘perspective-taking’, 
which may require more social and non-inferential role-taking. This result, therefore, is in keeping 
with the interpersonal theory, although it is not so clear how to explain intact aspects of role-taking by 
this account.
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In addition, the two groups tended to score higher on co-ordination than on perspective taking, 
suggesting that in this task, the level of difficulty is higher on perspective taking than co-ordination of 
story content.
One element that needs to be taken into consideration is the interdependence of the role-taking 
measures. For example, the overall role taking score integrates different measures, which can receive 
a high score, only after the participant has shown a certain level of understanding on previous 
measures that require a lower degree of role-taking. For example, if a child scores zero on “Adoption 
of a role”, he or she could not score more than one on “Adoption of a perspective” and “Change of 
perspective”. Although the interdependence of these measures influence the distribution of scores, it 
was decided to follow Feffer’s method in ask to derive composite scores that indeed reflect different 
stages in role-taking. The results comprise an adequate ordinal set of data to what non-parametric 
statistics can be applied.
The mental terms used in the stories were similar in both groups. The two groups used ‘desire’, 
‘perception’, ‘emotion-behaviour’, ‘emotion’ and ‘cognition’ mental state terms. These results 
are comparable with the results found by Tager-Flusberg et al. (1995) who reported that 
individuals with autism use the same number o f  emotion and related feeling state terms than 
verbally matched control individuals. These authors were not able to examine the use of cognitive 
mental state terms because very few participants in each group used them in their study. In the 
present study, the use of these terms by participants with autism was similar to that of the control 
group. The impairments in role-taking of the participants with autism, therefore, cannot be 
explained in terms of a difficulty in understanding mental state terms, as has been suggested by 
the theory of mind theory. However, this study only examined productivity and not 
comprehension of mental state terms, and it is plausible that differences might arise with a task of 
comprehension of mental state term.
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Finally, the two groups were also comparable regarding the content of the stories with respect to 
topic, degree of interaction among characters, and psychological and emotional engagement 
among the characters of the stories. The participants produced stories about similar topics, for 
example school, family or robberies, and the characters of their stories were described in 
interaction with each other. These results suggest that the participants were motivated to produce 
the stories and to relate the characters of the stories with each other, and, therefore, any 
differences in role-taking are not explained by those aspects of the story content. However, the 
majority of those interactions did not convey any psychological or emotional engagement among 
the characters of the stories, with less than a half of the participants producing interactions rated 
with a ‘definite’ psychological and emotional engagement.
There is one interesting incident that comes from the rater’s experience. She acknowledged that a 
few participants told the stories, as if they were actually happening. They were not only taking the 
role and behaving as if they were the character of the story, they also seemed to think they were 
the main character of the story. After having rated the stories, when the rater discovered the 
participants’ diagnosis, it was found that these participants were within the group with autism. 
This recalls the episode described by Loveland and Tunali (1993) from a high functioning male 
with autism who participated in their study. He seemed to have a lack of awareness that the story 
that he was retelling was fiction. The authors suggested that this might be an indication o f  a 
failure to understand the character’s motivations. It is difficult to know why some of these 
participants appear to have a ‘stream-of-consciousness’ sense of other people’s perspective. It is 
possible that the lack of differentiation between self and other leads these individuals to not only 
take the role of another person, but also in some cases to ‘become’ that person.
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Therefore, the results that individuals with autism showed more difficulties in role-taking than in 
co-ordination of story content vis-a-vis control participants, and that no group differences in 
terms of content of the stories were found between the two groups, suggest that individuals with 
autism fail in those aspects that are more dependent on non-inferential role-taking. Moreover, the 
similarities between the two groups in the type and frequency of mental terms used, suggest that 
the difficulties of individuals with autism in role-taking in this task cannot be explained by an 
impairment in conceptual aspects of theory of mind. However, this task does not examine 
comprehension of mental state terms directly, and therefore it is unclear whether individuals with 
autism might be limited in their understanding of mental state terms. New studies that include 
production and comprehension tasks are needed. Moreover, it is unclear whether individuals with 
autism have difficulties in  adopting the perspective of real people instead of story characters. 
More research is needed in this new area.
One important factor to take into consideration is that the groups of the present study were 
matched according to chronological age and language ability, as measured by a test of vocabulary 
comprehension (BPVS), mean length of utterances, and mean number of words per story-version. 
Such matching procedures mean that this group of participants may not be representative of the 
whole autistic spectrum. Also, one needs to be cautious about generalising these results to the 
autistic population as a whole, for reasons of small sample size. However, the two groups were 
carefully matched and the levels of difficulty of the task were appropriate -  there were neither 
floor nor ceiling effects in either group of participants- suggesting that the task was suitable for 
examining certain aspects of role-taking. Further studies in this area are needed, with participant 
samples of greater size.
It is of note that verbal mental age was found to be related to role-taking in the control 
participants, but not in the participants with autism. One interpretation of this result might be that
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individuals with autism use different strategies than non-autistic participants to take the roles, or 
adopt the perspectives of story characters and, perhaps, of other people. These correlations might 
also be influenced the wider range of overall role-taking scores found in the non-autistic group 
than in the group with autism, and therefore their interpretation is tentati ve.
The results of this study suggest that although individuals with autism appear to have limitations 
in some aspects of role-taking, they might have some role-taking ability that they can use in some 
situations. It is possible that they can achieve this role-taking understanding through social 
capacities that they have intact. For example, the interpersonal interactions elicited when 
requesting, or when responding to another person’s request, might provide the child with autism 
with some experience about the subjective perspectives of others.
It is also possible that there are aspects of the process of identification that are present in some 
children with autism. In this way, their understanding of the viewpoints of other people might be 
influenced by their degree of identifying with them.
To conclude, the present study provides evidence that individuals with autism have limitations in 
role-taking. More specifically, they seem to have specific difficulties in consistently applying 
those role-taking aspects that might be more dependent on non-inferential forms of role-taking, as 
opposed to other aspects that might be more cognitively based.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Understanding deictic expressions in Autism: Part one
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, role-taking will be examined from the viewpoint of ‘Deixis’. The term ‘Deixis’ is 
the Greek word for pointing or indicating. Deictic expressions are those used to indicate and to 
locate specific targets. Examples are the linguistic terms this/that, here/there, come/go, 
bring/take, I/you, and before/after. Non-verbal examples include the gestures of pointing and 
nodding. Deictic expressions are anchored in the ‘speaker’ and therefore shift in dialogue 
depending on who is speaking. Therefore, one person’s here is another person’s there, and so 
forth. The study of deixis is important because the child’s understanding of deictic expressions 
might depend on both conceptual and non-inferential role-taking. It will be argued that although 
cognitive factors may play an important part in the development of deictic expressions in young 
children, non-inferential role-taking that develops through interpersonal engagement also shapes 
deictic understanding and use.
Deictic expressions can be classified into either verbal or non-verbal. Verbal deictic expressions: 
are those terms that are used to indicate a place (e.g, here/there), a motion (e.g, come/go), or 
moment in time (e.g, before/after). Verbal deictic terms also involve personal pronouns, such as 
I/You, that are used as pointers that locate different people in conversations. The ‘personal’ 
elements underlying these terms might vary in degree, for example, it is possible that personal 
pronouns might require a higher degree of role-taking than other deictic terms, such as deictic 
locatives. Non-verbal deictic expressions (e.g, pointing) are used to physically indicate aspects of 
the world to another person. These expressions can be classified into two main groups according 
to the goal that one wants to achieve. Non-verbal deictic expression can be used to request things. 
For example, a child may indicate to someone to fetch a car toy from a high shelf by pointing at 
it. They may also be used to share things. For example, a child may indicate by pointing to share
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the event o f  an aeroplane flying overhead with another. Non-inferential role-taking may be a 
mechanism regulating and organizing verbal and non-verbal deictic expressions.
It has been suggested that before a child can use deictic terms correctly, he/she not only needs a 
representation of a self as an entity distinct from others (Bates, 1990) but also an understanding of 
different points of view (de Villiers & de Villiers, 1974; Loveland, 1984). Moreover, it has also 
been suggested (for example by: Chamey, 1981, Cox, 1986; Hobson, 2002) that the child comes 
to comprehend and use deictic expressions by identifying with the person who speaks; that is, by 
experiencing the other’s perspective and attitude and ‘moving’ into the shoes of the other in 
relation to an aspect of the world. So, for example, in the case where the adult uses the word 
‘there’ while pointing to a bird, the child integrates and associates the utterance (‘there’) with the 
attitude that accompanies the term (the adult’s attitude). Thus, the understanding of deictic 
expressions appears to contain personal elements that allow young children to grasp deictic 
meaning.
The principal hypothesis of the present study is that individuals with autism, compared with 
chronological age and verbal mental age matched non-autistic individuals, will show limitations 
in their production and comprehension of verbal and non-verbal deictic expressions. The rationale 
here is that because of the difficulty children with autism have in identifying with and ‘moving’ 
to the psychological position of the other person, aspects of deictic functioning that rely on non- 
inferential role-taking will be affected.
In this chapter, the emergence of deixis in typically developing children will be considered, and 
followed by a review of those few studies that have examined verbal and non-verbal deictic 
expressions in individuals with autism.
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4.2 deixis in typical developing children
Comprehension of deictic expressions involves taking into account different points of view. The 
understanding of terms such as ‘here/there' requires taking the point of view of the speaker and 
appreciating that here refers to a place near the speaker and there to a place far from the speaker 
(Cox, 1986). The same applies to other deictic terms such as 'this/that’, ‘come/go ’ or ‘bring/take’. 
Let us take the following conversation:
Speaker 1: Could you bring that book?
Speaker 2: Which book?
Speaker 1: That book over there (while pointing)
Speaker 2: Oh this book! Shall I  put it over there (while pointing)1 
Speaker 1: No, could you put it over there?
This example illustrates how deictic terms are knitted into conversations to focus and orientate 
the listener to the speaker’s perspective. For this interaction to succeed the speaker/listener needs 
to ‘understand’ both cognitive and interpersonal aspects of the situation, as in: a) the spatial 
relation between the speaker, listener and the referent (Fillmore, 1971), b) the non-verbal pointing 
that helps locate the book (located near speaker2, far from speaker 1) and its destination (near 
speaker 1, far from speaker2), and c) the speakers’/listener’s psychological orientation (what they 
may feel, think or intend in that situation).
Thus, understanding of deictic expressions implies taking into account several aspects of a 
situation. All these different aspects reveal that deixis is “highly context sensitive” (Bruner, 1975. 
p.69). One aspect of this context is interpersonal non-inferential role-taking. As already stated, 
Hobson (2002) is one of several commentators to suggest that the child comprehends and uses 
deictic expressions through identification with the person who speaks. In relation to  personal 
pronouns he states:
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“She (the child) recognizes that her mother's insistent 7 do it!’ expresses her mother’s attitude, 
and that her mother’s ‘That’s mine!’ expresses her mother’s claim to possession. So, when the 
child herself has that attitude, then all she has to do is use the utterance which expresses that 
attitude for herself ’’ (p.223).
Thus, according to this view the child moves (with feelings) to the psychological perspective of 
the other person and feels that person’s attitude towards this relevant aspect of the world. 
Identification, therefore, has been suggested to be important for the understanding of personal 
pronouns. It seems reasonable to suggest that it is also important for the child’s acquisition of 
other kinds of deictic expressions, since they also require taking into account the speaker’s 
perspective. For example, the child may use the word 'there ’ while pointing to a glass of milk. 
Then, by identifying with the other’s attitude, and using statements such as ‘look over there! all 
by him/herself, will he/she understand the full meaning of deictic expressions. However, it might 
be the case that this explanation is incorrect, or that the explanation is only partial, in which case 
an investigation of autism might prove to be revealing in this regard.
One important aspect of these types of deictic expression is that they are often accompanied by a 
non-verbal deictic gesture, like pointing, for example. The majority of studies designed to study 
deictic terms have failed to examine the implication of non-verbal gestures in the understanding 
and use of deixis. Thus, it is unclear to what extent the use of pointing helps young children 
understand deictic terms.
The use of non-verbal gestures is evident in children during the first year of life. There are two 
aspects of the pointing and reference that seem to  be relevant in  the infant’s development o f  
social understanding. The infant not only initiates social episodes by pointing to things and 
showing them to other people, but also he/she can follow other people’s pointing or gaze. Infants 
begin following the gaze of others and pointing by the end of the first year of life (Scaife and 
Bruner, 1975; Trevarthen and Hubley,1978). The development of these skills was discussed in
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Chapter 1, where it was considered how joint attention episodes serve to focus the child and adult 
on the same object or event. As mentioned, infants use person-person-world episodes to request 
things and to show things to others. Adults also tend to direct the infant’s attention to specific 
things in a shared world. Non-verbal gestures, such as pointing or nodding, very commonly 
accompany the infant’s and the adult’s actions of showing or requesting. Deictic terms, such as 
‘that’ and ‘there’ are used very frequently by adults and children to refer to common goals, and 
they mostly appear together with either a explicit pointing or a handling gesture (Wales, 1979). 
Authors such as Wales (1979) and Shatz (1982) emphasized that children below the age of 24 
months use referential gestures as attentional devices to locate things or events. Children need to 
learn the conventional relation between language and gesture before the latter can be anything 
more than attentional devices (Shatz, 1982). So children under 24 months are able to comprehend 
and use non-verbal gestures, which demonstrates their capacity to understand the proximal/non- 
proximal distinction that is necessary for deictic comprehension. This later becomes manifest in 
deictic expressions.
Cox (1986), pointed out that children do not learn deictic terms by marking simple associations 
between the word and the object, nor are they influenced directly by the frequency that adults use 
these terms. The child needs to have first understood how other people use them and then he/she 
has to reverse the roles and apply them for herself. Non-verbal gestures are interpersonal 
expressions that not only direct the child’s attention to an object or event, but they also provide 
the child with the opportunity to move to the psychological and emotional position of another 
person through non-inferential role-taking.
So it is not that children simply Team’ the words, they also learn the context within which the 
words are used, and perhaps, through identification with the other in relation to a shared world. 
But the competent comprehension and use of deictic expressions is itself an end point in a
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developmental process that involves the coming together of different capacities. To examine this 
‘context’, further research designed to look at the emergence of deictic comprehension in 
typically developing children, and of specific relevance for the present thesis, will now be 
reviewed.
Clark and Sengul (1978) examined understanding of the deictic terms here/there and this/that in 
three groups of children with mean ages of 3;1 years, 3;11 years and 4;11 years of age. In their 
task the child sat at a table on which were placed two discs as shown in Figure 1. One disc was 
situated opposite the child next to speaker 2, and the other disc was placed to the child’s side next 
to speaker 1.
Speaker 2
o o
Speaker 1
Figure 4.1: Task layout used by Clark and Sengul (1978)
Pairs of similar toy animals were place on each disc, and the child was asked questions such as, 
“Make the dog over here/there turn around” or, “Make this/that chicken hop". In this way, the 
child’s understanding of the deictic terms here/there and this/that was tested in relation to the 
animal that the child selected to manipulate. The investigators found that the comprehension of 
deictic terms improved with age over the period between 3 and 5 years, and that the locative pair 
here/there was mastered before the demonstratives this/that. In addition, they found that the 
youngest children did not contrast these terms and followed a pattern of response. For example,
115
most of these three years old children choose the animal that was on their own side of the table 
regardless of the deictic term used in the instructions, while some of the younger children selected 
the animal closer to the speaker. These authors suggested three stages in the acquisition of these 
terms: no contrast, followed by partial contrast, followed by fu ll contrast; and that in the 
acquisition of the deictic contrast, it is critical where children start from and what route they 
follow. They also suggested that this/that terms might be more difficult to understand than 
here/there terms because this/that not only refer to a place that is near or far from the spear, but 
also to an object that is located in one of these places. Therefore, this and that include part of the 
meaning of here and there.
In another study by Clark (Clark and Gamica, 1974) the older children that participated in this 
task did successfully discriminate between the deictic terms come/go and bring/take using the 
speaker as the point of reference. Four age groups of 11 typically developing children (six, seven, 
eight and nine years-olds) were given a task in which they were shown three animals: one inside a 
garden, and two outside the garden as shown if Figure 2.
Garden
(Pig) ✓
(Monkey)
Figure 4.2: Task layout used by Clark and Gamica (1974)
In one trial, for example, the Pig was placed inside the garden, and the Monkey and the dog were 
placed outside the garden. The child was told: “the dog says, ‘Can I  come into the garden? ’ 
Which animal is he talking to? “ In this way, the participant had to work out who was either the
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speaker or the listener in relation to the deictic term used by the animal that was speaking, which 
was determined according to the visual-spatial situation of the animals (either inside or outside 
the garden). The deictic terms ‘come’, ‘go’, ‘bring’ and ‘take’ were each used in four different 
situations (two identifying the speaker and two identifying the addressee) over the course of three 
different sessions. The authors found that overall the verbs ‘come’ and ‘bring’ elicited 
significantly more correct responses than ‘go’ and ‘take’ across the different ages. They also 
found that comprehension of the verbs ‘go’ and ‘take’ increased significantly with age. This 
result was not found with the verbs ‘come’ and ‘bring’. Moreover, it was easier for the 
participants of all the groups to identify the speaker where the verb was ‘go’ or ‘take’, and easier 
to identify the addressee where the verb was ‘come’ or ‘bring’. The authors suggested that 
semantic complexity is one of the major determinants of order of acquisition of deictic verbs. 
They explained this complexity in terms of cognitive strategies that children rely on before they 
are able to  learn the full meaning of deictic verbs (e.g. by selecting always the person or the 
object at the goal regardless of the term used).
There are limitations to both of Clark’s studies. In particular, they only examined for the 
comprehension of verbal deictic terms and not production. So it is unclear whether the children in 
the samples would have used deictic terms in the correct contrastive way when they themselves 
were the point of reference. Further, these studies stressed the cognitive components of deixis, 
and not the social factors that may also contribute to the learning of these expressions.
Methodologically, it is difficult to distil out those aspects of deixis that are dependent on 
cognitive understanding (conceptual role-taking) and those aspects that are learned through the 
child’s interpersonal engagement with other people (non-inferential role-taking). One way to 
examine the social factors involved in deixis is to explore the use and understanding of deictic 
expressions in children with autism, for whom other evidence points to difficulties in identifying
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and engaging with others. In the next section I will consider these ideas and experimental work 
conducted with children with autism.
4.3- Deixis in autism
There are very few studies that have examined deixis in individuals with autism. Those reviewed 
here have mainly focused on two specific areas of deixis: a) the understanding and use of 
personal pronouns, and b) the understanding and use of deictic shift from present to past tense. It 
has proved difficult to find a study that has examined the deictic expressions, ‘here/there’,
'this/that ‘come/go ’ or 4bring/take' in individuals with autism. Some of the studies that have 
been conducted will be reviewed in this section.
Whereas typically developing children use and respond to verbal deictic expressions by the end of 
the first year or the beginning of the second year of life, using co-ordinated non-verbal gestures, 
individuals with autism have an impairment in the ‘sharing’ (protodeclaratives), as opposed to the 
‘requesting’ function of these gestures (protoimperatives). This impairment may provide young 
children with autism with fewer social events in which to experience the use of deictic 
expressions, but may also indicate that aspects of deixis related to sharing experiences are most 
critical. In addition, individuals with autism have been found to have difficulties in following 
other people’s gaze, a process that is relevant for understanding deixis. However, responding to 
gaze and pointing has been found to be related to verbal mental age in individuals with autism 
(Leekam et a l 1998; DiLavore and Lord, 1995; Mundy et al, 1994). For example, Leekam et a l 
(1998) showed that individuals with autism of mental ages above 48 months (but not below this 
age) were as proficient as non-autistic language matched individuals in  following the gaze of 
other people when being tested in a laboratory. In addition, Mundy et al (1994) found that
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children with autism with MA above 20 months were as proficient as control non-autistic 
individuals in following an experimenter’s pointing gesture. What this finding suggests is that 
there is a developmental effect in these children’s responses to an adult’s pointing or gaze 
gesture, and that a certain level of verbal ability is necessary to understand these joint attention 
expressions. These findings might also suggest that language depends on these joint attention 
expressions. Nevertheless, first hand reports obtained from the parents of the children of Leekam 
et al (1998) study suggested that they did have difficulties in following another person’s head turn 
in their everyday lives. What this suggests is that aspects of non-verbal functioning may be 
‘spared’ in children with autism, but only insofar as they become evident in well-structured 
laboratory tasks.
It is unclear whether individuals with autism use pointing or other non-verbal deictic expressions 
when using a deictic terms such as ‘ that' that may help other people determine the object of 
reference. Moreover, it is not known whether individuals with autism use these terms in the 
correct contrastive way (e.g. ‘this’ for near and ‘that’ for far). More is perhaps known in relation 
to the use and understanding of personal pronouns in people with autism. In his first description 
of autism, Kanner (1943) emphasized the abnormal use of personal pronouns in children with 
autism. He reported that some of his patients, like Charles (described in Chapter 2), repeated 
personal pronouns just as heard and therefore they ended up referring to themselves as ‘You’ and 
to other people as ‘I’. Some people have explained this deictic error as a form of echolalia where 
the child repeats exactly what is heard due to a lack of linguistic comprehension (Bartak and 
Rutter, 1974), rather than a reflection of their difficulty in differentiating self and other- although 
multiple impairments in cognition and social functioning may play a role (Fay, 1979).
However, it is not the clearly case that the individuals with autism have obvious difficulties with 
personal pronouns. Current research suggests that pronoun reversal errors are not as common as
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previously reported in children with autism. For example, Tager-Flusberg (1989) evidenced 
reversal errors of pronoun use in only 12% of instances of pronoun use. Thus, this would seem to 
indicate that pronoun errors are evident but not pervasive.
Jordan (1989) examined the understanding of the personal pronouns ‘you’ and ‘me’, both from 
the listener’s and the speaker’s viewpoint, in a group of 11 autistic children (aged 6 yrs 8 mo to 
16 yrs 5 mo), who were compared with 11 normally developing children (aged 2 yrs 5 mo to 9 yrs 
6 mo) and 11 mentally handicapped children (aged 14 yrs 6 mo to 19 yrs). The participants were 
matched by receptive vocabulary age (according to the EPVT). The participant sat next to the 
experimenter at a table with objects. All participants had previously demonstrated their 
understanding of the object labels in a play situation. To examine the comprehension o f ‘you’ and 
‘me’ from the listener’s point of view, the participants were given instructions such as Tut the 
hat/badge on to you/me" or Tush the car near 'you/me”. Under this context, the only reference 
for the pronouns was either the experimenter (the speaker) or the child (the addressee). To 
examine the speaker’s contrast, the participants were asked questions such as ‘Who’s g o t the 
hat?’ or ‘Look! The spider’s landed on....?’. Regarding the listener contrast, all groups showed 
proficient comprehension of the personal pronouns ‘you’ as applying to themselves, and ‘me, as 
applying to the speaker. However, in relation to the speaker’s contrast, it was found that the 
participants with autism used more proper names or incorrect pronouns, than the comparison 
groups. The author said: “a difficulty with the deictic use o f pronouns can explain why the autistic 
children have such a high rate o f error in production and why the majority fa il to produce either 
pronoun at all, while showing excellent comprehension o f these same pronouns’’ (p. 176). She 
concluded that the difficulties found in individuals with autism in using personal pronouns might 
relate to differences in social behaviour, like their low propensity to engage in joint attention 
routines. Such social routines may underlie many pragmatic aspects of language development, 
like for instance deixis.
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The results of the above study are consistent with Lee, Hobson & Chiat (1994) who compared 25 
participants with autism with 25 CA and VMA matched non-autistic individuals, on a series of 
tasks to test the comprehension and production of the personal pronouns T  and ‘You’. For 
example, in one task the participants were presented with a cardboard sheet with two different 
drawings of familiar objects on each side (e.g. a cat on one side and dog on the other side). The 
card was positioned between the participants and the experimenter so that the participant could 
see one drawing and the experimenter could see the other drawing. After establishing that the 
participants knew what was on each side, they asked questions such as, ‘Who sees the cat? ’ or 
‘Who sees the dog?’. To test for production the same materials were used, but this time the 
participants were asked ‘ What can You/I see? This experiment also included a control task to 
control for task demands, where the same question was put to the participants, but the pronoun 
was substituted for the child’s name/E’s name. The results of this tightly controlled task 
demonstrated that the participants with autism were as proficient as their matched control 
participants in the comprehension of the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘You’, and very few participants 
showed pronoun reversal errors. However, the group with autism showed a relative propensity to 
use the pronoun T  (as in 7  see it *) rather than ‘me ’, and those of lower ability tended to use 
proper names for themselves and the experimenter instead of ‘m e ' and ‘you ’.
Interestingly, and in accordance with Leekam et al. (1998), the teachers were asked about 
pronoun difficulties in the sample. They reported abnormal use of personal pronouns in the 
majority of their pupils with autism (17/25). Also the authors reported a very striking episode: 
one of the participants with autism who had performed perfectly throughout the personal pronoun 
task, turned to leave and said, ‘Thank you for seeing you, Tony \  The authors suggested that the 
abnormalities of individuals with autism in the use of personal pronouns ‘might be reflected in 
unusual patterns o f usage, rather than in incorrect use’ (p. 172). One possible explanation of this
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unusual pattern of usage is that the anchorage of self-experience may not be as secure for autistic 
as for non-autistic individuals. On the other hand there is also the possibility that ‘more able 
autistic subjects might have learned conventional patterns o f pronoun usage by abnormal 
cognitively mediated compensatory strategies rather than by normal process o f acquisition' (Lee 
et al. 1994, pl72).
Another area of deixis that has been examined in individuals with autism is the inability to shift 
verbs from present to past tense. Bartolucci and Albers (1974) presented three participants with 
autism (Chronological Ages: 11.06, 7.06 and 6.0 years, and Mental Ages: 5.04, 3.10 and 5.04 
years respectively) different actions with pictures and toys where, for example, a girl was 
drinking juice. They were then asked questions such as: ‘Ann is drinking the juice. She did the 
same thing this morning. What did she do? ' So in this example the authors examined whether the 
children would transfer the word drink (present) into drunk (past). Alternatively the child was 
presented verbally or in writing with an incomplete sentence, such as ‘Yesterday Ann — the 
juice \  and then the participant was asked to finish the sentence. The participants’ performance 
was compared that of three non-autistic participants (Chronological Ages: 10.06, 10.0 and 9.06 
years, and Mental Ages: 4.05, 3.08 and 4.03 years respectively), who had a mental age slightly 
higher than the group with autism. The authors found that the participants with autism did 
significantly less well than the control participants in the production of past tense. They 
concluded that the children with autism “show evidence o f a problem, at the level o f the 
relationship between the morphological and the semantic aspects o f  language in the area ofpast 
tense" (p. 140). By this the authors mean that the deictic problem with past tense in individuals 
with autism, stems from a cognitive impairment in language to make connections between 
different aspects of language, and in particular, in the development of cognitively mediated 
syntactic structures that relate to deixis. However, this conclusion needs to be considered 
cautiously due to the small samples used in this study. More research is needed in this respect.
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From the review o f the literature, it is unclear whether or not individuals with autism have a 
specific impairment in their capacity to comprehend and use deixis. It has been suggested that 
individuals with autism may draw more heavily on alternative cognitive processes that contribute 
to this capacity and that in certain structured situations this enables then to succeed in their use 
and understanding of personal pronouns deictic term. The limitations of individuals with autism 
may lie in more subtle qualitative responses that may, in the typical case, be more interpersonally 
mediated.
The aim of the present study was to extend the scope of the previous studies by examining the 
performance of individuals with autism in a set of tasks that tested the production and 
comprehension of the deictic terms ‘here/there ’, ‘this/that \ ‘come/go ’ and ‘bring/take The use 
of these types of verbal deictic terms has not yet been examined in individuals with autism. In 
addition, the present study was designed to examine not only the performance of individuals with 
autism with regard to verbal deictic terms, but also the relationship between these linguistic terms 
and the non-verbal deictic expressions that often accompany them.
4.4 deixis in autism: An experim ental investigation.
The aim of this study was two-fold. Firstly, it was necessary to design a task to elicit both verbal 
and non-verbal deictic expressions without using any deictic expression in the instructions. 
Secondly, the aim was to design a set of comprehension tasks where both non-verbal and verbal 
deictic expressions were used in the instructions, that could be compared with well structured 
control conditions to ensure that any failure in the performance of the task was due to a lack of
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understanding of both verbal and non-verbal deictic expressions, and not due to other task related 
factors.
4.4.1- Hypothesis
The hypothesis behind this set of studies, designed to examine deixis in children with autism, is 
that the correct use and understanding of deictic expressions (both verbal and non-verbal) relies 
on the capacity of the child to identify with other people, and that the capacity of people with 
autism to identify and adopt the psychological perspectives of other people is limited (e.g. Lee et 
a l 1994; Hobson and Lee, 1999). If the production and comprehension of deixis depends in some 
respects on these processes, then it was reasonable to predict that people with autism were likely 
to be limited in their use and understanding of deictic expressions.
The present set of studies aimed to test the prediction that individuals with autism, compared with 
matched non-autistic individuals, would show different responses in the production and 
comprehension of verbal and non-verbal deictic expressions (such as here/there, come/go, 
this/that, or non-verbal head nods indicating a position in relation to the person nodding). More 
precise predictions will be detailed as part of the methodology of the individual studies.
Four separate experiments were conducted to study production and comprehension of deictic 
expressions in individuals with autism. The first experiment was designed to examine production, 
while the remaining three were designed to test comprehension.
4.4.2- Participants
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The participants in this set of studies were 20 young people with autism and 20 without autism 
but with mental retardation. All the participants came from special education schools for children 
with special needs. The participants with autism were diagnosed using the criteria of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV: American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994- See Appendix 1) for autism. The main investigator observed the participants 
in different situations in their schools and the information obtained was checked with their 
teachers. The participants with autism also met diagnostic criteria on the Childhood Autism 
Rating Scale (CARS: Schopler,E. et al. 1986- See Appendix 2).
The two groups were closely matched for chronological age and verbal mental ability (see Table 
4.1). Verbal mental ability was estimated using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS: 
Dunne/a/. 1982).
Chronological age 
Mean/ SD/ range 
(yr;mo)
Verbal mental age 
mean / range 
(yr;mo)
Autistic Group 
n = 20
10;11 
SD: 2;10 
(5;09-14;09)
5;09 
SD: 2;04 
(3;01-12;05)
Control Group 
n = 20
10;10 
SD: 1;09 
(7;03-13;05)
6;00 
SD: 2;06 
(3;04-12;03)
Table 4.1 Deixis study: Participant characteristic
4.4.3- Administration of tasks.
All four experiments were presented with a fixed order across two testing sessions. The test of 
production (Experiment 1) was always administered first so that the spontaneous responses of the
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children w ere n ot p rompted by t he c omprehension t asks t hat followed. A fter t his e xperiment, 
Experiment 2 was administered. This experiment examined the comprehension of the deictic 
verbs ‘come’ and ‘bring’. The next experiment to be administered was Experiment 3, which was 
designed to examine comprehension of verbal deictic expressions and non-verbal deictic 
expressions. This testing session took between 15 and 30 minutes to administer.
The second testing session comprised the final comprehension task (Experiment 4). This task was 
based on an earlier study by Clark and Garnica (1974), where comprehension of the deictic terms 
‘come/go’ and ‘bring/take’ was assessed. This lengthy task was administered approximately one 
week after the first testing session, to ensure that the participants’ performance was not affected 
by fatigue.
The design and method of the Experiment 1 will now be considered in some detail. Experiments 
2, 3 and 4 will be detailed in the following chapter.
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4.5 Experiment 1: Production of verbal and non-verbal deictic 
expressions in autism.
This task was designed to study the use of verbal and non-verbal deictic expressions in 
individuals with autism.
4.5.1- Predictions
The following predictions were made about autistic children’s performance relative to the 
matched control group:
When prompted to communicate with someone about spatially located events, participants with 
autism will be less likely to use deictic gestures to communicate than will the control participants. 
This would be evidenced by:
a) Less use of both verbal and non-verbal deictic gestures.
b) Less co-ordinated episodes that include a ‘verbal deictic’ gesture and a ‘nonverbal 
deictic’ gesture.
c) more ‘atypical’ verbal deictic expressions, by which is meant the use of a term that 
refers to a near location, but it is used to refer to a distant location, and the opposite.
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Figure 4.3 Deixis Experiment 1: task layout
The material was introduced to the participant with one experimenter (El) giving the following 
instructions:
" We are going to play a game together with some animals and two fields. First o f  all, let's see 
what animals we have. What do you call this animal?... and what colour is this field?  "
After having checked that the participant could name all the animals and established that the two 
fields were white, the participant was asked to put a field on each of the two chairs. Experimenter 
1 (El) gave the instructions to the participant, experimenter 2 (E2) stood facing the participant (P) 
on the other side of the room. Once the participant had placed the fields on the chairs El said:
"Some o f the animals live in one field  (El stood by the field and without pointing, indicated the 
field by touching it) and some o f  the animals live in the other fie ld  (El stood by the field and 
without pointing indicated the field by touching it). We want you to help us put the right animals 
in the right fields. We’ll tell you, (participant’s name), what to do. ”
Then the participant was asked to sit on the chair set aside for him/her, facing Field 1. El asked 
E2 to turn around as follows:
“ Tony (E2) turns around and I  will tell you what to do 
While holding one of the plastic animals El said:
" Tell Tony to put -  (El showed the animal to the participant) -  in -  (El briefly placed the animal 
in one of the two fields and then she put it back on the table) ”.
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In the production task it was important not to contaminate the participant’s responses by using 
deictic terms in the instructions given to him/her. Due to the difficulty of finding a non-deictic 
word that could be substituted for the deictic terms in die instructions, the participant was shown 
what to do. Then El put the animal back on the table and asked E2 to turn around to face the 
participant. During the response period E2 waited for the participant to spontaneously instruct 
him on what to do. If the participant did not instruct E2, or the participant’s instructions were not 
clear, E2 would then prompt the participant. In those cases where the participant indicated the 
animal to pick up but did not indicate which field, E2 said to the participant: "Which field? ", and 
he would continue prompting until the participant’s instructions were clear. In those cases where 
the participant did not respond at all after 3 seconds approximately, E2 said: “Tell me what to 
do".
This procedure was performed with six different animals. The fields in which the animals were to 
be placed were varied, such that three instructions were directed to the field closest to P and three 
to the field furthest from P. Thus, the instructions for proximity and distance had the same 
number of trials. T able 4.2 s hows t he f  ixed o rder o f  t he q uestions, w hich a 111 he p articipants 
received, indicating the different fields. The instructions were arranged with systematically 
changing, but not rigidly alternating reference to the ‘near’ and ‘far’ fields.
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TRIALS E l’S INSTRUCTIONS
1 Tell Tony to put (the cow) in (FAR field).
2 Tell Tony to put (the dog) in (NEAR field).
3 Tell Tony to put (the sheep) in (NEAR field).
4 Tell Tony to put (the goat) in (FAR field).
5 Tell Tony to put (the pig) in (FAR field).
6 Tell Tony to put (the horse) in (NEAR field).
Tab le 4.2 Deixis Experiment 1: instructions
Participants were expected to remain seated and give instructions to E2. However, if a participant 
did stand up and physically demonstrate where E2 should put the animal, this was permitted. 
Indeed, it was possible that those participants who physically enacted instructions to E2, were the 
very ones who experienced difficulties with deictic expressions. In the event of a child standing 
up, the procedure (the six trials) was repeated, and El asked the participant to remain seated when 
giving the instructions to E2. This happened in four cases in each group.
The task was designedto prom pttheparticipantstoeom m unicatetoE2andtouse adeictic 
expression. The two fields were identical in shape, size and colour. This put the participants in the 
position of having to use a deictic expression (either verbal or non-verbal) to indicate one of the 
two fields.
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4.5.3- Scoring and Reliability
Each trial was coded from the videotape in the following four measures:
Verbal Deictic Score: in each trial, a score of 1 was given if the participant used a verbal deictic 
term (VD). Thus, the total VD score ranged from 0 to 6.
Non-Verbal Deictic Score: in each trial, a score of 1 was given if the participant used a non­
verbal deictic expression (NVD). The use of pointing was the non-verbal expression that received 
a score here. Thus, the total NVD score ranged from 0 to 6.
Co-ordinated Deictic Expressions: in each trial, a score of 1 was given if the participant used a 
verbal deictic expression (VD) together with a non-verbal deictic expression (NVD). These 
episodes were considered co-ordinated deictic expressions.
‘Atypical’ deictic use: A score of 1 was given if the participant responded with a deictic term that 
was not typical. Table 4.3 shows the VD terms that were rated as ‘atypical’.
IN RELATION TO FIELD 1 
(I.E. CLOSE TO P)
IN RELATION TO FIELD 2 
(I.E. CLOSE TO E2)
‘TYPICAL’
TERM
‘ATYPICAL’
TERM
‘TYPICAL’
TERM
‘ATYPICAL’
TERM
This That That This
Here There There Here
Table 4.3 Deixis Experiment 1: ‘atypical’ deictic use
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The principal rater was not blind to the hypothesis of the study, nor each participant’s diagnostic 
group. For reliability purposes a second rater blind to both the hypothesis and diagnosis of the 
participants rated 25% of videotaped material (i.e. 10 participants, of which five were randomly 
selected from each group). The degree of agreement was calculated using the Kappa coefficient 
statistic, which takes into account the likelihood of chance agreement between the raters. The 
Kappa coefficient for the participants’ use of pointing when instructing was 0.73, indicating 
'substantial agreement' (Landis and Koch, 1977; See Appendix 4). Reliabilities were not 
calculated for the participants’ use of verbal expressions because the categorization of the verbal 
terms used were explicit and did not require two judgements.
4.5.4- Results of Experiment 1
In this task, all participants were given the greatest opportunity to use a deictic gesture. Thus, if 
the participants did not spontaneously give the experimenter (E2) an instruction, or gave 
incomplete or unclear instructions, they were prompted by E2 who asked one more time, “Which 
field? ” or “Tell me what to do ”. It was predicted that participants with autism would use fewer 
deictic expressions compared with the control group.
1- Verbal Deictic Score:
On examining the participants’ use of VD across the six trials, there was not a significant 
difference between the two groups (Mann-Whitney Test, U = 192, one tailed, ns). In fact, the 
distribution of the participants across the VD scores was very similar in the two groups, as shown 
in Table 4.4. Here, it can be seen that at least half of the participants in each group used a VD 
term (13 participants with autism and 10 control participants), in at least five trials.
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Number of trials: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Autistic group 
n = 20
1 1 4 1 6 7
Control group 
n = 20
3 1 1 3 2 10
Table 4.4 Deixis Experiment 1: Number of participants using ver bal deictic terms
2- Non-Verbal Deictic Score:
When examining the participants’ use of NVD across the six trials no significant differences were 
found between the two groups (Mann-Whitney Test, U= 192.5, one tailed, ns). Once again, the 
distribution of the participants across the NVD scores was remarkably similar between the two 
groups, as shown in Table 4.5. Here, it can be seen that the majority of participants in each group 
used a NVD term (19 participants with autism and 16 control participants), in at least five trials.
Number of trials: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Autistic group 
n = 20
1 5 14
Control group 
n = 20
1 3 2 14
Table 4.5 Deixis Experiment 1: Number o participants using non-verbal deictic terms
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3- Co-ordinated Deictic Expressions:
The number of trials where the participants used a VD term together with a pointing (NVD) were 
examined (See Table 4.6). No significant differences were found between the two groups in this 
case (Mann-Whitney Test, U= 186.5, two tailed, ns). Then, those participants who coordinated a 
VD term with a pointing (NVD) in at least five trials were considered. In this case, there were 11 
participants with autism and eight control participants.
Number of trials:
Autistic group 
n = 20
Control group 
n = 20
Table 4.6 Deixis Experiment 1: Number of Ps using ‘co-ordinated ceictic expressions’
4- “Atypical” deictic use:
Across the six trials, 20 participants with autism and 17 control participants used a VD term at 
least once. It is this sub-sample that is considered here. In the participants’ instructions to E 2 ,15 
out of 20 autistic participants, and 12 out of 17 control participants used an ‘atypical’ deictic term 
at least once. The total number of ‘unusual’ atypical terms was 31 in the group with autism, and 
26 in the control group.
a) The ‘near’ field: In relation to responses directed to the participant’s closest field, 11 
participants with autism and 12 control participants used an ‘atypical’ VD term at least 
once. Here, the participants with autism used a total of 19 ‘atypical’ terms, and the
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control participants used a total of 26 ‘atypical’ terms directed to the closest field 
respectively. The ‘atypical’ terms used by these participants were the terms ‘there ' and 
‘that'.
b) The ‘fa r ’ field: In this case, there were significantly more participants with autism who 
used an ‘atypical’ VD terms at least once when they directed their instructions to the 
distant field, in that 8 participants with autism and but not a single control participant 
used the terms ‘here’ or ‘this ’, instead of ‘there' or ‘that\ when referring to the far field 
(Fisher’s Exact Test, two tailed, p=0.004). These eight participants used ‘here* or ‘this* 
for the distant location a total number of 12 times.
4.5.5- Further observations
Further observations were made in relation to a) the children’s initial responses prior to 
prompting, and b) ‘atypical’ deictic use with regard to the first trials, which was directed to the 
‘far’ field.
1- Children’s initial responses prior to prompting:
The results this far have concerned the deictic use after the participants had been instructed by E2 
and, when necessary, were prompted to give a response. It is also of interest to examine the 
participants’ spontaneous responses after E2 turned around, and before a prompt.
When the experimenter turned around and faced the participant, nine participants with autism but 
not a single control participant failed to give spontaneous instructions to the experimenter in at 
least one trial. Out of these nine participants, only one participant did not give any spontaneous
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instruction across all the six trials, and seven participants gave spontaneous instructions in four or 
five trials. Thus, the majority of the participants in the two groups gave a spontaneous instruction 
to the experimenter in at least four out of the six trials.
Within those participants who gave spontaneous instructions to the experimenter, 10 participants 
with autism and 12 control participants gave unclear instructions in at least one trial, and required 
a prompt. Out of these participants, only four participants with autism and two control 
participants required a prompt in three or more trials. Once again, the two groups were very 
similar in this respect.
a) Verbal Deictic Score (responses prior to prompt):
When examining the participants’ spontaneous use of VD across the six trials no significant 
differences were found between the two groups (Mann-Whitney, U=168, one tailed, ns). The two 
groups gave similar responses. For example, four participants in each group did not use any 
verbal deictic term across the six trials, and 11 participants in each group used a VD term in at 
least four trials.
b) Non-Verbal Deictic Score (responses prior to prompt):
When examining the number of episodes of spontaneous pointing across the six trials significant 
differences were found between the two groups (Mann-Whitney Test, U= 126.5, one tailed, 
p<.02). However, when looking at the number of participants who used pointing spontaneously 
across the six trials (See Table 4.7) the difference between the two groups was not marked. Here, 
it can be seen that although a majority of control participants used pointing in all the six trials (12
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participants), 14 participants with autism and 16 control participants used pointing in four or 
more trials.
Number of trials: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Autistic group 
n = 20
1 2 2 1 5 4 5
Control group 
n = 20
1 3 2 2 12
able 4.7 Deixis Experiment 1: ISumber of Ps using NVD expressions spontaneously
c) Co-ordinated Deictic Expressions (responses prior to prompt):
The number of trials where the participants used a VD term together with a pointing (NVD) was 
examined. No significant differences were found between the two groups in this case (Mann- 
Whitney Test, U= 158.5, two tailed, ns). The two groups gave similar number of co-ordinated 
deictic expressions, for example, there were 10 participants with autism and 11 control 
participants who showed a co-ordinated deictic expression in at least four trials.
2- ‘Atypical’ Deictic use (first trial):
The first trial of the task was directed to the ‘far’ field. By examining the participants’ use of 
atypical terms in the first trial, it was established whether the participants with autism used the 
terms ‘here’ or ‘this’ ‘atypically’ without being contaminated by the following trials that were 
directed to the ‘near’ field.
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During the first trial 14 participants in each group used a deictic expression to locate the ‘far* 
field. Five participants with autism used an ‘atypical’ deictic term (either ‘here ' or ‘this'). Thus, it 
is considered unlikely that the participants with autism used these atypical terms across the six 
trials due to perseveration in their response.
4.6 Summary of findings and discussion
The principal result of this study is that participants with autism were closely similar to those 
without autism in using verbal and non-verbal deictic expressions. In addition, no significant 
differences were found between the two groups in the number of participants who used co­
ordinated deictic expressions (using a verbal deictic term and pointing at the same time).
There was, however, one significant group difference. Only among the children with autism (8 
out of 20) were there instances where the terms ‘here’ and ‘this’ (instead of ‘there’ and ‘that’) 
were used to indicate the ‘far’ field.
These results suggest that participants with autism were more proficient in their use of deictic 
expressions than was expected. Most of the results were not in accordance with predictions 
derived from the interpersonal theory. One possible explanation is that there might be both 
cognitive and social abilities that are intact in individuals with autism, and these might be 
sufficient to achieve deixis, at least at a productive level. For example, it is possible that their 
intact visual-spatial perspective taking ability might play a role in their understanding about the 
anchorage o f  d eictic e xpressions i n t hemselves a nd o ther p eople. 11 i s a Iso p ossible t hat their 
ability to respond to and use joint attention to request for things, might elicit interpersonal
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experiences that may provide young children with autism with some information about different 
perspectives in other people, an information that might prove useful in the acquisition of deixis.
On the other hand, autistic children’s atypical use of the terms ‘here’ and ‘this’ to indicate things 
far away from the speaker, might suggest that some individuals with autism are less firmly 
‘anchored’ in a person-centred stance than children without autism. One person’s ‘here’ and ‘this’ 
can be another person’s ‘there’ and ‘that’, and if a child does not anchor and take the perspective 
of the other person, then this might result in a difficulty in differentiating the correct contrastive 
use of deictic terms. Thus, it is possible that the lack of identification with other people might 
affect some, and subtle, aspects of the use of deictic expression in some individuals with autism.
Another possible interpretation comes from the theory of mind theory. It is possible that in order 
to understand that the terms ‘this’ and ‘here’ only refer to a near location to the speaker, one 
needs to see how other people use these terms before using them correctly. An understanding of 
the psychological perspective of other people might be an important factor in understanding how 
other people use these terms. Thus, individuals with autism might see that other people use the 
terms ‘this’ and ‘here’ to refer to things that are close to them but far from the child with autism, 
and therefore when the child with autism refers to things that are distant he/she might use these 
terms too.
Thus, Experiment 1 suggests that individuals with autism are more proficient in their use of 
deictic expression than had been predicted, although they seem to have some subtle limitations in 
their use of these expressions, specifically, in the use of ‘there’ and ‘that’ to refer to a location 
that is distant from them .
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It is unclear whether individuals with autism use deictic expressions efficiently in natural 
situations. It is also unclear whether their understanding of deictic expressions is limited. The 
next chapter will examine comprehension of verbal and non-verbal deictic expressions and will 
end with a review and discussion of the findings of chapter 4 and 5.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Understanding deictic expressions in Autism: Part two
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5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 the production of deictic expressions was examined in children with autism and 
matched non-autistic children. The present chapter will consider the comprehension of deictic 
expressions in individuals with autism, as investigated through three experiments. Experiment 2 
was designed to examine the comprehension of the deictic terms ‘come’ and bring’. Experiment 3 
was designed to examine verbal and non-verbal deictic expressions in individuals with autism. 
Finally, Experiment 4 was designed to examine comprehension of the verbal deictic terms 
‘come/go’ and ‘bring/take’ in these children by administering a version of the Clark study (1974) 
that included a novel control condition.
5.2 Experiment 2: comprehension of ‘come’ and ‘bring’ in 
autism.
This experiment was designed to examine the comprehension of the deictic verbs ‘come’ and 
‘bring’ in individuals with autism. These terms involve a movement to the speaker and they have 
been reported to be easier to understand than the deictic verbs ‘go’ and ‘take’ which involve a 
movement away from the speaker (Clark and Gamica, 1974).
5.2.1- Participants
The participants who took part in this experiment were the same 20 participants with autism and 
20 participants without autism that were described in Chapter 4 and who took part in Experiment
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1. The participants with autism were diagnosed using the criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV: American Psychiatric Association, 1994- See Appendix 
1) for autism, and also met diagnostic criteria on the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS: 
Schopler,E. et al. 1986- See Appendix 2). The participants of the two groups were closely 
matched according to chronological age (See Table 4.1) and verbal mental age. The participants 
with autism had a mean chronological age of 10 years and 11 months and mental ability, and a 
mean verbal mental age of 5 years and 9 months. The control participants had a mean 
chronological age of 10 years and 10 months and mental ability, and a mean verbal mental age of 
6 years.
5.2.2- Predictions
The terms ‘come’ and ‘bring’ not only refer to proximity to the speaker but also involve a 
movement towards the speaker. So in order to understand ‘come’ and ‘bring’ one needs to know 
that the location of the goal is to the direction of the speaker. Clark and Gamica (1974) found that 
young children understand earlier those deictic terms that involve a movement towards the 
speaker than those which involve a movement from the speaker. It is for this reason that it was 
predicted that the terms ‘come’ and ‘bring’ might be understood even when a person uses them 
without a non-verbal prompt (e.g. a point or a nod with the head). It was predicted that the 
participants with autism would find it more difficult than the control participants to understand 
such terms. This difficulty might be reflected not only in the fewer number of correct responses 
given by the participants with autism, but also in the pattern of their responses (requiring more 
non-deictic prompts).
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5.2.3- Method
Experiment 2 was designed to examine the comprehension of the deictic verbs ‘come’ and ‘bring’ 
when they were used without a non-verbal deictic expression like a nod or a pointing. This 
experiment was administered after Experiment 1.
The layout of the material was similar to that of the production test (See Figure 4.3). Two plastic 
fields were placed on two chairs approximately 150 centimetres apart. A set of plastic animals 
was placed on a table situated to one side in between the fields. In this task, one of the white 
fields was replaced by a brown field. Although for the purposes of the experiment this was not 
necessary, having these two coloured fields prepared the participants for the next experiment. In 
this experiment, the participant was asked to stand by the animals while the two experimenters sat 
on the chairs. The position of the camera was changed to the centre of the room, with the aim of 
capturing the whole scene from one side for later scoring, as shown in picture 5.1.
P ictu re 5.1 Deixis Experiment 2: Task layout
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In order to test understanding of the deictic verbs ‘come’ and ‘bring’, the participants were asked 
to put one of the animals in the field closest to the experimenter who gave instructions such as 
‘Find the sheep and bring it ’ or "Find a horse and come with i t '. The experimenters took it in turn 
to give a total of four instructions as shown in Table 5.1. Each experimenter used the term ‘bring’ 
or ‘come’ once across the four instruction, and the two terms were alternately presented.
E l ’S INSTRUCTIONS 
(Brown Field)
E2’S INSTRUCTIONS 
(White Field)
1- Find the sheep and BRING it.
Instruction 2: BRING the sheep.
Follow-up: Put the sheep in the BROWN field
2- Find a horse and COME with it. 
Instruction 2: COME with a horse. 
Follow-up: Put a horse in the WHITE field
3- Find a pig and COME with it. 
Instruction 2: COME with a pig. 
Follow-up: Put a pig in the BROWN field
4- Find the Sheep and BRING it.
Instruction 2: BRING the Sheep.
Follow-up: Put the Sheep in the WHITE field
Table 5.1 Deixis Experiment 2: ‘come-bring’ task instructions
If the participants did not respond by putting an animal inside a field after the first instruction the 
instruction was repeated. Since the majority of participants were expected to have at least picked- 
up the animal after the first instruction, the repeated instruction was changed to the simplest form 
linking the animals with the deictic term, for example, ‘Bring the sheep ’.
Finally, if the participants did not respond after the repetition of the instruction (instruction 2), 
he/she would be given a final follow-up instruction in which the colours of the fields, for 
example, ‘Put the p ig  in the brown f ie ld ’, replaced the function of the deictic term.
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5.2.4- Scoring
Responses were classified according to: which plastic field the animal was placed into after the 
deictic instructions, and whether correct or incorrect.
5.2.5- Results
a) 'Screening’ condition:
The number of correct responses that the participants gave after the follow-up instructions (where 
the colours of the fields were used instead of deictic terms) was examined, with the purpose of 
establishing that those participants who did not respond during the deictic trials, understood the 
basic requirements of the task.
Table 5.2 shows the participants who responded after the follow-up instruction across the four 
trials. It c an b e s een from t his t able, f  or e xample, t hat t hree p articipants w ith a utism a nd s ix 
control participants required a follow-up instruction in the four trials. All these participants who 
responded after the follow-up instruction gave correct responses.
NUMBER OF 
RESPONSES:
0 1 2 3 4
Autistic 
n = 20
5 11 1 3
Control 
n = 20
11 1 2 6
Table 5.2 Deixis Experiment 2: Number of Ps responding after follow-up instructions 
b) Deictic condition:
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The number of correct responses that the participants gave after the deictic instructions was 
examined.
When examining the total number of responses across participants no significant differences were 
found between the two groups (Mann-Whitney Test, U= 161, one tailed, ns). However, when 
examining the number of participants who gave a correct response in all four trials, significant 
differences were found between the two groups. Table 5.3 shows the number of participants who 
gave a correct response. Here, it can be observed that only two participants with autism, 
compared with 11 control participants, gave a correct response in all four trials (Fisher’s exact 
test, one tailed, p=.003). However, when examining those participants who responded correctly in 
three or more trials no differences were found between the two groups, in that 14 participants 
with autism and 12 control participants gave correct responses.
NUMBER OF 
CORRECT 
RESPONSES:
0 1 2 3 4
Autistic 
n = 20
3 3 12 2
Control 
n = 20
6 2 1 11
Table 5.3 Deixis Experiment 2: Number of Ps responding correctly after deictic instructions
In addition, those participants who responded during the deictic instructions, and gave an 
incorrect response were examined. In this case, there were only three participants with autism 
who responded after the deictic instructions in the four trials, and who gave an in correct response 
in either one or two trials.
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5.2.6- Summary of Experiment 2 results
The results of this experiment shows that there were significantly fewer participants with autism 
than control participants giving correct responses, across the four trials of the task. However, it is 
difficult to know whether this lower propensity to give a correct response across the four trials of 
the task is due to a difficulty in understanding deictic terms, in as much as the majority of 
participants with autism gave correct responses in three out of the four trials. Therefore, it is not 
possible to interpret the results of this experiment with confidence.
5.3 Experiment 3: comprehension of verbal and nonverbal 
deictic expressions in autism.
This Experiment was designed to examine comprehension of verbal and non-verbal deictic 
expressions.
5.3.1- Participants
A non-deictic task was used as a screening test to select those participants who demonstrated a 
capacity to deal with the task demands. Those participants who gave five or more, out of eight, 
correct spontaneous responses during the screening task were selected. Using this criterion it was 
assumed that the participants who responded correctly in five of the eight trials understood the 
task. This approach was justified by estimates of the probability that the participants responded 
correctly by chance in at least five trials. The binomial distribution showed that the probability 
was approximately two out of one hundred, which suggest a low probability to achieve this by
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chance. As a result of this screening, ten participants with autism and five control participants 
were excluded from the analysis. The remaining participants remained closely matched according 
to language ability (See Table 5.4).
Chronological age 
mean / sd /range 
(yr;mo)
Verbal mental age 
mean / sd/ range 
(yr;mo)
Autistic 
Group 
N =  10
12;04 
SD: 23.31 
(8;02-14;09)
6; 10 
SD: 30;45 
(4;03-12;05)
Control 
Group 
N =  15
11;00 
SD: 17.63 
(8;09-13;05)
6;07 
SD: 30;46 
(3;04-12;03)
Table 5.4 Deixis Experiment 3: Participant characteristics
5.3.2- Predictions
The prediction of Experiment 3 was based on the hypothesis of the study that individuals with 
autism would be restricted in some aspects of their understanding of deictic expression because of 
their limited social capacities. It was predicted that relative to control participants, those with 
autism would give fewer correct responses in the tests of deixis (verbal and non-verbal).
5.3.3- Method
This test examined separately the participant’s understanding o f  verbal deictic and non-verbal 
deictic expressions. The layout of the material was similar to that of the Experiment 2 (See 
Picture 5.1).
In this experiment, two coloured fields (one white and one brown) were positioned on the two 
chairs and the plastic animals were set out on the table. The reason for having two different
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coloured fields was that the colours of the fields could be used to differentiate the fields instead of 
the deictic expressions in a screening task. In this experiment, the participant was asked to stand 
by the animals while the two experimenters sat on the chairs. The task for the participant was to 
put two animals into either one or the two fields, based on instructions from the two 
experimenters.
In the previous experiment (Experiment 2), E l had introduced a further ten plastic animals to the 
participant (three horses, two ducks, two pigs, one cow and two sheep) and a white field had been 
replaced by a brown field. Thus, the participants were already familiar with the animals, colours 
and position of the fields and the aim of the task (i.e. to put animals inside the fields). The 
participants were instructed by the two experimenters who took turns. They were asked to take 
two animals, and in some cases to put them each into a different field, and in other cases to put 
the two animals into the same field. This procedure reduced the probability of the participant 
succeeding by chance if one animal was used at a time, and to increase memory load. The colours 
of the fields were used instead of verbal deictic terms during the non-deictic trials of the 
screening test. Those participants who did not give a response after the first instructions were 
given a follow-up instruction using the colours of the fields in order to end the task with a 
response.
Two deictic tasks were included in this study to examine comprehension of verbal deictic 
expressions (VD) and comprehension of non-verbal deictic expression (NVD). These two tasks 
were counterbalanced across participants to control for possible order effects. In this way, half of 
the participants received the VD task first, and the other half the NVD task.
The screening task was given before the deictic tasks in half of the participants, and after these 
tasks in the other half of participants.
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-  Screening task:
In the screening task, the colours of the fields were used instead of deictic expressions. Here, the 
deictic terms were replaced with the colours of the fields, for example, “Place a p ig  in the 
WHITE field  and put a duck in the BROW Nfield”. Table 5.5 shows the instructions of this task, 
which included eight instructions: four in which the two animals were directed to different fields, 
and four in which the two animals were directed to the same field. If the child gave no response 
after the first instruction, he/she was given the instructions with the colours of the fields. In this 
way the participants were encouraged to give a response and carry on with the task.
SCREENING TASK
E l’s INSTRUCTIONS E2’s INSTRUCTIONS
1- Put a cow in the BROWN field and 
place a horse in the WHITE field
2- Place a horse in the WHITE field and 
place a duck in the WHITE field
3- Put a pig in the BROWN field and 
place the Goat in the WHITE field
4- Put a dog in the BROWN field and put 
a Sheep in the BROWN field
5- Place a horse in the WHITE field and a 
put a sheep in the WHITE field
6- Place a pig in the WHITE field and put 
a duck in the BROWN field
7- Place a horse in the BROWN field and 
put a cow in the BROWN field
8- Put a pig in the BROWN field and 
place a sheep in the WHITE field
Table 5.5 Deixis Experiment 3: Screening Task instructions
As described before, this screening task was used to select participants who performed well on 
this condition. In this way, it was established that the participants who were given the VD and the 
NVD control tasks had an understanding of the aim of the task, and that errors observed during 
the deictic conditions were not due to incidental task demands.
-Verbal Deictic task (VD):
During the verbal deictic task the participants were asked to put two animals into the fields by 
one of the experimenters, using verbal deictic expressions, for example “Put a duck in THAT
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fie ld  and put a horse in THIS fie ld ”. This task included eight instructions (See Table 5.6): four in 
which the two animals were directed to different fields, and four in which the two animals were 
directed to the same field.
The terms bring/take, come/go, here/there and this/that were used once in the instructions directed 
to the opposite fields, for example, with instructions such as “BRING a duck and TAKE a sheep ”, 
or “Put a cow THERE and put a p ig  HERE and the terms come/come, bring/bring, this/this and 
here/here were used once in the instructions directed to the same field, for example with 
instructions such as “COME with a horse and COME with a cow  ”, or “Put a p ig  HERE and put 
a horse HERE".
If the child gave no response after the first instruction, he/she was given a non-deictic follow-up 
instruction using the colours of the fields. In this way the participants were encouraged to give a 
response and carry on with the task.
VERBAL DEICTIC TASK
E l’s INSTRUCTIONS E2’s INSTRUCTIONS
1- BRING a duck and TAKE a Sheep. 
Follow up instruction: Put a duck in the 
brown field and a Sheep in the white field
2- COME with a horse and COME a cow 
Follow up instruction: Put a horse in the 
white field and a cow in the white field
3- Put a cow THERE and put a pig 
HERE.
Follow up instruction: Put a cow in the 
white field and a pig in the brown field
4- COME with a Goat and GO with a 
horse
Follow up instruction: Put a Goat in the 
white field and a horse in the brown field
5- BRING a pig and BRING a sheep. 
Follow up instruction: Put a pig in the 
brown field and a sheep in the brown field
6- Put a duck in THAT field and put a 
horse in THIS field.
Follow up instruction: Put a duck in the 
brown field and a horse in the white field
7- Put a sheep in THIS field and put a dog 
in THIS field.
Follow up instruction: Put a sheep in the 
brown field and a dog in the brown field
8- Put a pig HERE and put a horse HERE
Follow up instruction: Put a pig in the 
white field and a horse in the white field
Table 5.6 Deixis Experiment 3: VD Task instructions
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-Non Verbal Deictic task (VD):
During the non-verbal deictic condition the experimenters used non-verbal instruction instead of 
the verbal deictic terms. In this case, a nod directed to the appropriate field was used. In this way, 
participants were asked, for example to “put a cow (Experimenter shows nod to Brown field) and 
put a pig  (Experimenter shows nod to white field) ”. A nod was used instead of a pointing gesture 
as it was reasoned that a point might be easier to understand than a nod, and because a nod was 
relatively novel (rather than conventional) in this setting. In this way, the level of difficulty of this 
task was increased by using head nods. It was important to take level of difficulty into account in 
order to avoid either ceiling or floor effects in the participants’ performance.
Four instructions were given to  the participants (See Table 5.7): two directed to the opposite 
fields, for example with instructions such as “Put a duck (NOD TO WHITE) and put a Sheep 
(NOD TO BROWN)”; and two directed to the same fields, for example with instruction such as 
“Put a horse (NOD TO BROWN) and put a cow (NOR TO BROWN) ”. In this task, as previously 
shown, a nod towards the appropriate field was given instead of the deictic verbal expression in 
the instructions. If the child gave no response after the first instruction, he/she was given a non- 
deictic follow-up instruction using the colours o f  the fields. In  this way the participants were 
encouraged to give a response and carry on with the task.
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NON-VERBAL DEICTIC TASK
E l’s INSTRUCTIONS E2’s INSTRUCTIONS
1- Put a duck (NOD TO WHITE) and put 
a Sheep (NOD TO BROWN).
Follow up instruction: Put a duck in the 
white field and a sheep in the brown field
2- Put a horse (NOD TO BROWN) and 
put a cow (NOR TO BROWN).
Follow up instruction: Put a horse in the 
brown field a nd p ut a c ow i n t he brown 
field.
3- Put a Goat (NOD TO WHITE) and put 
a horse (NOD TO WHITE).
Follow up instruction: Put a goat in the 
white field and put a horse in the white 
field.
4- Put a cow (NOD TO BROWN) and put 
a pig (NOD TO WHITE).
Follow up instruction: Put a cow in the 
brown field and put a pig in the white 
field.
Table 5.7 Deixis Experiment 3: NVD Task instructions
5.3.4- Scoring
In each condition, the total number o f  trials for which the participants put the animals in the 
correct fields was calculated. Thus, the maximum number of correct responses in the verbal 
deictic tasks was eight, and in the non-verbal deictic task was four.
5.3.5- Results
a) Verbal deictic task: Table 5.8 shows the distribution of individual scores for the total number 
of correct responses where the participants put the animals in the correct fields. The participants 
with autism were not significantly different from the control participants in the number of correct 
responses given (Mann-Whitney Test, U=54, one tailed, ns). When examining those participants 
who gave four or more correct responses (i.e. those participants who responded correctly in at 
least half of the trials), there were four out of ten participants with autism and 12 out of 15 control 
participants (Fisher’s Exact Test, one tailed, p=0.053).
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CORRECT
RESPONSES:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Autistic 
n = 10
1 2 1 2 1 3
Control 
n =  15
1 2 3 4 3 2
Table 5.8 Deixis Experiment 3: Number of participants across correct trials in VD task
b) Non-verbal deictic task: Table 5.9 shows the distribution of individual participants according 
to the number of responses in which the animals were put in the correct fields after the 
instructions. In this case, participants with autism were significantly less likely to give a correct 
response than the control participants across the eight trials (Mann-Whitney Test, U=41, one 
tailed, p < .05). Only three out of 10 participants with autism and 11 out of 15 control participants 
gave a correct response after the instructions in at least three trials (Fisher’s Exact Test, one 
tailed, p=0.04).
CORRECT
RESPONSES:
0 1 2 3 4
Autistic 
n = 10
3 4 1 2
Control 
n = 15
1 1 2 3 8
Table 5.9 Deixis Experiment 3: > umber of participants across correct trials in NVD task
c) Responses after follow-up instruction: During the VD and NVD tasks, if the participants gave 
no response after the first two instructions when deictic expressions were used, they were then 
given a follow-up instruction using the colours of the field. Although the participants included in 
this study were selected because they understood the basic task requirements, as shown in their
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high performance in the non-deictic task, the follow-up instructions were used to confirm this 
understanding, and to encourage the children to give a response and carry on with the tasks.
In the verbal deictic (VD) task, there were four participants in each group who required a follow- 
up instruction (where the colour of the fields was used) at least in one trial. Two out of the four 
participants with autism, and one out of the four control participants who were given this follow- 
up instruction gave an incorrect response.
In the non-verbal deictic (NVD) task, there were five participants with autism and two control 
participants who required a follow-up instruction (where the colour of the fields was used) at least 
in one trial. Here, all the participants except for one participant in the control group gave correct 
responses.
Thus, the majority o f  the participants in the two groups who required a follow-up instruction 
responded with the correct field. In this way, the children’s understanding of the requirements of 
the task was confirmed.
d) Correlation with chronological age and verbal mental age: The associations between the 
number of correct responses in both the VD and the NVD tasks, and the participants’ 
chronological and verbal mental ages were examined with non-parametric Spearman correlations.
The correlations are shown in Table 5.10. Due to the small groups these correlations are only 
tentative and need to be considered as suggestive. VMA was related to comprehension of verbal 
and non-verbal deictic expression in both groups. CA was related to the comprehension of non­
verbal deictic expressions in the control group only, but not with the comprehension of verbal 
deictic terms in either of the two groups.
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Verbal Deictic 
score
Non-verbal Deictic 
score
Autistic
participants
n=10
CA .165 .064
VMA .613 .752
Control
participants
n=15
CA .035 .734
VMA .789 .627
Table 5.10 Deixis Experiment 3: Correlations with CA and VMA
5.3.6- Summary of Experiment 3 results
Those participants selected for this study were those who could deal with the demands of the task 
when no deictic expression was used, giving five or more correct spontaneous responses in the 
screening task. The prediction was that relative to control participants, those with autism would 
give fewer correct responses in the tests of deixis (verbal and non-verbal). The responses given 
after instructions where verbal deictic terms were used were not significantly different between 
the two groups, although participants with autism tended to give fewer correct responses in this 
situation. The participants with autism, however, showed significantly more difficulties in 
understanding the non-verbal nod used by the experimenters to indicate a field.
5.4 Experim ent 4: comprehension o f ‘com e/go’ and ‘bring/take’ 
in autism.
The final experiment was conducted in a separate testing session a few days after the first testing 
session. This test was administered separately due to the length o f  time required for it. This
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ensured that the participants’ performance was not affected by fatigue. This test was based on an 
earlier study by Clark and Garnica (1974), where comprehension of the deictic terms ‘come/go’ 
and ‘bring/take’was assessed.
5.4.1- Participants
The participants who took part in this task were the same 20 children with autism and 20 children 
with learning disabilities that took part in the previous tests.
Due to the demands of this task, five participants with autism and two control participants were 
unable to finish the task. Moreover, three participants with autism and one control participant 
performed very poorly throughout the task, in both study and control conditions, and were not 
included in the final sample in order to ensure that all the participants understood the task. 
Therefore 12 participants with autism and 17 control participants completed the task. To ensure 
that the two selected groups were well matched by CA and VMA five more control participants 
were excluded from the study (without referring to their task performance), leaving a total of 12 
participants in the control group. Table 5.11 shows that the two groups were comparable in both 
their chronological ages and their verbal mental age (according to the British Picture Vocabulary 
Scale).
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Chronological age 
mean /sd/ range 
(yr;mo)
Verbal mental age 
mean /sd/ range 
(yr;mo)
Autistic Group 
n =  12
10;11 
SD: 2; 11 
(8;09-14;06)
6;05 
SD: 2; 10 
(3;01-12;05)
Control Group 
n =  12
10;09 
SD: 1;10 
(7;03-13;05)
6;06 
SD: 2;10 
(3;03-12;03)
Table 5.11 Deixis Experiment 3: Participant characteristics
5.4.2- Predictions
It was predicted that the participants with autism would be less able to understand verbal deictic 
terms, compared with their matched non-autistic counterparts, but would nonetheless show ability 
to respond to similar structured instructions devoid of deictic reference (i.e. the control task).
5.4.3- Method
This task was based on a task designed by Clark and Gamica (1974), which tested the 
comprehension of the deictic terms ‘come-go’ and ‘bring-take’. A novel control task was 
introduced to establish the specificity of any group differences that emerged.
One female experimenter tested the participants in a quiet room of the participant’s school. The 
material used for this task was a red plastic field with an opened gate and a set of three plastic 
animals (a cow, a horse and a pig). One of the three animals was placed inside the field and the 
other two animals were placed outside the field. All the animals were situated facing a middle
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point, and the distance between all of them was the same (approximately 1 5 centimetres), as 
shown in picture 5.2. In some trials a leaf was placed next to one of the animals as food.
Picture 5.2 Deixis Experiment 4. Task layout
In the original task designed by Clark and Gamica (1974), the participants were given two sets of 
24 instructions where they were asked to show which animal was talking (speaker), or which 
animal was being spoken to (addressee). The authors used one set of three different animals (for 
example, a dog, a pig and a monkey) for each set of instructions,. So for example, after having 
shown to the participants which animal was placed inside a plastic garden and which two animals 
were situated outside the garden, they were asked questions such as: “The dog says (from outside 
the garden), “ Can I come into the garden?”. Which animal is  he talking to ? ’. In the present 
study, to ensure that the participants’ performance was not affected by fatigue, the task was 
reduced to one set of eight instructions where each expression was used twice with the following 
order of the deictic verbs: GO, BRING, COME, TAKE, GO, BRING, COME, TAKE.
161
In addition, another set of eight instructions was devised as a control condition where no deictic 
terms were used. In this condition, what the animals said captured certain characteristics of each 
one of the animals, in order to differentiate the animal that was talking or the animal that was 
being spoken to, without using any deictic verb. Table 5.12 shows the instructions of the task.
The animal inside the field was replaced every four instructions in order to shift the point of 
reference through the tasks. In both conditions, the instructions intended to identify the speaker 
were counterbalanced with those designed to identify the addressee. Also, both control and study 
tasks were counterbalanced among participants to control for possible order effects.
Index Task
(The HORSE is in the Field) Correct
response
1 Which animal can say to the COW: "go into the Field" PIG
2 The PIG has the food. The PIG starts to talk: "I'm bringing the food into the Field". Which animal is the PIG talking to? HORSE
3 The COW is walking to the Field. Which animal can say : "the cow is coming into the Field" HORSE
4 The PIG has the food. The PIG starts to talk: "I will take the food into the Field?" Which animal is the PIG talking to? cow
(The PIG is in the Field)
5 The COW starts to talk: "I'm going into the Field" Which animal is the COW talking to? HORSE
6 The HORSE has some food. Which animal can say to the HORSE: "Bring the food into the Field"? PIG
7 The COW  starts to talk: "Can I come into the Field?" Which animal is the COW  talking to? PIG
8 The HORSE has the food. Which animal can say: "the HORSE is taking the food into the Field"? COW
Control task
(The HORSE is in the Field) Correct
response
1 Which animal can say to the COW: ‘My name is horse and I can run fast’ HORSE
2 The PIG wants it to be quiet. The PIG starts to talk:" oinggg...oinggg, stop mooing". Which animal is the PIG talking to? cow
3 The COW is looking around. Which animal can say :" Cow, they call me Horse and I have a saddle" HORSE
4 The PIG wants some food. The PIG starts to talk: "Cow, I will have some o f  your milk!" Which animal is the PIG talking to? cow
(The PIG is in the Field)
5 The COW starts to talk: "Horse, I'm going to use your saddle" Which animal is the COW talking to? HORSE
6 The HORSE has the food. Which animal can say to the HORSE: "They call me Pig and you, HORSE, have all the food? PIG
7 The COW  starts to talk: "Can I roll in the mud with you. Pig? Which animal is the C OW  talking to? PIG
8 The HORSE has the food. Which animal can say: "Moo, the horse is eating!" COW
Table 5.12 Deixis Experiment 4: Instructions
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5.4.4- Scoring
In each task, each one of the eight trials in which the participants gave a correct answer was given 
a score of one. Thus, the score of both index and control tasks ranged between 0 to 8.
5.4.5- Results
Tables 5.13 shows the distribution of the participants across number of correct responses in the 
deictic task. No significant differences were found between the two groups (Mann Whitney, U= 
66, one tailed, ns) on the test of deixis. In fact, the two sets of scores were distributed very 
similarly. Only one participant with autism and two control participants scored zero in the deictic 
task, and at least half of the participants in each group (6 participants with autism and 7 control 
participants) gave a correct answer in more than four trials, with only one participant in each 
group responding correctly in eight and seven trials respectively.
CORRECT
RESPONSES:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Autistic 
n = 12
1 1 1 3 1 4 1
Control 
n = 12
2 3 3 3 1
Table 5.13 Deixis Experiment 4: Number of participants across correct trials in deictic task
Tables 5.14 shows the distribution of the participants across number of correct responses in the 
control task. Here, the participants with autism were found to perform significantly less well than 
the control participants (Mann Whitney, U= 32.5, two tailed, p< .02). On inspection of the 
participants’ distribution of scores across the eight trials, however, the two groups were very
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similar. For example, 10 participants with autism and 11 control participants responded correctly 
in six or more trials. It can be seen that the significant difference was due to having 9 control 
participants, and only 3 participants with autism responding correctly in all eight trials. Only two 
participants with autism gave a correct response in four trials, and one control participant in five 
trials. Therefore, all the participants in each group gave a correct response in four trials or more in 
the control task.
CORRECT
RESPONSES:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Autistic 
n = 12
2 4 3 3
Control 
n = 12
1 2 9
Table 5.14 Deixis Experiment 4: Number of participants across correct trials in control task
5.4.6- Summary of Experiment 4 results
The performance of the two groups was very similar across the two tasks. For example, at least 
half o f  the participants in each group, and all the participants in the two groups gave correct 
answers in four or more trials of the deictic and the control tasks respectively.
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5.5 Summary of results and discussion
Experiment 2 examined the comprehension of the deictic verbs ‘come’ and ‘bring’. The results of 
this task were difficult to interpret confidently. In spite of having significantly fewer participants 
with autism than control participants giving a correct response across the four trials of the task, 
the majority of the participants with autism gave correct responses in at least three of these trials. 
Thus, it is difficult to know whether the lower propensity of the participants with autism to give a 
correct response across the four trials was due to a lack of understanding of the deictic terms, or 
due to other factors that might not be related to deictic understanding.
In Experiment 3, where comprehension of verbal and non-verbal deictic terms was examined, the 
two groups of participants were not significantly different in understanding verbal deictic 
expressions, although the participants with autism showed a tendency to give fewer correct 
responses. However, the participants with autism were significantly less likely than control 
matched participants to understand instructions where a non-verbal deictic expression (i.e. a head 
nod) was used.
Finally, Experiment 4 included a perspective-taking task where one animal was placed inside a 
plastic field, and two other animals were placed outside the field. The aim was to indicate the 
animal that speaks, or the addressee animal, in accordance with either deictic or non-deictic 
terms. Here, the performance of the two groups was very similar across the two tasks.
Therefore, the main finding of these experiments is that contrary to predictions, individuals with 
autism are relatively proficient in their understanding of deictic expressions, although there might 
be limitation in some aspects of this understanding.
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One of the limitations found in the participants with autism, was in relation to their understanding 
of instructions when non-verbal deictic expressions were used, in Experiment 3. They were 
significantly less likely than the control participants to give a correct response after these 
instructions. This result could not be explained by a lack of understanding of the task, in as much 
as these participants had been selected because they demonstrated a capacity to deal with the task 
demands.
It is important to highlight that the non-verbal gesture selected for this task was a nod of the head, 
instead of a point The reason why a point was not used in the instructions was because people 
might use pointing more frequently than other kind of non-verbal expression when interacting 
with individuals with autism, and therefore such individuals might be more used to responding to 
this kind of expression. Also, individuals with autism have been reported to be proficient in their 
understanding of pointing when it is used to ask for things, as opposed to ‘share’ an event (Baron- 
Cohen, 1989). One possible explanation is that they can either be taught or learn by themselves 
the meaning of a point through cognitive or social abilities that might be intact in these children. 
For example, individuals with autism perform well on visual perspective-taking tasks, a capacity 
that could relate to the understanding of pointing.
However a head nod seems to implicate something more than pointing when it is used to reveal 
the location of an object, in that it implicates an interpersonal gesture. For example, in 
Experiment 3, informal observations of the videotapes revealed that the experimenters not only 
nodded to a location, but also expressed a gesture by raising their eyebrows and moving their 
bodies forward. The interpersonal information expressed through these nods may explain why 
individuals with autism had more difficulties than the control participants in understanding the 
instructions when a head nod was used.
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One possible explanation, therefore, is that individuals with autism might have difficulties in  
understanding these expressions because they fail to understand the attitudes expressed by those 
non-verbal deictic gestures. It is possible that the deictic use of a head nod, not only indicates a 
location, but also expresses what the person who uses the gesture is intending to communicate in 
identifying a location. Thus, the process of identification might be important to understand these 
expressions.
From the perspective of theory of mind theory, the focus is less on the subjective understanding 
of the attitudes and feelings of other people who use non-verbal deictic gestures, but rather upon 
children’s conceptual understanding of what another person is intending when using these 
expressions. Thus, a lack of concepts about the minds of other people might also explain this 
finding.
The experiments presented in Chapter 4 and 5 were designed to examine production and 
comprehension of deictic expressions. They revealed only a few subtle group differences 
throughout these experiments, suggesting that individuals with autism are more proficient with 
deixis than previously thought.
The question now is how do they come to understand deictic expressions? Whereas non-autistic 
individuals seem to learn deixis through joint attention routines and role-playing the action of 
others (Chamey, 1980), and identifying with the person who speaks (Hobson, 2002), individuals 
with autism may rely more on cognitive (Lee at al. 1994) and other social abilities that might be 
intact. For example, it is possible that the processes underlying their abilities to make requests 
and to recognise visuo-spatial perspectives might provide children with autism some experience 
of the perspectives of others, and this experience might be relevant in  their understanding o f  
deixis.
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Thus, it is possible that individuals with autism do not follow the same developmental pathway to 
achieve deixis, relaying more on impersonal routes than non-autistic individuals, who might relay 
more on personal aspects of the situations. It is also possible that the acquisition of deixis may 
depend less on some of the social and interpersonal factors that were thought underlie deictic 
understanding, for example, the process of identification. Although the present results suggest 
that individuals with autism can achieve a good level of understanding of deixis, the subtle group 
differences also suggest that these abilities may not be identical to those of non-autistic children. 
For example, the participants with autism, in relation to matched control participants, used more 
‘atypical’ deictic terms for distant locations, and had more difficulties in understanding non­
verbal deictic expressions. The lack of involvement and identification with other people might 
explain these subtle difficulties.
Therefore, and to  conclude, the results of these experiments suggest that the impact of social 
factors on deictic understanding and the personal elements involved, might be more subtle than 
previously thought. It is possible that compensatory social and cognitive abilities explain a major 
part of deictic understanding. However, it is possible that the process of identification, a non- 
inferential type of role-taking, might play a role in such understanding in non-autistic individuals.
The next chapter will examine processes of social connectedness and non-inferential role-taking 
by focusing on interpersonal non-verbal communication in individuals with autism.
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CHAPTER SIX
Role-taking aspects of non-verbal communication in Autism
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6.1 Introduction.
Every conversation contains some implicit language that goes beyond words. One example of this 
is the language of gestures, looks, stress and intonation of the voice; in other words, the language 
of non-verbal communication. This body language often takes precedence over the actual 
meaning of the words, with the result that a general feeling of mutual understanding occurs 
together with a feeling of closeness with the other person. Thus, through this interchange of body 
gestures there is another event taking place in a different level. This event is interpersonal 
engagement.
It has been noted in previous chapters that interpersonal engagement plays an important role in 
our understanding of other people as individuals with different perspectives from our own. People 
with autism appear to have both difficulties in engaging emotionally and psychologically with 
other people, and difficulties in understanding other people’s perspectives. In the first study of 
this thesis, participants with autism were asked to retell stories taking the perspectives of two 
story characters. The results of this study suggested that individuals with autism have difficulties 
in moving from the perspective of one character to the perspective of another. Nevertheless, the 
majority of participants with autism reached some degree of understanding of different 
viewpoints in the characters of their stories. Since a minority of participants in the two groups 
adopted the perspective of the main character and described it conveying that character’s 
psychological orientation, it is difficult to know whether the participants with autism were really 
having special difficulty in putting themselves in the “character’s shoes”. There remains the 
question whether individuals with autism can put themselves into the shoes of real people.
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Interpersonal engagement in autism was also studied indirectly in the studies of Chapters 4 and 5, 
where aspects of deixis that might be dependent on understanding different perspectives, were 
examined. Again, individuals with autism seemed to be more proficient in their use and 
understanding of deictic expressions than we had thought. One possibility is that individuals with 
autism might rely more on cognitive and intact social routes in  coming to  understand deixis. 
However, some abnormalities were found in their use and understanding of some deictic 
expressions. A possible explanation for these abnormalities is that individuals with autism might 
fail to identify with other people.
The present study aims to examine the processes of interpersonal engagement and role-taking by 
focusing on non-verbal communication between two people in the context of a one-to-one 
interaction.
6.2 Non-verbal communication in autism.
The diagnostic and statistical manual of mental Disorders, (DSM-IV: American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994- See Appendix 1) states that autism involves a qualitative impairment in social 
interaction. One feature of autism, is a marked impairment in the use of multiple non-verbal 
expressions such as eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate 
social interaction. Although there have been several studies that have focused on the use of 
gestures and non-verbal expressions in individuals with autism (Tantam et al. 1993; Stone et al. 
1997; Capps et al. 1999; Camaioni et al. 1997, 2003; Freeman, 1998; Kikuchi, & Koga., 2001; 
Misailidi, 2002; Nadel 2002), there have been remarkably few investigations on the ways in 
which individuals with autism use and make use o f other people’s non-verbal behaviour in 
informal conversations (Tantam et a l 1993; Capps et al. 1999). Here, I shall review two studies
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that have examined non-verbal communication in individuals with autism in the context of one- 
to-one conversations.
Tantam, Holmes & Cordess (1993) examined the use of head and neck movements, directed gaze 
to other people, vocalizations, hand gestures, self-regulation and postural change in participants 
with Asperger Syndrome1, who were conversing with another person. Two experiments were 
carried out where the participants were prompted to talk about ‘what people say to each other 
when they first meet’. Participants were in their twenties, and were interviewed by a person who 
was blind to their diagnosis. The first part of the study involved a group of nine participants with 
autism and nine typically developing participants, and the second part involved six participants 
with autism, who were matched according to chronological age with a group of six schizoid 
patients. The schizoid patients were selected because they showed a similar degree of social 
isolation and eccentricity as the autistic participants, but had no developmental features of autism. 
The first 3 minutes and 50 seconds of each interview were analysed. No significant differences 
between the two groups were found in relation to the frequency and duration of each kind of 
behaviour studied. Postural shifts and smiles were infrequent, and mutual smiling tended to be 
non-significantly less marked in the interactions involving the participants with autism. The 
authors then examined gaze in response to speech, and found that in the first part of the study, 
individuals with autism, in relation to their control participants, looked significantly less to the 
interviewer when they were listening to him. They did not find such differences when the 
participants were the ones speaking. Although the group difference was not significant, the same 
pattern was found in the second part of the study. However, the interviewer looked significantly 
more and spoke significantly less to  the autistic partners than to the control participants. The
1 Asperger syndrome is often considered a type o f  autism, and for the present purposes I w ill use ‘autism’ 
to refer to Asperger syndrome.
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authors attributed this difference to the autistic participants’ failure to look to the interviewer 
while the interviewer was speaking, which could have induced the interviewer to respond 
differently when interacting with them. The authors concluded that these results might be due to a 
lack of expected gaze. They suggested that it is the inborn tendency to orientate to human faces 
and vocalizations that is impaired in autism, and this might lead to the affective abnormalities 
found in such individuals.
Another study that examined non-verbal communication in autism in the context of a one-to-one 
conversation was that carried out by Capps, Kehres, & Sigman (1999). They tested the 
hypotheses that individuals with autism have abnormalities in their non-verbal skills when 
relating to others. Fifteen children with autism (Mean CA: 3.3; Mean MA: 2.9; Mean IQ: 17.3; 
Mean language age: 2.2) were closely matched with 15 developmentally delayed children 
according to verbal ability (Mean CA: 2.6; Mean MA: 2.2; Mean IQ: 13.1; Mean Language age: 
1.5), developmental quotient and mental age (according to  Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale). 
The participants were engaged in a semi-structured informal conversation where they talked with 
an experimenter about holiday, friends and school for six minutes. Head nods and shakes, smiles, 
and gestures when describing events (e.g. moving hands and arms) were rated throughout the 
interaction. Smiles were rated as either appropriate or inappropriate to the context. As the 
investigators had expected, groups did not differ in terms of head shakes and nods that were used 
to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but the participants with autism were less likely to nod while listening to 
their partner’s talk than were comparison children (t =2.3, df=17.40, p<.005). However, children 
with autism were as likely as the comparison group to smile, display affect with smiles 
appropriate to the context, and use gestures. The authors pointed out that non-autistic individuals 
share assumptions about how people think or feel, and that this is what guides our involvement in 
conversations and what is lacking in autism. They suggest that “the social deficits in autism are
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perhaps best understood in terms o f a profound difficulty in acquiring and making use o f  
conventional knowledge ” (p.340).
The two studies presented above show that differences in the non-verbal behaviour of individuals 
with autism, in relation to verbally matched comparison groups, are surprisingly modest. For 
example, individuals with autism appeared to use smiles and gestures as much as their 
comparison groups. However an interesting finding that appears in both studies is that individuals 
with autism looked less (Tantam et al, 1993) and used fewer shakes and nods (Capps et al, 1999) 
when their partner was talking. No such differences were found when the participants themselves 
were talking. The authors explained these abnormalities in terms of a lack of expected gaze 
(Tantam et al, 1993) and a difficulty in making hypotheses about how people think or feel (Capps 
et al, 1999). In addition, Capps et al (1999) stated, in relation to individuals with autism, that 
“..our efforts to establish complete intersubjectivety inevitably fa ll short. ..” (p.340). 
Unfortunately they did not examine this observation further.
The present study aims to examine participants’ non-verbal expressions when they are speaking, 
in relation to those periods of time when another person is speaking. In addition, manifestations 
of intersubjectivity in individuals with autism will be examined by ‘subjective ratings’, in parallel 
to behavioural measures. It will be argued that something more basic than a lack of expected 
gaze, or a lack of ‘theorizing’ about other people’s minds, leads individuals with autism to use 
fewer non-verbal cues when a partner is talking. This basic process is interpersonal engagement, 
which, as described in previous chapters, involves the process of identification with the other 
person.
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6.3 A study to examine non-verbal communication in young 
people with autism
The present study was carried out in two stages. In the first stage, the aim was to replicate 
previous findings from other studies. Then, in a second stage new predictions were made, based 
on an hypothesis about a lack of identification by, and with, individuals with autism, and the 
subjective quality of their engagement.
6.3.1- First hypothesis and predictions
The hypothesis underlying this study is that individuals with autism are less engaged with other 
people emotionally and psychologically, than are non-autistic individuals. The first predictions 
were that this lack of social engagement with other people would be manifest in abnormalities in 
interpersonal non-verbal communication, and more specifically, that participants with autism 
would not co-ordinate these expressions with another person’s utterances, even though they might 
be able to co-ordinate such expressions with their own utterances. It was expected that in relation 
to verbally matched control participants, those with autism would:
1- (In accordance with Tantam and Cordess, 1993), look for less time to the interviewer's face 
during the interview when the interviewer was talking, in relation to those periods when the 
interviewer was listening.
2- (In accordance to Capps, Kehres, & Sigman, 1999), show fewer nods and shakes of their heads 
during the interview, when the interviewer was talking, in  relation to  those periods when the 
interviewer was listening. (P.S. here, each nod or shake is understood as a single episode).
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3- smile less when the interviewer was talking, in relation to those periods when the interviewer 
was listening.
In this way, the first part of this study attempted to replicate previous findings from Tantam et al. 
(1993), and Capps et al. (1999) studies.
6.3.2- Participants
Twelve adolescents (8 males and 4 females) who satisfied the criteria of the diagnostic and 
statistical manual of mental Disorders (DSM-IV: American Psychiatric Association, 1994- See 
Appendix 1) for autism, and who met research diagnosis criteria on the Childhood Autism rating 
scale (CARS: Schopler et al. 1986- See Appendix 2) were matched with 12 non-autistic 
participants with developmental delay and without autism or other diagnosed medical condition 
(9 males, 3 females) according to chronological age (CA) and performance on the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS: Dunn, Dunn and Whetton, 1982). Given the relative weakness of the 
verbal abilities of individuals with autism relative to their non-verbal abilities, it seemed 
appropriate to match participants by verbal ability because the interaction was in the context of a 
conversation. The participant characteristics are shown in table 6.1.
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Chronological age 
mean /sd/ range 
(yr;mo)
Verbal mental age 
mean / sd/ range 
(yr;mo)
Autistic 
Group 
n = 12
15;06 
SD: 42 
(9;02-19;00)
6;06 
SD: 19 
(4; 04-9; 09)
Control 
Group 
n=  12
14;04 
SD: 22 
(11;02-17;01)
6;07 
SD: 18 
(4;00-9;03)
Table 6.1 NYC study: Participant characteristics
6.3.3- Method
This study employed videotapes of conversation that had been previously recorded in order to study 
self-concepts of adolescents with autism (Lee and Hobson, 1998). At the time the interviews were 
conducted, Lee and Hobson did not anticipate that the videotapes would be reviewed for the present 
purposes. The conversation itself took the form of a semi-structured self-understanding interview 
(that followed the procedure devised by Damon and Hart, 1982), where the participants were asked 
questions about themselves. The duration of the interviews ranged between 35 and 60 minutes.
Participants were interviewed in a quiet room by a male investigator. For the present study, and 
before the tapes had been examined, three minutes of the videotaped interview were selected for 
each participant. It was rated the part of the interview that began with the following question: 
‘ What kind ofperson are you? How would you describe yourself? '. This part of the interview was 
selected for the reason that the non-verbal communication of the participants with autism was 
expected to be, perhaps, more strikingly abnormal when they have to talk about and describe 
themselves.
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At this point, it is important to highlight that at the time the interviews were conducted, the 
interviewer did not know that the videotapes would be used to examine non-verbal communication 
between himself and the participants.
6.3.4- Scoring of the interaction and Reliability
The following measures were rated second by second by the author of this thesis who was blind 
to diagnosis but who was not blind to the hypothesis and predictions of the study. The following 
ratings, except eye contact which was rated in the interviewer as well, were applied only to the 
participants:
Eye Contact- second-by-second ratings were made of looks to the conversational partner. The 
percentage of time of these looks was calculated, out of the total time spent looking to the other 
person, in relation to the period of time when either the participant or the interviewer was talking.
Shakes and nods- Shakes and nods were coded by counting the numbers of episodes of shaking 
or nodding. An episode was identified from the beginning of a shake or nod until the end of the 
head movement. Those episodes where the participants moved their heads to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
were not included in our analysis. This replicated the approach of previous studies. Each episode 
was classified according to whether the interviewer or the participant was talking.
Smiles- Smiles were coded by counting the number of episodes of smiling. An episode was 
identified from the beginning of a smile until the end of the smile. Also, each episode was 
classified according to whether the participants’ smile followed the interviewer’s smile or not, 
and according to whether the interviewer or the participant was talking.
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For reliability purposes, an independent rater who was blind to diagnosis and the hypothesis of 
the study was trained to rate all the behavioural measures on the first minute of 25% of the 
participants (three participants with autism and three control participants). Inter-rater agreement 
was estimated with the intraclass correlation coefficient (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979). The intraclass 
correlation coefficient produces measures o f  consistency or agreement of values within cases. 
This coefficient was calculated instead of Kappa because the two compared ratings involved 
frequencies of occurrence of events and were not ordinal in nature. The IC for the participant’s 
looks was 0.93 when the participants were talking, and 0.99 when the interviewer was talking. 
The IC for the participant’s shakes and nods was 0.91 when the participants were talking, and 
0.82 when the interviewer was talking. The IC for the participant’s smiles was 0.75 when the 
participants were talking, and 0.91 when the interviewer was talking. Finally, IC for the 
interviewer’s looks to the participants was 0.98. These coefficients suggest that the measures used 
were ‘excellent’ according to Feiss (1981) and, Cicchetti and Sparrow (1981), as shown in 
Appendix 4.
6.3.5- Results: Stage I.
- Looks
a) Participants ’ responses: The percentage of time that the participants looked to the interviewer 
was calculated a) when the participant was talking, and b) when the interviewer was talking. 
Contrary to what had been predicted, no significant group differences were found in either of 
these two situations. For example, approximately half of the participants in each group looked to 
the interviewer for 40 percent or more of the time in each situation. Figure 6.1 shows the mean of 
the percentage of time that the participants looked to the interviewer in each one of the two 
situations.
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■ Autistic H Control
% Time looking % Time looking
at I when P talks at I when I talks
Figure 6.1 NVC study: Percentage of time that the participants looked at the interviewer.
b) Interviewer’s responses: the interviewer’s looks to the participants were examined using the 
approach adopted by Tantam and collaborators, without taking into account who was speaking. 
The overall time that the interviewer looked to the participants throughout the three minutes was 
calculated. Results showed that the interviewer looked significantly less to the participants with 
autism than to the control participants (Mann Whitney, U= 35, two tailed, p< .05). This result was 
in the opposite direction to the one reported in theTantam et al. study.
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- Head shakes and nods
Those episodes when the participants moved their heads to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ were not included in 
this analysis. The percentage of the numbers of episodes shaking and nodding was calculated, out 
of the total number of the participant’s ‘shakes and nods’ episodes, in both situations when the 
interviewer was talking, and when the participants were talking (See Figure 6.2). As predicted, 
participants with autism showed significantly fewer number of episodes of shakes and nods in the 
situation when the interviewer was speaking (Mann-Whitney, U= 34.5, one tailed, p<.025). In 
this context three participants with autism and nine control participants shook their heads or 
nodded at least once (Fisher’s Exact Test, one tailed, p=.02). Therefore, even though the 
participants with autism looked to the interviewer as much as the control participants when the 
interviewer was talking, they showed significantly fewer head shakes and nods in this situation.
In the situation where the participants were talking, the two groups were not significantly 
different with regard to the percentage number of shakes and nods (Mann-Whitney, U= 57, one 
tailed, ns). In this situation six participants with autism and 10 control participants showed at least 
one episode of a shake or a nod (not a significant difference between the groups).
181
■ Autistic H Control
% Number S/N at % Number S/N
I when P talks at I when I talks
Figure 6.2 NVC Study: Percentage of number of participants’ head shakes or nods 
- Smiles
The two groups were very similar regarding the number of participants who smiled in relation to 
who was talking. Nine participants in each group smiled at least once when they were talking, and 
7 autistic and 9 control participants smiled at least once when the interviewer was speaking. In 
addition, 5 participants with autism and 2 control participants smiled after the interviewer had 
smiled.
6.3.6- Summary of Results: Stage I.
The participants with autism were expected to show fewer non-verbal gestures, and specifically 
when the interviewer was speaking. Although the two groups were not significantly different in 
the p ercentage o f t  ime 1 ooking t o the i nterviewer (with half o f  t he participants in each group
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looking for more than 40% of the time), the group with autism showed significantly fewer 
number of episodes of shakes and nods in the situation when the interviewer was speaking. In 
addition, the two groups were very similar in the number of smiles, where a majority of 
participants in each group smiled at the interviewer during the interaction.
In relation to the interviewer’s looks to the participants, results were in the opposite direction to 
those of Tantam et al. The interviewer looked significantly less to the participants with autism 
than to the control participants
To summarise a t this point, although some subtle differences in the pattern of the non-verbal 
behaviour were found, between individuals with autism and control participants matched 
according to verbal ability, what is striking here is the similarity between the two groups in the 
use of looks, shakes and nods, and smiles.
Therefore, the study began by replicating previous work with regard to the head ‘shakes and 
nods’ of participants with autism, which were fewer than those of control participants when the 
interviewer was speaking, and with regard to ‘smiles’ where no group difference in frequency 
was found. However, previous results with regard to the participants’ looks to the interviewer in 
relation to the periods of time when either the participant or the interviewer was talking, were not 
replicated.
6.3.7- Further hypothesis and Predictions: Stage II.
The children with autism were not different in shaking and nodding their heads when they were 
the ones talking (i.e. ‘according to themselves’), but were less inclined to shake and nod in 
attunement with the interviewer’s communication and stance, in the case when the interviewer
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was talking. Normally, we shake and nod our heads in accordance with what we experience in 
tune with the other person, but this is less the case with autism. If children with autism have a 
lowered propensity to identify with other people, that is to say, to feel ‘moved’ by others, it might 
follow that the ‘someone else’ has a reciprocal difficulty in identifying with the child with autism.
At this point, it was decided to examine further the interviewer’s responses to the participants. 
One prediction was made: that only when the participants with autism were talking, the 
interviewer would show fewer shakes and nods. No further predictions were made with regard to 
the interviewer’s looks or smiles, for the reason that it was unclear whether these measures might 
be specific indices of identification with the other person. However, these non-verbal expressions 
were also examined in the interviewer.
Further predictions were made in relation to the hypothesis that the relatively subtle group 
differences in behavioural indices, belie important group differences in identification. With this in 
mind, a final prediction was made: on ‘subjective’ judgements of interpersonal engagement, 
group differences would emerge. More specifically, it was predicted that independent raters 
would judge the quality of patterned inter-personal communication to be abnormal in the autistic 
participants. Thus, it was predicted:
a) that individuals with autism would be judged to show low levels of affective engagement with 
the interviewer.
b) that ratings of overall communication would show the dialogue between participants and 
interviewer to be less smooth and flowing, in the case of individuals with autism.
c) that the prevalence of "oddities” in non-verbal communication would be higher in individuals 
with autism, than in control participants.
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6.3.8- Scoring of the interaction and Reliability of new measures: Stage II
The interviewer’s looks to the participants, shakes and nods, and smiles, were rated in relation to 
the periods of time when either the participant or the interviewer were talking. A second rater 
who was blind to diagnosis and hypothesis of the study was trained to rate the 25% of the ratings 
(i.e. three participants with autism and three control participants). The intraclass correlation was 
calculated to examine the consistency or agreement of values within cases. The IC for the 
interviewer’s looks was 0.95 when the participants were talking, and 0.94 when the interviewer 
was talking. The IC for the interviewer’s shakes and nods was 0.63 when the participants were 
talking, and 0.62 when the interviewer was talking. The IC for the interviewer’s smiles was 0.89 
when the participants were talking, and 0.95 when the interviewer was talking. These coefficients 
suggest that all the measures used in this section of the study were ‘excellent’, except the 
interviewer’s head shakes and nods that were considered ‘good’, according to Feiss (1981) and, 
Cicchetti and Sparrow (1981) as shown in Appendix 4.
Judgements were also made regarding the quality of the interpersonal engagement between 
participants and interviewer. These ratings were ‘subjective’ in the sense of requiring human 
judgement, but ‘objective’ in being subjected to estimates of inter-rater reliability.
Affective engagement: this was the degree of emotional connectedness between the participant 
and the experimenter. ‘Affective engagement’ was rated using a one-to-five point scale (see Table 
6.2), where a score of one was given for “no emotional connection ”, and a score of five was 
given when there was judged to be a “strong emotional connection ” between the participant and 
the interviewer.
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Flow of the interview: This was the degree to which the dialogue between the participant and the 
interviewer was smooth and flowing. ‘Flow of the interview’ was rated with a one-to-five point 
scale (see Table 6.3), were a score of one was given when there was a “minimum dialogue ”, and 
a score o f  five was given w henthe d ialogue b etween the participant and the interviewer was 
judged to be “very smooth
Oddities- This was the only measure to be rated in the participants only. ‘Odd’ gestures were 
those non-verbal expressions in the participants that were considered atypical or uncommon.
An independent rater who was blind to diagnosis, was trained to code affective engagement and 
flow of the interview on approximately 40% of the participants (five participants of each group). 
Kappa coefficients were calculated in this case, because of the ordinal nature of these measures. 
For “affective engagement” the Kappa coefficient was 0.61, and for ‘flow of the interview’ the 
Kappa coefficient was 0.66, indicating 'substantial agreement' (Landis and Koch, 1977; See 
Appendix 4) between the investigator and the rater. The ‘odd’ episodes were not subjected to 
estimates of reliability, and these results should be considered only suggestive.
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A f f e c t iv e  e n g a g e m e n t
Judge the degree of emotional connectedness between the participant and the experimenter:
5.
Strongly connected: The child is clearly engaged with Ex. She is responsive to the emotional signals 
expressed by Ex. Further, she integrates an appropriate degree of emotional 
expression (e.g., smiling, frowning) to both connect and 'hold' Ex. in the course 
of the interaction.
4.
Moderately connected: The child is connected with Ex. but to a lesser degree than above. In this case 
she is reasonably responsive to Ex.'s signals, and occasionally integrates an 
appropriate degree of expression to connect with Ex.
3.
Somewhat connected: Some emotional connection is evidenced. Here there is a feeling that the actions 
displayed by the child are 'rehearsed' or are being 'thought about' before being 
performed. She may appear to know how to respond, but not involve herself in 
the interaction. Nonetheless these actions have some power in connecting to Ex.
2.
Minimally connected: The child is barely connected with Ex. She may appear wooden and inflexible 
in her reactions to Ex. She displays very little emotional expression herself.
1.
No emotional connection: The child may respond to Ex.'s questions, but there appears to be no emotional 
connection between the two. The child may appear 'robotic' or seem to want to 
be elsewhere rather than with Ex.
fable 6.2 NYC Study: The non-verbal subjective ‘Affective Engagement’ scores sheet.
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F l o w  o f  t h e  in t e r v ie w
Judge the degree to which the interview was smooth and flowing:
5.
Very smooth: The interview proceeds at a relaxed and steady pace. There i s a strong sense 
that both the child and the participant are working together in the conversation, 
and that the work is fairly balanced between the two. The overall impression is 
of a dialogue that flows in a mutually rewarding manner.
4.
Reasonably smooth: The interview p roceeds at a less relaxed and steady pace than defined above. 
There is a sense that both parties are working, but the child requires the 
occasional prompt to stay on track. For example Ex. may need to repeat a 
question or lay stronger emphasis on a repeated question to draw the child back 
into the dialogue. The child is responsive to this, and something of a pace is re­
established.
3.
Fairly smooth: The interview seems to move in 'fits-and-starts'. There are times when the child 
appears to be working but there are equal amounts o f time when Ex. needs to 
work harder to draw her back into a dialogue.
2.
Strained dialogue: There is a strained dialogue. Ex. has to work very hard to keep some kind of a 
conversation going. However, the child is drawn on at least one occasion, where 
there is a feeling that something might develop but then doesn't.
1.
Minimum or no dialogue: There is hardly any dialogue at all. The child may respond with terse answers to 
Ex.'s questions, but on the whole she puts little or no effort into an exchange 
with Ex. Ex. is seen to be doing all the work in conducting the interview.
Table 6.3 NVC Study: The non-verbal subjective ‘Flow of the Interview’ scores sheet.
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6.3.9- Results: Stage II.
- Looks
Figure 6.3 shows the percentage of time that the interviewer looked to the participants in relation 
to who was speaking. Regarding the periods of time when the participants were talking, the 
interviewer looked to the participants for most of the time (more than 95 percent of the three 
minutes) in each group. However, the interviewer looked significantly for more time to the 
control than to the participant with autism when he (the interviewer) was the one talking (Mann 
Whitney, U= 35, two tailed, p< .05). In the latter case the interviewer looked to two autistic and 
eight control participants for more than 90 percent of the three minutes (Fisher’s Exact Test, two 
tailed, p=.04).
% Looks to P % Looks to P
when P talks when I talks
Figure 6.3 NVC Study: Percentage of time that the interviewer looked at the participants
■ Autistic Q Control
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- Head shakes and nods
The prediction was that only when the participants with autism were talking, the interviewer 
would show fewer shakes and nods. Figure 6.4 shows the percentage of the number of the 
interviewer’s ‘shakes and nods’ episodes, out of the total number of the interviewer’s ‘shakes and 
nods’ episodes, for each group, in both situations when the participants were talking, and when 
the interviewer was talking. This figure shows a difference in the profile of the interviewer’s head 
and nod responses. The pattern of results indicated that the percentage of the interviewer’s shakes 
and nods, when the interviewer was talking, was significantly higher with the participants with 
autism than with the control participants (Mann-Whitney, U= 19, two tailed, p<.01), although he 
moved his head to nod or shake at least once at all the participants of the two groups in this case. 
The percentage of the number of the interviewer’s head movements at the participants when the 
interviewer was talking was 88.8 (SD: 16.2) for the participants with autism and 67.94 (SD: 
12.7) for the control participants.
In the case when the participants were talking, and in accordance to the prediction, results 
indicated that the percentage of the interviewer’s shakes and nods was higher, but this time with 
the control participants than with the participants with autism (Mann-Whitney, U= 19, one tailed, 
p<.01). The percentage of the number of the interviewer’s head movements at the participants 
when the participant was talking was 11.2 (SD: 16.2) for the participants with autism and 32.06 
(SD: 12.7) for the control participants. In this case, the interviewer moved his head to nod or 
shake at least once towards five participants with autism, whereas he did so towards all the 
control participants (Fisher’s Exact Test, one tailed, p=.02).
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autism Control
■  % number o f  S/N to P when P talks Q % number o f  S/N to P when I talks
Figure 6.4 NVC Study: Percentage of number of interviewer’s head shakes or nods
- Smiles
The pattern of the interviewer’s smiles was very similar in both groups. The interviewer smiled at 
least once to the majority of the participants in each group, both when the participants were 
talking (towards 9 autistic and 8 control participants) and when the interviewer was talking 
(towards 11 autistic and 10 control participants). Also, the interviewer smiled at least once after 
the participant had smiled. This occurred with eight participants with autism and nine control 
participants.
- Subjective ratings:
a) Affective engagement
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Affective engagement was defined as the degree to which participants and interviewer were 
emotionally connected during the selected three minutes of the interview. Figure 6.5 shows the 
distribution of participants in the affective engagement score (See Table 6.2). In accordance with 
predictions, participants with autism were significantly less affectively engaged with the 
interviewer than the control participants (Mann-Whitney, U= 26, one tailed, p<.01). Here, only 
five individuals with autism and almost all the control participants (eleven) were rated with a 
moderate or greater affective connection with the interviewer (Fisher’s Exact Test, one tailed, p= 
.01). Note that only one participant with autism was rated to have a strong emotional connection 
with the interviewer.
No emotional Minimal Somewhat Moderate Strong emotional
connection connection
■  Autistic (n=12) Q Control (n = 12)
Figure 6.5 NVC Study: Affective engagement scores
b) Flow o f the interview
Flow of the interview was rated with a one-to-five point scale (See Table 6.3). The prediction that 
the dialogue between the participant and interviewer would be less smooth and flowing with the 
participants with autism than with the control participants was confirmed (Mann-Whitney, U= 16, 
one tailed, p<.001). As Figure 6.6 illustrates, 10 control participants and only two participants 
with autism had very smooth dialogues with the interviewer (Fisher’s Exact Test, one tailed,
p=.002).
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Minimum Strained dialogue Fairly smooth Reasonably Very smooth 
dialogue smooth
■  Autistic (n=12) Q Control (n = 12)
Figure 6.6 NYC Study: Flow of the interview scores
c) Oddities
As predicted, participants with autism showed significantly more oddities than control 
participants (Mann-Whitney, one-tailed, p<.001). In this case, 11 participants with autism and 
only 2 control participants manifested an oddity at least once (Fisher’s Exact Test, one tailed, p= 
.00). Table 6.4 provides a description of the odd episodes. Most of the odd episodes in the group 
with autism were related to odd face gestures (eight participants), most of which were odd smiles 
(seven out of the eight). None of the control participants showed this kind of oddity. The two 
control participants who showed an oddity, showed a nod out of context, and an odd body gesture 
(where the participant talked without looking at the interviewer, but as if speaking with someone 
else), respectively.
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Al 1- No looks at the experimenter throughout the 3 min.
A2 1-A very brief smile.
A3 1- No looks at the experimenter throughout the 3 min.
2- Fast and forced smile.
3- Fast change of face expression.
4- Fast change of face expression.
A4 1- Unnatural body gesture.
2- Unnatural gesture with the hand.
3- Unnatural gesture with the hand (and the intonation of voice).
4- Unnatural body gesture.
5- Unnatural body gesture.
6- Breaks gaze with I and stands lost within his thoughts.
7- Unnatural gesture with the hand.
8- Unnatural gesture with the hand.
A5 1- Fast and forced smile.
2- S looks at the shelves very interested in the middle of the conversation.
3- Very slow shake of head when saying ‘I don’t know’.
A6 1- Unnatural face expression.
2- Smile out of context.
3- Smile out of context.
A7 1 - S closes eyes when looking at I throughout the whole 3 min.
2- Smile out of context.
3- Odd face expression (moving eyes).
4- Unnatural smile.
5- Unnatural smile.
6- Unnatural smile out of context.
7- Unnatural smile and nod.
A8 1 - Unnatural nod following I’s nod.
2- Unnatural nod following I’s nod.
3- Unnatural nod.
4- Smile out of context.
5- Unnatural nod following I’s nod.
6- Unnatural nod following I’s nod.
7- P makes faces at the experimenter while he’s not looking.
A10 1- Fast and forced smile.
2- Fast change of face expression.
A ll 1 - Odd fast head movement.
A12 1 - Unnatural body gesture.
Cl 1- Nod out of context.
C6 1- P talks without looking at I but as if he is speaking with someone else (during 95 
second)
A= Participant with autism, C= Control participant
Table 6.4 NVC Study: Descriptions of odd episodes
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6.3.10- Summary of results: Stage II.
The principal prediction of this stage was that only when the participants with autism were 
talking, would the interviewer show fewer shakes and nods. The rationale for this prediction was 
that the interviewer would nod when he was talking (i.e. ‘according to himself), but because of 
his difficulty in identifying with the participants with autism, would find it less natural to nod 
when the participant was talking (i.e. ‘according to the other’). In accordance with the prediction, 
the interviewer used fewer head shakes and nods of the head with the participants with autism, 
when the participants were talking. Whereas the interviewer showed a significantly lower 
percentage of head shakes and nods with the control participants, when the interviewer was 
talking.
In addition, the interviewer’s looks showed a different pattern. He looked significantly less to the 
participants with autism than to the control participants, but only when he (the interviewer) was 
the one talking. N o significant differences were found in the case when the participants were 
talking. Therefore, the lack of the interviewer’s shakes and nods when the participant with autism 
was talking w as not s imply a r eflection o f  h is 1 ooking 1 ess t o t he p articipants. M oreover, t he 
interviewer also smiled to the majority of the participants of the two groups at least once in both 
situations.
In stark contrast to the similarities found in stage I, where the participants of both groups 
appeared to use looks, shakes and nods, and smiles, (regardless of who was talking), subjective 
ratings showed that significantly more participants with autism were a) less affectively engaged 
with the interviewer, b) showed a fairly or minimum smooth dialogues, and c) showed more odd 
non-verbal episodes during the interaction.
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6.4- Discussion
This study reports four sets of important findings: 1) some of the predicted results were 
confirmed in the study, 2) some of the predicted results were not confirmed in the study, 3) the 
difference between the two groups was more evident when subjective measures of interpersonal 
engagement were employed, and 4) differences between the two groups were obtained in the non­
verbal expressions used by the interviewer.
The main predicted result confirmed in  the study was that individuals with autism shook and 
nodded their heads significantly less than the control participants, but only when the interviewer 
was talking. This result can have two interpretations. The first interpretation gives some support 
for the interpersonal theory. It is possible that individuals with autism showed this pattern 
because they did not identify with the interviewer, and therefore, they did not use this kind of 
interpersonal non-verbal expression to engage with him. Therefore, they were less inclined to 
shake and nod their heads in attunement with the interviewer’s communication and stance. 
However, they shook and nodded their heads ‘according to themselves’ when they were the ones 
talking, because this process might not require identifying with someone else. The second 
interpretation of this result gives some support for the theory of mind theory. The lack of 
understanding of the mental states of the interviewer could explain this result. The participants 
with autism did not shake and nod their heads when the interviewer was talking, because they did 
not understand the mental perspective of the interviewer.
The results not confirmed by the study were in relation to the use of looks and smiles by the 
participants with autism, when the interviewer was talking. Contrary to previous findings 
(Tantam et al, 1993), the participants with autism were not significantly different to the control
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participants in their looks to the interviewer when the interviewer was talking. In fact, the two 
groups were closely similar in their looks to the interviewer (See Figure 6.1.) in both situations, 
when the interviewer or the participant was talking. Also, the use of smiles was similar in the two 
groups, suggesting that individuals with autism do use smiles when they speak and when their 
partners speak. This result is in accordance to the findings of Capps et al. (1999) who also found 
that individuals with autism were as likely as the comparison children to smile. In Tantam et al. 
(1993) study very few participants smiled in each group.
These results suggest that the lack of shakes and nods of the participants with autism when the 
interviewer was talking cannot be explained by a general failure to use non-verbal expressions, in 
as much as individuals with autism used looks and smiles during this situation. Moreover, even 
though individuals with autism seemed to be proficient in the use of several non-verbal 
expressions, they show a lack of interpersonal engagement with their partners. For example, in 
spite of the use of looks, shakes and nods and smiles when interacting with another person, 
individuals with autism show low affective engagement and strained dialogues. Moreover, even 
though they used smiles as often as non-autistic individuals, the quality of some of these smiles 
were rated as atypical and odd (e.g. a fast smile). Individuals with autism might use smiles, 
shakes and nods or looks to other, but the processes involved in these expressions seem to be 
different from the ones involved in non-autistic individuals.
One possible interpretation of these results is that whereas non-autistic individuals might use 
these expressions naturally and unconsciously while engaging with other people (and perhaps 
driven by the process of identification), individuals with autism might use these expressions more 
consciously, driven by cognitive compensating strategies. Moreover, shakes and nods appear to 
be non-verbal expressions that are more influenced by our identification with the person we 
speak, as suggested by the results. The low affective engagement and flowing dialogues between
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the participants with autism and the interviewer might be explained by their lack of identification 
with the interviewer. In addition, the presence of non-verbal odd expressions in the participants 
with autism might be explained by their lack of experience of the subjective experience of other 
people, a process that might be important in the acquisition of non-verbal expressions and in their 
use in social contexts.
On the other hand, and from the point of view of the theory of mind theory, a lack of 
understanding of m ental s tates i n t he i nterviewer m ight a Iso e xplain t he 1 ack o f  i nterpersonal 
engagement between the participants and the interviewer. It is possible that the use of head shakes 
and nods requires more understanding of the perspectives of other people than the use of other 
expressions, like smiles. It is also possible that the low affective engagement and flowing 
dialogues between the participants with autism is the consequence of the difficulties of 
individuals with autism to think about the psychological perspectives of other people. Also, if 
individuals with autism have difficulties in thinking about what another person is thinking, they 
may not be aware of how to use non-verbal expressions normally. This might explain the high 
prevalence of non-verbal oddities in the participants with autism.
Tentatively, I would conclude that non-verbal expressions are acquired in a less inferential and 
cognitive context. It is possible that we “learn” how to use these expressions, through non- 
inferential processes by integrating other people’s non-verbal expressions into our own non­
verbal repertoire.
Finally, an interesting finding was obtained regarding the non-verbal expressions used by  the 
interviewer. Whereas he looked more often to the control group than to the group with autism 
when he was the one talking, the interviewer showed fewer head shakes and nods with the 
participants with autism when the participants were talking. The interviewer was unlikely to
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respond differently with the autistic participants consciously because, although he was not blind 
to the participants’ diagnosis, he did not know that the interviews would be used to study non­
verbal communication at that time. Tantam et al (1993) also reported that the interviewer in their 
study responded differently with the autistic than with the control groups by looking significantly 
more to the autistic partners, and suggested: “the Asperger subjects’ social behaviour was 
abnormal and induced a corresponding abnormality in the interviewers” (p. 130). Although they 
did not examine these results in relation to the periods of time when either the participant or the 
interviewer was talking, these results are only partly in keeping with the ones reported here. In 
our study, the interviewer looked somewhat less to the autistic than to the control group. 
Moreover, the main finding of Tantam et al. study was that individuals with autism showed 
significantly fewer looks than the control participants when the interviewer was talking. This 
result was not significant in our study, although there was a tendency towards the same direction.
One possible reason that could explain these different findings may not only rely on the different 
topic of conversation chosen in each study (self-understanding, as oppose to what people say to 
each other when they first meet), but also on the different control groups used in each study. In 
our study the participants with autism were matched according to verbal ability with non-autistic 
mentally delayed participants. Tantam et al. (1993) used two different control groups, typically 
developing children (with unreported IQ) and schizoid individuals matched according to verbal 
IQ. Thus, this study might have been controlling for different abilities than the study included in 
this chapter.
Finally it is important to take into consideration that the participants of Tantam et al. study were 
individuals with Asperger syndrome, whereas the participants of our study had a diagnosis of 
autism based on the DSM-VI criteria for autism. It is unclear whether these two groups of 
individuals with autism may differ in their use of non-verbal expressions.
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One possible explanation of these results is that the interviewer experienced the difficulties of 
individuals with autism in identifying with him, and also failed to identify with the participants 
with autism. Or the interviewer might have looked less to the autistic participants when he was 
the one talking because he was not being reassured with shakes and nods by the participants with 
autism. A lack of understanding of the interviewer’s mental states can not explain these results, 
since the participants with autism shook and nodded their heads when they were talking as much 
as the control participants, and still the interviewer shook and nodded his head less with the 
participants with autism in this situation. Tentatively, one might conclude that the pattern of 
results can be better explained by the interpersonal theory than the theory of mind theory.
This study presents limitations that need to be taken into consideration. For example, the small 
size of the sample makes the results difficult to generalize to other populations. The matching 
procedure can also explain the lack of striking differences between the two groups, since, 
although the aim of the study was to examine non-verbal expressions, the participants were 
matched according to their verbal ability. This type of matching is conservative in the sense that 
individuals with autism perform better on non-verbal than on verbal tasks, and therefore the non­
verbal understanding of the group with autism might have been above that of the control 
participants. However, even though the participants were matched according to verbal ability, 
there were some significant findings that provide relevant information about the use of non-verbal 
interpersonal communication of people with autism.
In relation to the interpersonal theory, this study suggests that although looks and smiles seem to 
be used very often in interactions, shakes and nods appear to play a special role when someone 
becomes a listener. They also suggest that there are subjective processes of interpersonal 
engagement underlying conversations. The results of this study illustrates that interpersonal
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engagement is a process that happens between two people, and when one pole of the dyad is weak 
the other pole becomes weakened as well. What these results suggest is that there may be 
something more unconsciously interpersonal, and perhaps implicating the process of 
identification, in the use of shakes or nods that may be different from the use of other behavioral 
expressions, like smiles o r looks. Shakes and nods are used very often when interacting with 
other people, and they seem to be guided by the intersubjective interpersonal pull which directs 
every conversation.
This study sheds some light on the nature of the non-verbal communication in autism in the 
context o f  a one-to-one interaction. It also sheds some light about the processes that underlie 
every conversation, which can be summarized with two words: social connectedness.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Summary of findings and general discussion
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7.1 Synopsis of theoretical background of the thesis
This thesis examined the ability to adopt different psychological perspectives in individuals with 
autism. In typically developing children, this ability unfolds during the early years of life and 
provides the necessary concepts to think about the internal perspectives of other people. 
Conceptual role-taking has been described as the mechanism that allows young children to think 
about the thoughts and feelings of others, a mechanism that is impaired in individuals with 
autism. Yet there is a dispute about the origin of such role-taking. The interpersonal theory, 
suggests that the ability to be ‘moved’ by other people’s attitudes and feelings, a non-inferential 
form of role-taking, is impaired in individuals with autism (Hobson, 2002), and that this 
impairment leads individuals with autism to have later difficulties in thinking about other 
persons’ perspectives. The theory of mind theory locates the problem in more cognitive 
mechanisms, and specifically, in the ability to ‘metarepresent’.
The aim of this thesis has been to apply scientific methodology to examine particular aspects of 
both conceptual and non-inferential aspects of role-taking in individuals with autism, with the 
intention of defining more precisely the nature of such limitations. A range of studies has been 
carried out to examine role-taking in autism, focusing on three main areas of research: a) 
narrative role-taking, b) deixis, and c) non-verbal interpersonal communication.
Chapter 1 made the distinction between interpersonal and cognitive aspects of role-taking. Non- 
inferential role-taking was described as the ability to move into and adopt the emotional or 
subjective perspective of another person. Engagement in primary intersubjectivity- the earliest 
form of relatedness between infants and caregivers- reveals that this kind of role-taking might 
already be present in the earliest months of life (Trevarthen,1979). Here, it seems to exist in the
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form of a dance between babies and their caregivers, in which they respond to one another in a 
co-ordinated and attuned manner. Following the first few months of life, infants begin to 
increasingly attend to objects in the world, outside of the dyadic interaction with their caregivers. 
They begin to follow the gaze, the head turn or the point of an adult, as well as to use non-verbal 
gestures directed to aspects of the world in relation to the orientation of other people. This type of 
relation is more clearly related to role-taking, in that the child’s orientation appears to be affected 
by the orientation of someone else. This new phase of secondary intersubjectivity involves the 
coordination and sharing of infant-caregiver understanding about objects and events. The infant 
participates in interpersonal interchanges with another person concerning the world around them, 
a process that is evident in social referencing and joint attention episodes. During the three years 
that follow, children develop the cognitive ability to think about what another person might be 
seeing, thinking, or believing, with what has been called conceptual role-taking.
Two main theories that examine the origins of conceptual role-taking were described in this 
chapter: the ‘interpersonal’ theory and the ‘theory of mind’ theory. The interpersonal theory 
suggests that the ability to engage with other people from early in life is what grounds the 
understanding of self and others as centres of consciousness. The process of identification i s 
suggested as the mechanism that allows young infants to ‘move’ to the stance of another person 
with feelings, and to experience aspects of the world through the ‘emotional viewpoint’ of 
another person (Hobson, 1999. 2002).
In contrast, the theory of mind theory considers the child’s understanding of different points of 
views and perspectives in other people as an outcome of previous cognitive developments. It also 
considers the child’s social understanding to be conceptual in nature. In other words, the child 
needs to have concepts before he/she can have this level of awareness of self and other.
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The end o f  Chapter 1 outlined the hypothesis that basic non-inferential role-taking processes, 
related to the way we identify with the attitudes and feelings of other people, are relatively 
lacking in individuals with autism. This view was presented as the underlying hypothesis of this 
thesis.
Chapter 2 described the case of autism, and examined how the above theories portray the 
difficulties o f  individuals with autism in  understanding the minds o f  other people. These two 
theories disagree in their views regarding the primary impairment that leads individuals with 
autism to have role-taking difficulties in understanding the psychological perspectives of others. 
Whereas the conceptual theory suggests that individuals with autism have an impairment in the 
modular system that provides young children with the necessary equipment to develop concepts 
about other people’s minds (i.e. conceptual role-taking), the interpersonal theory suggests that a 
more basic non-inferential role-taking underlies such impairment, in particular, the process of 
identification.
The scientific literature presented suggests that individuals with autism have difficulties in 
understanding some mental states, but not others, and that such difficulties do not always seem to 
be accounted for by cognitive limitations. For example, studies of emotion recognition suggest 
that individuals with autism are proficient i n understanding certain emotions; however, when 
using more subtle methods of investigation, individuals with autism show difficulties in this 
respect. They appear, therefore, to use different compensatory strategies than non-autistic 
children, in some situations to achieve the same goals.
Impairments in primary and secondary intersubjectivity were reported in individuals with autism, 
and limited non-inferential role-taking was suggested to be the possible mechanism responsible 
for these impairments. However, evidence from parents and family home movies illustrate the
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difficulty i n e stablishing whether, as the interpersonal theory suggests, an impairment in non- 
inferential role-taking might be present from birth in individuals with autism.
Other studies reported some evidence to support the proposal that individuals with autism have 
difficulties identifying with other people. Moreover, studies with congenitally blind children, and 
children raised in Romanian orphans, suggest that an early and severe deprivation of social 
contact (either biologically rooted as in the case of individuals with autism and those who are 
congenitally blind, or environmentally rooted as in the case of Romanian orphans) can lead to a 
picture that is remarkably similar to that of autism.
Although the studies of this thesis were not designed to examine the early impact of limitations of 
role-taking on social and cognitive capacities of the child with autism, they were intended to test 
whether, in relatively older children and adolescents, there is evidence for qualities o f impaired 
role-taking that seem to be in keeping with the interpersonal theory of autism and beyond that 
which could be explained by the ‘theory of mind’ theory. These aspects of role-taking were 
examined taking into consideration important methodological issues. It was vital to distinguish 
between a specific deficit in performance on a task, and a deficit due to 'general' forms of 
cognitive disability. In this way, in order to control for possible effects of the general cognitive 
abilities of the participants on the tasks, the participants with autism were matched with non- 
autistic participants according to chronological age and verbal mental age. Also, where possible, 
control tasks were devised in order to impose similar level of difficulty in cognitive demands 
upon the participants, as the study tasks. It was important to establish that the tasks were not 
either too difficult or too easy for the participants in order to avoid any ceiling or floor effects.
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Before discussing the theoretical implications of the findings, and the limitations of the studies 
and possible future investigations, a summary of the studies reported in this thesis, and their 
findings will be given.
7.2 Summary of studies
This thesis was designed to increase understanding o f  certain aspects o f  role-taking in  young 
people with autism. In particular, it was intended to increase understanding of impaired and intact 
aspects of conceptual and non-inferential role-taking in these individuals.
Chapter 3 was concerned with the ability to adopt the role and/or the perspective of another 
person in individuals with autism. This ability has mainly been studied by examining the way 
individuals with autism modify their language according to social context (Baltaxe, 1977; 
Menyuk, 1969; Prutting, 1982; Loveland etal. 1990, Tager-Flusberg, 1981), or by examining 
their use and understanding of mental state terms (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Pemer et al. 1989; 
Reed and Peterson, 1990), but it has rarely been studied by examining directly their difficulties in 
adopting the perspective of another person. The aim of the task included in Chapter 3 was to 
examine this aspect of role-taking by investigating the ways in which individuals with autism 
organise stories according to the roles and the perspectives of the characters.
Role-taking was studied in Chapters 4 and 5 from the point of view of deixis. The study of deixis 
was considered relevant for our focus of study since the child’s understanding of deictic 
expressions might depend on both conceptual and non-inferential role-taking. It was argued that 
although cognitive factors may play an important part in the children’s understanding of deictic 
expressions, non-inferential role-taking might also shape deictic understanding and use. Thus, a
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set of tasks was designed to examine production and comprehension of verbal and non-verbal 
deictic expressions in individuals with autism.
Finally, Chapter 6 examined the processes of interpersonal engagement and role-taking by 
focusing on the non-verbal communication exchanged between two people in the context of a 
one-to-one interaction. The aim of this study was to examine whether a possible impairment in 
identification with other people might be reflected in the ways in which individuals with autism 
use non-verbal expressions in a conversation with another person. Moreover, this study examined 
how such impairment might also be reflected in the ways in which a conversational partner uses 
these non-verbal interpersonal gestures. In addition, a novel approach was introduced to measure 
objectively, ‘subjective’ forms of interpersonal engagement.
7.3 Summary of findings
The underlying hypotheses of this thesis was that suggested by the “interpersonal theory”: 
individuals with autism have an impairment in the ability to adopt different psychological 
perspectives (conceptual role-taking), because o f more basic impairments in identifying with and 
moving (with feelings and attitudes) to  the p  erspectives o f  other people (non-inferential role- 
taking).
In addition, the “theory of mind theory” was introduced as an alternative theory that could also 
explain some of the results found across the studies of this thesis. Next, I shall summarize the 
findings of these studies, by focusing on how the ‘interpersonal theory’ and the ‘theory of mind’ 
theory might explain them.
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7.3.1- The interpersonal theory
One of the most striking results found across the studies of this thesis, is the similarities between 
the participants with autism and matched non-autistic participants in certain aspects of role-taking 
that were predicted to be impaired in individuals with autism by the interpersonal theory. 
Participants with autism, like their counterpart participants, a) reached some degree of 
understanding of different roles among characters described in stories; b) used verbal and non­
verbal deictic expressions when indicating a location to another person; c) were proficient in their 
understanding of verbal deictic expressions; and d) used non-verbal interpersonal expressions 
when in a conversation with another person.
However, other findings revealed significant differences between the participants with autism and 
the non-autistic matched participants, as predicted by the interpersonal theory. Participants with 
autism, in relation to control participants, a) had more difficulties in role-taking aspects of stories 
that were told from the point of view of a story character; b) used ‘atypical’ deictic terms when 
referring to a location distant from them; c) had more difficulties in understanding non-verbal 
deictic expressions; d) used fewer shakes and nods of the head when another person was talking 
to them, a pattern that was also found in the interviewer’s head shakes and nods when the 
participants with autism were talking to him; and c) were less affectively engaged with another 
person and showed more strained dialogues and odd non-verbal expressions, when conversing 
with another person.
To begin with, I shall focus on those results that are not in keeping with the ‘interpersonal theory’ 
hypothesis. I shall deal with each of the above sets of findings in more detail.
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Individuals with autism were found to reach some degree of role-taking when adopting the 
perspective o f  a story character, when using and responding to deictic expressions, and when 
using certain interpersonal non-verbal expressions when conversing with another person.
What these results suggest is that individuals with autism have some role-taking ability that they 
can use in some situations. It is perhaps important to note that in the case of the story-telling task 
and the deictic tasks, the situations presented were highly structured, and this may have rendered 
the tests more manageable for the children with autism, than natural social situations. The role- 
taking abilities of the children might well be less adequate in other contexts, such as when they 
need to adopt the perspective of another person in natural social exchanges.
The question now is how children with autism come to achieve some level of role-taking. There 
are two sets of issues here. One is whether there are forms of role-taking that do not rely upon 
the kinds of interpersonal factors, in particular the process of identification, that are important in 
the most ‘social’ forms of perspective-taking. Thus, the children’s ability to perform relatively 
well in the tests of understanding deixis, might arise on the basis of whatever social-perceptual 
mechanisms are intact in autism (such as the reading of people’s intentions, or whatever 
processes underlie their abilities to make requests and to recognise visuo-spatial perspectives) and 
not require attunement to the attitudes of others.
The second issue is whether, even in the more socio-emotional aspects of interpersonal 
engagement, children w ith a utism h ave a t otal o r o nly a r elative d isability. 11 i s a feature o f  
clinical experience that whereas a child with autism can at times appear totally unconnected with 
the feelings and attitudes of someone else, at other times the child appears to be at least somewhat 
sensitive to the other person’s mental state. Therefore, even if it is the case that children with 
autism have a lesser propensity to identify with the attitudes of others, this may be a limitation
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rather than a complete absence, and may not be so severe as to completely undermine basic role- 
taking abilities.
Next, I shall focus on those results that are in keeping with the ‘interpersonal theory’ hypothesis.
Some of the results presented in this thesis, suggest that individuals with autism might have 
specific difficulties in those aspects of conceptual role-taking that might be more dependent on 
interpersonal factors, in relation to other aspects that might be more dependent on the general 
cognitive ability of the child. For example, the narrative role-taking task revealed aspects of 
perspective-taking that are concerned with the children’s understanding of other people’s 
perspectives and viewpoints, and with the flexibility to understand that the same situation can be 
perceived differently by different people, despite relatively high verbal abilities (as established 
through matching) and proficiency in giving descriptions in terms of thought and feelings.
In addition, tentative findings suggest that verbal mental age might be unrelated to role-taking 
ability in individuals with autism, whereas the two appear to be associated in non-autistic 
participants. This result is in keeping with the suggestion that individuals with autism might use 
different routes than non-autistic participants to achieve some role-taking understanding, and/or 
to using language. Thus, whereas in non-autistic children, language ability might be strongly 
related to role-taking aspects of interpersonal understanding, in children with autism, language 
ability might be linked with other, less interpersonal, capacities.
There is some evidence to support this suggestion, which comes from the studies that examined 
deictic understanding in individuals with autism.
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Individuals with autism were found to have differences in the use of the terms ‘here’ and ‘this’, 
perhaps reflecting a lack of contrast between the terms used to locate things close to the speaker 
but not far away from the speaker. This result might suggest that individuals with autism do not 
anchor in the point of view of the speaker, whose ‘here’ and ‘this’ are the other person’s ‘there’ 
and ‘that’.
Another finding that is in keeping with the interpersonal theory, is that individuals with autism 
have limited understanding of non-verbal deictic expressions, like a head nod used to locate an 
object. This finding suggests that individuals with autism have difficulties at this level of non­
verbal (rather than verbal) communication. This is compatible with the view that individuals with 
autism might have difficulties in understanding these expressions because they fail to move to the 
subjective perspective of other people and understand the attitudes of this person in relation to the 
deictic gesture expressed.
What gives additional force to the interpersonal account, is that this predicted that there might be 
aspects of impaired non-inferential role-taking in individuals with autism, that might not only be 
reflected in the ways in which they use these expressions with other people, but also in the ways 
in which other people use these expressions when interacting with them. As predicted, when 
conversing with a child with autism in the context of an interview, an interviewer appeared to use 
fewer shakes and nods of the head when the child with autism was talking, as opposed to when 
the interviewer was talking.
The notion that identification is a process of moving to the subjective experience of the other, and 
responding according to this experience, explains the lack of shakes and nods of the interviewer 
when the child with autism was talking. What might been happening here, is that the interviewer
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was not identifying with the participants with autism because he fe lt the lack of identification of 
the child with autism with him.
The same pattern was found in the participants with autism, in that they used fewer interpersonal 
expressions when the interviewer was talking, as opposed to when they were the ones talking. In 
particular, they used fewer shakes and nods of the head. However, as seen before, they appeared 
to use other non-verbal gestures when the other person was speaking, like looks or smiles. 
Obviously, it might be possible to interpret this finding as providing evidence for or against the 
interpersonal theory. However, the use of novel subjective measures revealed that even though 
individuals with autism appeared to use looks, smiles, and shakes and nods (at least when they 
were talking) when conversing with another person, they seemed to be less affectively engaged 
with the interviewer, and showed more strained dialogues, than language matched non-autistic 
individuals. These results suggest that there might be subjective processes of interpersonal 
engagement underlying conversations that cannot be reduced to the use of specific behavioural 
expressions. They also suggest that individuals with autism have limitations in using non-verbal 
expressions when they are required, but fail, to identify with the person who speaks.
Therefore, and to conclude at this point, the present thesis has provided evidence to support, and 
at the same time to qualify, the view of the interpersonal theory that individuals with autism have 
specific impairment in their ability to identify with others, that is to say, in their ability to 
perceive and respond to  the subjective experiences of others. The evidence also suggests that 
individuals with autism can achieve some degree of role-taking by using alternative routes based, 
perhaps, on intact cognitive and social capacities. Such capacities might be particularly important 
for achieving deictic understanding in individuals with autism.
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7.3.2- The theory of mind theory
To begin with, I shall focus on those results that are not in keeping with the ‘theory of mind’ 
hypothesis.
It is not clear how the theory of mind perspective would explain the finding that individuals with 
autism can achieve some level of role-taking. It is possible that individuals with autism might have 
different degrees of impairment in theory of mind. In this way, there may be individual differences 
among persons with autism in their capacity to understand what other people believe or know, and 
therefore some aspects of role-taking ability might be intact in some of these individuals.
However, the participants with autism were found to have limitations in role-taking aspects of stories 
that they produced from the point of view of a character. This result cannot be explained by an 
impairment in understanding mental state terms per se, since the participants with autism used mental 
state terms similar to those used by language matched non-autistic participants. However, this study 
only examined productivity and not comprehension of mental state terms, and it is plausible that these 
participants might show some limitations in their understanding of mental state terms in other 
situations. Such limitations might explain why individuals with autism were found to have more 
difficulties in those aspects of the task that were related to perspective-taking ability, and not to other 
capacities that may not rely on an understanding of a theory of mind, like the co-ordination of the 
story content.
Difficulties in understanding the mental states of another person cannot explain why individuals 
with autism showed low affective engagement with the interviewer, and had strained dialogues. 
These subjective measures revealed striking limitations in individuals with autism in aspects of
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interpersonal engagement, even though these children used smiles, looks, and, shakes and nods of 
the head when conversing with another person.
In addition, the lack of head shakes and nods found in the interviewer when the participants with 
autism were talking, cannot be explained by an impairment in understanding mental states. 
According to  this theory, the interviewer would be expected to reinforce the participants with 
autism when they were talking, as much as to the non-autistic participants, but this was not the 
case. This result suggests that there might be interpersonal processes underlying conversations 
that cannot be reduced to understanding the mental perspective of another person.
To summarize, from the theory of mind theory point of view, a lack of an understanding of a 
theory of mind in others does not seem to explain some of the results of these studies, like for 
example, a) the difficulties of individuals with autism in achieving a certain level of role-taking 
when telling stories from the point of view of a character, even though the p articipants u sed 
mental state terms as much as the control participants; b) the lack of head shakes and nods by a 
person who was listening to a child with autism, as opposed to when the that person was talking; 
and c) the lack of subjective aspects of interpersonal engagement between participants with 
autism and another person, even though individuals with autism used non-verbal expressions.
Next, I shall focus on those results that are in keeping with the ‘theory of mind’ hypothesis.
Individuals with autism were found to be proficient in their use and understanding of verbal 
deictic expressions. One possible, and tentative, explanation, is that deictic understanding might 
not be impaired in individuals with autism, because its development might not require 
understanding the mental states of other people. This explanation, however, does not explain the 
whole picture since, as reported, subtle limitations in deixis were found in these individuals.
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Thus, another explanation could be that deictic understanding depends only to some extent on the 
theory of mind ability of the child. This could explain the subtle limitations found in the 
participants with autism in some aspects of deixis.
For example, individuals with autism were found to show ‘atypical’ use of the deictic terms that 
refer to  a far location, as opposed to the ones that refer to a location close to the child. One 
possible interpretation of this result is that in order to understand that the terms ‘this’ and ‘here’ 
only refer to a location close to the speaker, one needs to see how other people use these terms 
before using them correctly. An understanding of the psychological perspective of other people, 
might be an important factor in understanding how other people use these terms. Thus, a child 
with autism might see other people using the terms ‘this’ and ‘here’ to refer to things that are 
close to them but far away from the child with autism, and therefore when the child refers to 
objects that are distant, he/she might use these terms too. The question is whether this 
interpretation is plausible.
Another finding that may provide some support for the theory of mind theory, is that individuals 
with autism were found to have difficulties in understanding non-verbal deictic expressions. One 
possible interpretation of this result is that individuals with autism have difficulties in 
understanding the intentions of other people when they use non-verbal deictic gestures to refer to 
a location. Thus, it is possible that a subjective understanding of the attitudes and feelings of other 
people, is not necessary to understand non-verbal deictic gestures, whereas a conceptual 
understanding of what another person is intending when using these expressions might be. Thus, 
conceptual limitations in understanding the minds of other people might also explain this finding.
A similar explanation could apply to the finding that individuals with autism use fewer 
interpersonal gestures, in particular shakes and nods of the head, when another person is talking,
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as opposed to when they are talking. It is possible that individuals with autism used fewer 
interpersonal non-verbal expressions in this situation because of a lack of understanding of what 
the interviewer was thinking. From this perspective, shakes and nods of the head might be 
understood as expressions that are used to reinforce the conversational partner, and to let the other 
person know we understand what he/she is saying. However, this suggestion does not explain 
why the same pattern was found in the interviewer, whose theory of mind ability was expected to 
be intact.
Therefore, a lack of an understanding of a theory of mind in other people does not seem to explain 
those subjective aspects of interpersonal engagement that were found to be limited in individuals with 
autism.
7.4 Implications of the research findings
The interpersonal theory suggests that individuals with autism are impaired in  their ability to  
move into the subjective perspectives of other people through feelings and attitudes. This theory
asserts that an impairment in the process of identification -  one of the processes involved in non-
inferential role-taking -  would lead to limited conceptual role-taking. This thesis examined
aspects o f  conceptual and non-inferential role-taking in  individuals with autism that might be 
impaired.
Chapter 3 reported a study that was designed to examine aspects of conceptual role-taking in 
individuals with autism, in particular, the ability to take the role of another person. This study 
introduced a method of research never used before with individuals with autism, where they were
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asked to tell stories from the point of view of different characters. The results of this study 
suggest that individuals with autism can achieve some degree of understanding of the roles and 
perspectives of story characters. However, they seem to be less consistent in applying the role- 
taking ability they have.
This study supports the suggestion that individuals with autism have limitations in moving 
flexibly across different viewpoints. It also confirms previous findings that when individuals with 
autism are well matched with non-autistic individuals according to language ability they seem to 
use similar mental state terms.
Therefore, this study has provided new evidence to suggest that individuals with autism are 
perhaps more proficient in understanding different perspectives in other people than research and 
theory have previously suggested. It appears that individuals with autism have some role-taking 
ability t hat t hey c an u se i n s ome s ituations. H owever, t hey s eem t o b e more limited and less 
flexible in using this ability than non-autistic individuals.
Chapters 4 and 5 examined the use and understanding of deictic expressions in individuals with 
autism. There are very few studies that have examined whether or not individuals with autism use 
and understand these expressions. The majority of these studies have focused on the 
understanding of individuals with autism of personal deictic expressions (Jordan, 1989; Tager- 
Flusberg, 1989; Lee et a l 1994). Although these studies report some limitations in the use of 
personal pronouns in individuals with autism, they reveal that they might have fewer difficulties 
in the use and understanding of these terms than has been previously reported. However, they 
also suggest that structured and organized contexts, like the context created in a scientific 
experiment, could be obscuring difficulties that they might have in more naturalistic contexts.
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In relation to the use and understanding of non-verbal deictic gestures, such as pointing, research 
in this area suggests that individuals with autism have specific difficulties in using and 
responding to gestures that are used to share events, as opposed to making requests (Baron-Cohen 
1989, Baron-Cohen et a l 1992; Baron-Cohen et a l 1996; Wimpory et al.2000). However, 
responding to some of these deictic gestures, like gaze and pointing, has been found to be related 
to verbal mental age in individuals with autism (Leekam and Hunnisett, 1998; DiLavore and 
Lord, 1995; Mundy et al, 1994), suggesting that there are aspects of the language of individuals 
with autism are associated with these abilities. However, first hand reports obtained from parents, 
suggest that even those children who appear to be proficient in following the point and the gaze 
of another person in laboratory situations, have difficulties in natural contexts. Therefore, the 
picture of deixis in individuals with autism is unclear.
The studies reported in this thesis (in chapters 4 and 5) provided new evidence concerning one 
area of research never examined before in individuals with autism: the production and 
comprehension of locative deictic expressions, such as the verbal terms, ‘here-there’, ‘this-that’, 
‘bring-take’ and ‘come-go’, and the non-verbal expressions of a point, or a nod of the head to 
express these concepts.
The results of this study provide new evidence to suggest that individuals with autism might be 
proficient in their use of these verbal and non-verbal deictic expressions. These results also 
suggest that although individuals with autism might be proficient in their understanding of verbal 
deictic terms, they might, at the same time, have limitations in understanding non-verbal deictic 
expressions. However, as in other studies, the tasks included in these experiments were structured 
and it is a possibility that these individuals show more marked difficulties in understanding these 
deictic expressions when in more natural and flexible contexts.
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Finally, chapter 6 examined the use and understanding of non-verbal interpersonal expressions in 
individuals with autism. This study was based on two previous studies, which had examined 
aspects of non-verbal communication in individuals with autism when conversing with another 
person (Tantam, Holmes & Cordess, 1993; Capps, Kehres, & Sigman, 1999). These studies 
suggest that individuals with autism use fewer interpersonal expressions, like looks to the other 
person or shakes and nods of the head, when their conversational partner is talking, but not when 
they are talking.
The results of this study confirmed the suggestion that individuals with autism use interpersonal 
non-verbal expressions in conversations with other people. However, they seem to use fewer 
interpersonal expressions when another person is talking, as opposed to when they are talking. In 
addition, the results of this study suggest that there might be aspects of impaired non-inferential 
role-taking in individuals with autism, that are not only reflected in the ways in which they use 
these expressions with other people, but also in the ways in which other people use these 
expressions when interacting with them. Moreover, this study used novel and promising measures 
to examine subjective aspects of interpersonal engagement, revealing possible impairments 
among individuals with autism in the more subjective processes of interpersonal engagement 
underlying conversations.
To conclude, the studies reported in this thesis have provided new and suggestive evidence about 
strengths and limitations that individuals with autism might have in both conceptual and non- 
inferential role-taking.
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7.5 Limitations of the studies and future investigations.
Three studies on narrative role-taking, deixis and non-verbal interpersonal communication were 
included in this thesis. Although these studies were carefully designed to examine aspects of role- 
taking in individuals with autism, they have some limitations.
The first aspect to be considered, is the procedure used for diagnosing the participants with 
autism included in these studies. One difficulty when diagnosing autism, is the wide variety of 
clinical features that might appear in these individuals. In addition, the quality of these features 
also varies considerably. For example, “lack of social or emotional reciprocity” (an item included 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-IV, 1994; See Appendix 1) 
can vary in degree, and even some children who show this disorder may display social and 
emotional reciprocity in different situations.
All the participants with autism included in the studies of this thesis fulfilled diagnostic criteria 
for autism according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, (DSM-IV, 
1994) and the Childhood Autism Rating Scale of Schopler, Reichler, & Renner (CARS, 1988; 
See Appendix 2). Although these measures are widely used, there are other observational 
measures that researchers and clinicians use to diagnose autism in a more systematic and in depth 
way (e.g. the ADOS). Also, the participants in the present set of studies were primarily 
functioning in the delayed range of cognitive ability. Therefore the children included in these 
samples might differ from the children with autism included in other research studies.
In addition, the participants with autism were group-matched with non-autistic participants 
according to chronological age and language ability, derived from the participants’ performance
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on the British Picture Vocabulary scale (BPVS: Dunn, Dunn and Whetton, 1982). This type of 
matching increases the likelihood that group differences are indeed autism-specific (Hobson, 
1991), for the reason that individuals with autism perform better on non-verbal than verbal tasks. 
Although the British Picture Vocabulary Scale is a test of single word comprehension, it has been 
reported to be highly and reliably associated with scores on the verbal sub-tests of the Wechsler 
Scales of Intelligence (Bartak et a l 1975; Lockyer and Rutter, 1970). Although it does not 
provide a comprehensive measure of all aspects of linguistic understanding, it has proven useful 
in a number of studies for establishing matched groups of participants with and without autism. It 
seemed, therefore, an appropriate matching procedure for the purpose of this thesis.
One of the limitations when matching according to performance on the BPVS, is that the 
individuals with autism are likely to perform better than non-autistic individuals on non-verbal 
tests (Hobson et a l 1988a), such as the Raven’s matrices test. Thus, by selecting this type of 
matching one takes a conservative approach with regard to non-verbal ability, in that the 
participants with autism might have had superior non-verbal abilities relative to their matched 
control participants.
This type of matching was appropriate in the studies of narrative role-taking and deixis. Both 
studies included verbal tasks, where it was important to establish that the two groups of 
participants were well matched according to their linguistic ability. In spite of this matching 
procedure, differences between the two groups were expected in linguistic aspects of the 
participants’ performance, for the reason that these aspects were predicted to be specifically 
impaired in autism. However, one task of the deixis study examined non-verbal aspects of deixis. 
Even though the participants with autism might have had superior non-verbal abilities than the 
control participants, the participants with autism nevertheless performed poorly on this task in 
comparison to controls, suggesting that the matching according to verbal ability was appropriate.
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The last study was different from the other two studies in that it examined non-verbal expressions 
in these children. In spite of this, it was decided to match according to language ability because of 
the nature of the task, an interview where the participants were asked questions and had to talk 
about themselves. In this way, matching according to non-verbal abilities would have resulted in 
a control group with higher linguistic skills, and therefore any differences in non-verbal aspects 
of the task could have been due to differences in their verbal responses across the interview, and 
not due to specificity of autism. In spite of the verbal matching, results showed that the two 
groups o f  p articipants of this study were significantly different in the use of some non-verbal 
expressions.
It would be advantageous if future research in this domain might include a further control group 
of typically developing children, matched with the two atypically groups according to verbal 
mental age. There are two specific benefits that come from such an approach. Firstly, certain of 
the present tasks, and specifically the tests o f  understanding and producing deictic terms, are 
novel. Therefore, by administering the tests with typically developing young children, and 
relating the results to other evidence of the children’s abilities, one can assess how effective the 
experimental arrangements are in assessing the abilities in question. Secondly, the results would 
shed light on group contrasts between typically developing and mentally retarded participants, 
and this would give indication not only of the effects of mental retardation on task performance, 
but also clarify further the specific contribution of the diagnosis of autism.
However, it was decided not to pursue this approach in the present study, for three reasons. 
Firstly, our principal concern was to focus on the contrast between the group with mental 
retardation and the group with autism, since it is this comparison that yields specific evidence of 
the contribution of autism per se, given that our participants all suffered from mental retardation 
in some degree. Secondly, the typical children would have been much younger, and this would
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have introduced additional influences on their performance such as shyness and distractibility, 
which might have obscured the comparisons with other groups. For example, in the non-verbal 
communication study, young children might have become very self-conscious in talking with an 
adult stranger about themselves, and this could easily affect their non-verbal communication. 
Thirdly, there was a time constraint, given the substantial numbers of tasks administered.
It is also important to note that one additional limitation of these studies is the small samples 
used. Although studies with appropriately matched participants and carefully designed tasks can 
show group differences when they are clearly present, it is also the case that statistical power to 
show group differences, especially when the effect size is small, is limited by small sample size. 
Therefore, there is the likelihood of showing no group differences, when they are, indeed, 
present. For example, Experiment 3 of the deixis study, revealed group differences in 
understanding non-verbal deictic terms, but not in understanding verbal deictic expressions. 
However, the distribution of the participants with autism in the verbal deictic task showed an 
‘almost significant’ difference, that might have become significant with a bigger sample. More 
research is needed to examine the areas of research chosen for this thesis with bigger samples.
Further, the results of these tasks need to be considered cautiously, for the reason that the 
participants of the selected samples might not be representative of the whole autistic spectrum. 
Also, the control participants had mental retardation, and may not represent how well typically 
developing children would perform.
Another limitation of these studies concerns the design of appropriate control and index tasks that 
measure the specific abilities examined in these children. The first thing to consider is that the 
measures used in the studies were reliable. All the measures were rated by two independent raters 
(at least one of whom was blind to diagnosis of the participants and hypothesis of the studies) and
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were found reliable. However, the study of non-verbal communication selected only one minute 
of the interview, out of the total three minutes, to be rated for reliabilities, and although the 
measure were found reliable one needs to consider the possibility of getting lower reliabilities if 
the three minutes of the interview had been selected.
The task included in the narrative role-taking study was a semi-structured task in which the 
stories that the participants produced were the focus of study. Some aspects of the participants’ 
stories were considered measures of conceptual role-taking. In this way, perspective-taking was 
measured by examining aspects of what the participants said in relation to the role and/or the 
perspective of one story character. To establish that any difference between the two groups of 
participants in the latter measure was due to specific difficulties encountered by participants with 
autism in role-taking, and not due to other task demands, a control ‘measure’ was selected. Co­
ordination of story content was considered to be an ability that is cognitively based, and which 
was not expected to  be impaired in  individuals with autism. The specificity of impairment in 
aspects of conceptual role-taking of this task was confirmed with the participants with autism 
performing significantly less well on perspective taking than the control participants, but equally 
well on co-ordination of story content.
However, more studies are needed to examine the possible limitations that individuals with 
autism might have when adopting the role of another person, as opposed to a story character. 
Thus, it might be possible to establish whether there might be other difficulties in ‘pretend’ 
contexts. In addition, it would prove very useful to do another study where participants with 
autism take the role of a character, where a theory of mind task is also administered. In this case it 
would be possible to examine whether limitations in conceptual role-taking are related to limited 
understanding of mental state terms in individuals with autism.
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Next, I shall review the design of the tasks included in the experiments of the deixis study. To 
begin with, the majority of these tasks appeared to be measuring deictic use and understanding. 
Experiment 1 examined the production of both verbal and non-verbal deictic expressions. This 
task proved to be well designed in that it elicited the use of deictic expressions in the participants 
of this study. However, no control condition was included. A control condition would have 
proved useful if significant differences had been found between the two groups in the use of these 
expressions, in  order to  establish that their lack o f  use of these expressions was not due to a 
general difficulty in communicating other messages to other people. However, both groups of 
participant were found to be proficient in the use of these measures.
Some limitations were found with regard to Experiment 2 (which examined comprehension of the 
terms ‘come’ and ‘bring’), which did not include a control task. In this task, the participants were 
given only four opportunities to show comprehension of the deictic terms. In addition, the 
probability of responding by chance was one out of two on each trial. The majority of participants 
with autism responded correctly on three out of four trials, compared to the majority of control 
participants who responded correctly on all four trials. Thus, it is difficult to know whether the 
level achieved by the children with autism might be due to chance, given the probability of 
guessing correctly.
In spite of the above limitations, the majority of the experiments included in the deixis study 
appeared to have appropriate levels of difficulty, and control measures or conditions established 
that specific aspects of the tasks presented difficulties for the children with autism. However, 
more research is needed to examine whether individuals with autism use and understand deictic 
terms in other contexts, perhaps less structured than in these tasks. It would be very interesting to 
examine the use and understanding of deictic expression of individuals with autism in natural 
situations. Moreover, longitudinal studies in this area with young children with autism would
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allow one to examine how young children acquire deixis, and which social and interpersonal 
process are involved in deictic understanding. Further, if  indeed there are delays and/or 
alternative routes to the achievement of deictic understanding among persons with autism, 
longitudinal studies might reveal the specific nature of this potentially atypical developmental 
pathway. Longitudinal studies of deictic language development could potentially shed some light 
on the interpersonal processes involved in the usual route to the achievement of deixis, which 
may be impaired in individuals with autism.
The last study of this thesis examined three minutes of an interaction, between participants with 
and without autism during a conversation with another person. In this study, the control 
conditions were found in specific parts of the interactions, for example, significant differences 
were predicted, between the participants with autism and the control participants, in the use of 
some non-verbal expressions when the interviewer was talking, but not when he was listening. In 
this way, it was possible to establish that the results were not simply the reflection of a ‘nodding 
difficulty’, but were manifestations of a relational abnormality.
One limitation of this study is that the context of the interaction was an interview, from which a 
small sample of time (three minutes) was selected. Future studies should examine aspects of the 
use of non-verbal expressions in individuals with autism in other contexts. It is possible that a 
context more social and natural than an interview, like a meal or an informal chat with a friend or 
a relative, for instance, could reveal more striking abnormal use of non-verbal expressions in 
individuals with autism.
It would also be very revealing to further examine the relationship between behavioural and 
subjective measures. Moreover, the use of the subjective measures might prove in the future to be 
very useful to understand the meaning of behavioural expressions used by individuals with
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autism. For example, it would be very interesting to examine behavioural and subjective aspects 
of interpersonal engagement, in individuals with autism, when interacting with different people, 
for example a person who displays an engaging and social attitude, and a person whose attitude 
might be more neutral. In this case, the last interaction could be used as a control condition for 
possible effects of interpersonal processes, in the interactions of the participants (with and 
without autism) with the ‘engaging’ partner.
To conclude, the studies included in this thesis were effective in revealing group differences in 
relation to specific abilities that were expected to be impaired in individuals with autism. In 
addition, those tasks that found few group differences, like the tasks of the deixis study, reached 
neither ceiling nor floor effect, suggesting that individuals with autism might be proficient in the 
abilities examined in these tasks, albeit proficient in subtly different ways than control 
participants.
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7.6 Conclusion
This thesis examined aspects of both conceptual and non-inferential role-taking in individuals 
with autism, which might be limited or intact. In particular, it investigated aspects of role-taking 
through the examination of narrative role-taking, deixis and interpersonal non-verbal 
communication.
The underlying hypothesis of this thesis has been that basic non-inferential role-taking processes, 
related to the way we identify with the attitudes and feelings of other people, are relatively 
lacking in individuals with autism.
This thesis has provided evidence to suggest that individuals with autism have limitations in role- 
taking that are better explained by an impairment in interpersonal, and non-inferential, aspects of 
role-taking, than by an account that focuses upon cognitive/conceptual limitations. In particular, it 
has highlighted the possible explanatory role for an impairment in identification in autism, a 
process that has been suggested underlies interpersonal interactions, and which might play an 
important part in the ways in which people engage with each other through social connectedness.
Yet we need to recognise that certain degrees of role-taking can be achieved by individuals with 
autism. Intact social and cognitive capacities provide routes to guide individuals with autism to 
reach some, albeit relatively limited, sensitivity to, and understanding of, the subjective 
perspectives of others.
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Appendix 1. Diagnostic criteria for autistic disorder
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition. A.P.A. (1994)
1. A total of six (or more) items from A, B, and C, with at least two from A, and one each from B 
and C.
A. Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifest by at least two of the following:
i marked impairment in the use of multiple non-verbal behaviours such as eye-to- 
eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate social 
interaction
ii failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level
iii a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements with 
other people (e.g., by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of 
interest)
iv lack of social or emotional reciprocity
B. Qualitative impairments in communication, as manifest by at least one of the following:
i delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken language (not accompanied 
by an attempt to compensate through alternative modes such as gesture or mime)
i i  in individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment in the ability to initiate 
or sustain a conversation with others
iii stereotyped and repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic language
iv lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imitative play 
appropriate to developmental level
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C. Restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests, and activities, as manifest 
by at least one of the following:
i encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns 
of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus
ii apparently inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines or rituals
iii stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger flapping or
twisting, or complex whole-body movements)
iv persistent preoccupation with parts of objects
2. Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following areas, with onset prior to age 3 
years: (a) social interaction; (b) language as used in social communication; or (c) symbolic or 
imaginative play.
3. The disturbance i s not b etter accounted for by Rett's D isorder o r Childhood Disintegrative 
Disorder.
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Appendix 2. Childhood Autism Rating Scale
I. Relating to People
N o  evidence  OF d iffic ulty  OR a bn o r m a lity  in r ela ting  TO p e o pl e : The child 's behaviour is appropriate  fo r her/h is age. Some shyness, fussiness, or 
j  annoyance a t b e ing  told w hat to do m ay b e  observed, but not to any atypical degree.
1.5
M ildly  a b n o r m a l  r ela tio n sh ips: The child m ay avoid looking a t the adult in the eye, avoid  the adult or becom e fussy  i f  interaction is forced, be 
2  excessively shy, not be as responsive to the adult as is typical, o r  cling to parents som ew hat m ore than m ost children o f  the sam e age.
2.5
Mo d e r a tely  a bn o r m a l  r ela t io n sh ips: The child shows aloofness (seem s unaw are o f  adult) at tim es. Persisten t and forceful attem pts are necessary 
^  to get the child's attention at tim es. M inimal contact is initiated by  the child.
3.5
Severely  a b n o r m a l  r el a t io n sh ips : The child is consistently  a lo o f o r unaware o f  w hat the adult is doing. She/he alm ost never responds or initiates 
4  contact with the adult. Only the m ost persisten t attem pts to get the child's attention have any  e f fe c t
n. Imitation
App r o p r ia t e  im it a t io n : The child  can im itate sounds, words, and  m ovem ents w hich are appropriate  for her/h is skill level.
1
1.5
M ildly  a bn o r m a l  im it a t io n : The child  im itates sim ple behaviours such as clapping or single verbal sounds m ost o f  the time; occasionally, imitates
2  only a fte r prodding  or a fte r a delay.
2-5
Mo d e r a tely  a bn o r m a l  IMITATION: T he child imitates only p art o f  the time and requires a g reat deal o f  persistence and  help from  the adult;
3  frequently  im itates only afte r a delay.
3.5
4
Sev er ely  a bn o r m a l  im itatio n : The child rarely  o r never im itates sound, words, o r  m ovem ents even w ith prodd ing  and assistance from  the adult.
Ill Emotional Response
Ag e-a ppr o pria te  and  situ a tio n -a ppr o pria t e  em o tio n a l  r e s p o n s e s : The child  show s the appropriate  type and  degree o f  em otional response as 
2  indicated by a change in facial expression, posture, and  manner.
1.5
M ildly  a b n o r m a l  em o tio n a l  r es po n s e s : The child occasionally  displays a  som ew hat inappropriate type or degree o f  em otional reactions.
2  Reactions are som etim es unrelated to the objects o r events surrounding them.
2.5
M o d e r a tely  a bn o r m a l  em o tio n a l  r es p o n s e s : The child shows definite signs o f  inappropriate type and /o r degree o r em otional response. Reactions 
2  m ay be quite inhibited o r excessive and unrelated to the situation; m ay grim ace, laugh, o r  becom e rigid even though no apparent em otion-producing
objects o r  events are present.
3.5
Severely  a bn o r m a l  em o tio n a l  r es po n s e s : R esponses are se ld o m  appropriate  to die s itua tion ; o n c e  the c h i ld g e ts in  a certa in  m ood, i t i s  very 
^  d ifficult to change the m ood. Conversely, the child m ay show  wildly d ifferent em otions w hen noth ing  has changed.
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IV. Body Use
j  Ag e-a ppr o pria te  body  u s e : The child m oves with the sam e ease, agility, and co-ordination o f  a norm al child  o f  the sam e age.
1.5
M ildly a b n o r m a l  bod y  u se : Some m inor peculiarities m ay be present, such as c lum siness, repetitive m ovem ents, p o o r co-ordination, o r  the rare
7 appearance o f  m ore unusual m ovem ents.
2.5
M o d e r a tely  a b n o r m a l  bod y  u s e : B ehaviours that are c lea rly  s tran g e  o r  u n u su a l fo r a child  o f  this age m ay include strange finger m ovem ents, 
3  peculiar finger or body posturing, staring or picking at the body, self-directed aggression, rocking, spinning, fm ger w iggling, o r  toe-walking.
3.5
Severely  a bn o r m a l  bod y  u se : Intense o r frequent m ovem ents o f  the type listed above are signs o f  severely  abnorm al body use. These behaviours 
^  m ay persist despite attem pts to discourage them  o r involve the child in other activities.
V. Object Use
Appr o pr ia te  u se OF, a nd  in ter est  in, TOYS a nd  OTHER o b je c t s : The child shows norm al interest in toys and  o ther objects appropriate for his o r  her 
J  skill level and  uses these toys in an appropriate manner.
1.5
M ildly  in a ppr o pr ia te  in ter est  in , o r  u se OF TOYS a nd  o th e r  o b je c t s : The child  m ay show atypical in terest in a toy o r play with it in an
2  inappropriate childish way (e.g., banging o r  sucking on the toy).
2.5
Mo d er a tely  in a ppr o pr ia te  in ter est  in , o r  u se  o f to y s  a nd  o th e r  o b je c t s: T he child m ay  show  little in te rest in toys o r  o ther objects, o r m ay be
3  preoccupied with using an object o r  toy in som e strange way. He o r she m ay focus on  som e insignificant p art o f  a toy, becom e fascinated with light
reflecting o f f  the object, repetitively m ove som e p art o f  the object, o r p lay with one ob jec t exclusively.
3.5
Severe  in a ppr o pr ia te  in ter est  in , o r  u se  o f  t o y s  a nd  o th e r  o b je c t s : The child  m ay engage in the sam e behaviour as above, with greater
^  frequency and  intensity. The child is d ifficult to distract when engaged in these inappropriate activities.
VI. Adaptation to Change
Ag e  a ppr o pria t e  r espo n se  t o  c h a n g e : W hile the child m ay notice o r com m ent on changes in routine, he  or she accepts these changes w ithout undue 
j  distress.
1.5
M ild  a b n o r m a l  a d a pta tio n  t o  c h a n g e : W hen an adult tries to change tasks the child  m ay continue the sam e activity or use the same materials.
2
2.5
M o d er a te  a b n o r m a l  a d a pta tio n  TO c h a n g e : The ch ild  actively res is ts  changes in  ro u tin e , tries to continue the o ld  activity, a n d  is d ifficult to
3  d is trac t He o r she m ay becom e angry and unhappy when an established routine is altered.
3.5
Severely  a b n o r m a l  a da pta tio n  TO c h a n g e : T he child  shows severe reactions to change. I f  a change is forced , he o r  she m ay becom e extrem ely
4  angry o r uncooperative and respond with tantrums.
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VII. Visual Response
A ge a ppr o priate  v isual  r e spo n se : T he child's visual behaviour is norm al and  appropriate  for that age. Vision is used  together with other senses as a 
j  way to explore a new  object.
1.5
M ildly  a bn o r m a l  visua l  RESPONSE: T he child  m ust be occasionally  rem inded to look a t objects. The child  m ay be in terested  in looking a t m irrors or 
2  lighting than peers, m ay occasionally  stare o ff  into space, or m ay also avoid looking people  in the eye.
2.5
M o d er a tely  a bn o r m a l  v isua l  RESPONSE: The child  m ust be rem inded frequently  to look a t w hat he/she is doing. He o r she m ay stare into space,
^  avoid looking people  in the eye, look at objects from  an unusual angle, o r  hold objects very c lose to the eyes.
3.5
Severely  a b n o r m a l  visua l r es po n s e : The child consistently  avoids looking  a t  p eo p le  o r  certain  objects and  m ay  show  extrem e f  o n n s o f  o tlier 
^  visual peculiarities described  above.
VIII. Listening Response
Age a ppr o pria te  listenin g  r espo n se : The child's listening behaviour is norm al and  appropriate  for age. Listening is used  together with other senses.
1
1.5
M ildly  a b n o r m a l  listening  r es po n s e : T here m ay be some lack o f  response, o r m ild overreaction  to certain sounds. R esponses to sounds m ay be 
2  delayed, and  sounds m ay need  repetition to catch die child's attention. The child m ay b e  distracted  by  extraneous sounds.
2.5
M o d e r a tely  a bn o r m a l  listening  r es p o n s e : T h e  ch ild 's  response to sounds vary; o f te n  ignores a sound the f ir s t  f e w  tim es i t  is m ade; m ay be 
^  startled or cover ears when hearing som e everyday sounds.
3.5
Se v er ely  a b n o r m a l  listening  r es p o n s e : The child overreacts and/or undcrreacts to sounds to an ex trem ely  m arked  degree, regardless o f  the type o f  
4  sound.
IX. Taste, Smell, and Touch Response and Use
No r m a l  u se  o f , a nd  r espo n se  t o , t a st e , s m ell , a n d  t o u c h : The child  explores new  objects in an age appropriate m anner, generally by  feeling and 
j  looking. Taste  o r  smell m ay be used when appropriate. W hen reacting  to minor, everyday pain, die child  expresses d iscom fort bu t does no t o v e rreac t
1.5
M ildly  a b n o r m a l  u se  OF, a nd  r espo n se  t o , t a s t e , SMELL, a nd  TOUCH: The child  m ay persist in putting  ob jects in his o r  her mouth; m ay smell or 
2  taste inedible objects; m ay ignore or overreact to m ild pain diat a norm al child would express as discom fort.
2.5
M o d e r a tely  a bn o r m a l  u se o f , a nd  r espo n se  t o , t a s t e , sm e l l , a n d  to u c h : The ch ild  m ay be m oderately  p reoccup ied  widi touching, smelling, or 
^  tasting objects o r people. T he child m ay e id ter react too m uch o r too little.
3.5
Severely  a b n o r m a l  use  o f , a n d  r espo n se  t o , t a st e , sm e l l , a nd  t o u c h : The child  is p reoccupied  with sm elling, tasting, o r feeling objects m ore
for die sensation dian for norm al exploration o r use o f  the objects. The child m ay com pletely ignore pain o r  react very  strongly to slight d isco m fo rt
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X. Fear or Nervousness
N o rm a l  fear  o r  n er v o u s n e s s : The child's behaviour is appropriate to both the situation and  to his o r her age.
1
1.5
M ildly  a b n o rm a l  fea r  OR n e r v o u sn e ss : The child occasionally  show s too m uch o r too little fear o r nervousness com pared to the reaction o f  a 
2 norm al child o f  the sam e age in a sim ilar situation.
2-5
M o d er a tely  a b n o r m a l  fear  o r  NERVOUSNESS: The child shows either quite a b it m ore o r quite a b it less fear than is typical even for a younger child 
^  in a sim ilar situation.
3.5
Severely  a b n o r m a l  fear  OR n e r v o u sn e ss : Fears persist even after repeated  experience w ith harm less events o r  objects. It is extrem ely d ifficult to 
^  calm  o r com fort the child. The child m ay, conversely, fail to show  appropriate regard  fo r hazards w hich o ther children o f  the same age avoid.
XI. Verbal Communication
N o r m a l  v er b a l  c om m u n ic a t io n , a ge a nd  situ atio n  a ppr o pr ia t e .
1
1-5
M ildly  a b n o r m a l  v er b al  c o m m u n ic a t io n : Speech sh ows o  verall r  etardation. M ost speech  is m  eaningful; h ow ever, som e echolalia or p ronoun 
2 reversal m ay occur. Som e peculiar words o r jargon  m ay be used occasionally.
2 .5
M o d e r a tely  a b n o r m a l  v erbal  c om m u n ic a t io n : Speech m ay be absent. W hen p resen t, verbal com m unication m ay be a m ixture o f  some
j  m eaningful speech  and som e peculiar speech such as jargon , echolalia, o r  pronoun reversal. Peculiarities in m eaningful sp eech include e xcessive
questioning o r p reoccupation with particular topics.
3.5
Severely  a b n o r m a l  v er b a l  COMMUNICATION: M eaningful speech is not used. T he child  m ay m ake infantile squeals, w eird o r  animal-like sounds, 
^  com plex noises approxim ating speech, or m ay show  persistent, bizarre use o f  som e recognisable w ords o r  phrases.
XII. Non-verbal Communication
No rm a l  use o f  n o n -v er b al  c om m u n ic a t io n , a g e  a nd  situ atio n  a ppr o pr ia t e .
1
1.5
M ildly  a bn o r m a l  u se  OF n o n -v er b al  c o m m u n ic a t io n : Im m ature use o f  non-verbal com m unication; m ay only poin t vaguely, o r reach  for w hat he / 
2 she w ants, in situations w here sam e-age child m ay point or gesture m ore specifically  to indicate w hat he or she wants.
2-5
M o d e r a tely  A b no rm a l  USE o f n o n -v er b al  c o m m u n ic a t io n : The child is generally unable to express needs o r  desires non-verbally, and cannot
2 understand the non-verbal com m unication o f  others.
3.5
Se verely  a b n o r m a l  USE OF n o n -v er b a l  c om m u n ic a t io n : T he child only uses b izarre  o r  peculiar gestures w hich have no  apparent m eaning, and 
4  shows no aw areness o f  the m eanings associated  with the gestures o r facial expressions o f  others.
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XIII. Activity Level
1
No rm a l  a ctiv ity  lev el  for  a g e  a nd  c ir cu m sta n c e : T he child is neither m ore active o r less active than a norm al child  o f  the sam e age in a similar 
situation.
1.5
2
M ild ly  a b n o r m a l  a ctiv ity  l e v e l : The child m ay either be mildly restless o r  som ew hat "lazy" and  slow  m oving a t times. The child 's activity level 
in terferes only slightly with his o r  her perform ance.
2.5
3
M o d e r a t e ly  a bn o r m a l  ACTIVITY LEVEL: The child m ay be quite active and  difficu lt to restrain . He o r  she m ay have boundless energy  and  m ay not 
go to sleep readily a t night. Conversely, the child m ay be quite lethargic, and  n eed  a great deal o f  p rodding  to get him  o r her to m ove a b o u t
3.5
4
Se verely  a b n o r m a l  a ctiv ity  l e v e l : T he child exhibits extrem es o f  activity or inactivity and  m ay even shift from  one extrem e to the other.
XIV Level and Consistency of Intellectual Response
1
In te l l ig e n c e  is n o r m a l  a nd  r ea so n a b l y  c o n sisten t  a cross v a r io u s  a r e a s : The child  is as intelligent as typical children o f  the same age and 
does not have any unusual skills o r problem s.
1.5
2
M ildly  a b n o r m a l  in tellectu a l  FUNCTIONING: The child is not as sm art as typical children o f  the sam e age; skills appear fairly evenly retarded 
across all areas.
2.5
3
M o d e r a t e ly  a b n o r m a l  in tellectu a l  f u n c tio n in g : In general, the child is n o t as sm art as typical children o f  the sam e age; how ever, the child  may 
function nearly  norm ally in one o r m ore intellectual areas.
3.5
4
Sev er ely  a b n o r m a l  in tellectu a l  fu n c tio n in g ; W hile  th e  ch ild  generally i s  no t a s  sm a r t  a s  th e  typical ch ild  o f  the sam e  age, h e  o r  s h e  may 
function even better than the norm al child  o f  the same age in one o r more areas.
XV. General Impressions
1
N o  a u t is m : The child shows none o f  the sym ptom s characteristic o f  autism.
1.5
2
M ild  a u t is m : The child  shows only a few  sym ptoms or only a mild degree o f  autism .
2.5
3
M o d e r a t e  a u t is m : T he child shows a num ber o f  sym ptom s o r a m oderate degree o f  autism .
3.5
4
Se v er e  a u t ism : T he child shows m any sym ptom s o r an extrem e degree o f  autism.
Total Score = Key: 15 to 29 - Non-Autistic / 30 to 36 - Mildly-Moderately Autistic / 37 to 60 
- Severely Autistic
Schopler, E., Reichler, R.J. & Renner, B.R. (1988). The Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS). 
Los Angeles, CA: Western Psychological.
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Appendix 3. Rules for calculating mean length of utterance (MLU)
1. Start with the second page of the transcription unless that page involves a recitation of some 
kind. In this latter case start with the first recitation-free stretch. Count the first 100 
utterances satisfying the following rules. (A 50-utterance sample may be used for 
preliminary estimate.)
2. Only fully transcribed utterances are used; none with blanks. Portions of utterances, entered 
in parentheses to indicate doubtful transcription, are used.
3. Include all exact utterance repetitions (marked with a plus sign in records). Stuttering is 
marked as repeated efforts at a single word; count the word once in the most complete form 
produced. In the few cases where a word is produced for emphasis or the like (no, no, no) 
count each occurrence.
4. Do not count such fillers as mm or oh, but do count no, yeah, and hi.
5. All compound words (two or more free morphemes), proper names, and ritualised 
reduplications count as single words. Examples: birthday, rackety-boom, choo-choo, quack- 
quack, night-night, pocketbook, see saw. Justification is that no evidence that the constituent 
morphemes function as such for these children.
6. Count as one morpheme all irregular pasts of the verb (got, did, went, saw). Justification is 
that there is no evidence that the children relates these to present forms.
7. Count as one morpheme all diminutives (doggie, mommie) because these children at least 
do not seem to use the suffix productively. Diminutives are the standard forms used by the 
child.
8. Count as separate morphemes all auxiliaries (is, have, will, can, must, would). A Iso all 
cantenatives: gonna, wanna, hafta. These latter counted as single morphemes rather than as 
going to or want to because evidence is that they function so for the child. Count as separate 
morphemes all inflections, for example, possessives {s}, plural {s}, third person singular 
{s}, regular past {d}, progressive {ing}.
9. The range count follows the above rules but is always calculated for the total transcription 
rather than for 100 utterances.
Brown (1973; p. 54)
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Appendix 4. Inter-rater reliability coefficients
Interpretation of K appa Coefficient
Coefficient Strength of Agreement*
<0.00 Poor
0.00 - 0.20 Slight
0.21-0.40 Fair
0.41 - 0.60 Moderate
0.61 -0.80 Substantial
0.81 - 1.00 Almost Perfect
♦Landis and Koch (1977)
Interpretation of Intraclass Correlation Coefficient
Coefficient Strength of Agreement*
<0.40 Poor
0.40 - 0.59 Fair
0.60 - 0.74 Good
>0.74 Excelent
♦ Feiss (1981); Cicchetti and Sparrow (1981)
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